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Abstract 
Society is challenging systems engineers by demanding increasingly complex and 
integrated IT systems (Northrop et al., 2006; RAE, 2004) e.g. integrated 
enterprise resource planning systems, integrated healthcare systems and business 
critical services provisioned using cloud based resources. These types of IT 
system are often systems-of-systems (SoS). That is to say they are composed of 
multiple systems that are operated and managed by independent parties and are 
distributed across multiple organisational boundaries, geographies or legal 
jurisdictions (Maier, 1998). 
SoS are notorious for becoming problematic due to interconnected technical and 
social issues. Practitioners claim that they are ill equipped to deal with the socio-
technical challenges posed by system-of-systems. One of these challenges is to 
identify the socio-technical threats associated with building, operating and 
managing systems whose parts are distributed across organisational boundaries. 
Another is how-to troubleshoot these systems when they exhibit undesirable 
behaviour. 
This thesis aims to provide a modelling abstraction and an extensible technique 
that enables practitioners to identify socio-technical threats prior to 
implementation and troubleshoot SoS post-implementation. This thesis evaluates 
existing modelling abstractions for their suitability to represent SoS and suggests 
that an agent-responsibility based modelling abstraction may provide a practical 
and scalable way of representing SoS for socio-technical threat identification and 
troubleshooting. The practicality and scalability of the abstraction is explored 
through the use of case studies that motivate the extension of existing 
responsibility-based techniques so that new classes of system (coalitions-of-
systems) and new classes of threat (agent-related threats) may be analysed. 
This thesis concludes that the notion of ‘responsibility’ is a promising abstraction 
for representing and analysing systems that are composed of parts that are 
independently managed and maintained by agents spanning multiple 
organisational boundaries e.g. systems-of-systems, enterprise-scale systems. 
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1. Thesis Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
Society is challenging systems engineers by demanding increasingly complex and 
integrated IT systems (Northrop et al., 2006; RAE, 2004) e.g. integrated enterprise 
resource planning systems, integrated healthcare systems and business critical 
services provisioned using cloud based resources. These types of IT system are 
often systems-of-systems (SoS). That is to say they are composed of multiple 
systems that are operated and managed by independent parties and are distributed 
across multiple organisational boundaries or legal jurisdictions (Maier, 1998). 
SoS are notorious for becoming problematic due to interconnected technical and 
social issues. An exemplar is the NHS ‘Care Record Service’ - a failing attempt to 
integrate patient care records across NHS organisations in England. When the 
‘Care Record Service’ contracts were awarded in 2003/4 it was intended that a 
detailed and integrated patient care record system would be delivered to all NHS 
trusts and GP practices by 2010. In 2009 the project was 4-5 years behind 
schedule, Accenture and Fujitsu – two of the four suppliers - had pulled out due to 
their inability to deliver, and the other suppliers, BT and CSC, had to revise their 
deliver schedules having recognised that more customisation was required than 
originally envisaged to meet each individual NHS organisations’ needs 
(Committee, 2009; Health, 2011; NAO, 2011; Office, 2011). Analyses of this 
project suggest that it is suffering from socio-technical issues (Currie & Guah, 
2007). 
The above example suggests, and practitioners claim, that they are ill equipped to 
deal with the socio-technical challenges posed by system-of-systems. One of these 
challenges is to identify the socio-technical risks associated with building, 
operating and managing systems whose parts are distributed across organisational 
boundaries. Another is how-to troubleshoot these systems when they exhibit 
undesirable behaviour. 
This thesis aims to provide a modelling abstraction and an extensible technique 
that enables practitioners to identify socio-technical threats and troubleshoot SoS 
post-implementation. This thesis evaluates existing modelling abstractions for 
their suitability to represent SoS and suggests that agent-responsibility based 
modelling abstractions may provide a practical and scalable way of representing 
SoS for socio-technical threat identification and troubleshooting. The practicality 
and scalability of the abstraction is explored through the use of case studies that 
motivate the extension of existing responsibility-based techniques so that new 
classes of system (coalitions-of-systems) and new classes of threat (agent-related 
threats) may be analysed. 
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1.2 Academic Merit 
System-of-systems are worthy of academic study as many of the challenges these 
systems pose are relevant to the engineering of large-scale IT systems. This is 
especially the case today as we live in an era where: 
• commercial pressures are driving the acquisition of ever more 
interconnected and sophisticated systems; 
• the proliferation of technologies such as cloud computing create 
dependencies across multiple organisations with often differing commercial 
interests; 
• consortia build, operate and maintain systems whose ongoing 
dependability is reliant on a ‘coalition’ of partners fulfilling obligations. 
Perhaps the following five challenges are indicative of the academic and industrial 
significance of this research area: 
• ‘How do we identify and understand threats to the dependability of 
a SoS when it is dependent on the actions of multiple technical and non-
technical agents operating in multiple organisations, whom may have differing 
self-interests or reside in different jurisdictions?’ 
•  ‘What modelling abstractions are suitable for representing these 
situations in a meaningful way to key stakeholders?’ 
• ‘How do we take into account groups of human agent’s abilities to 
resist/conflict with organisational changes when assessing the risks of 
deploying and operating a particular socio-technical configuration of an IT 
system?’ 
• ‘What technical or non-technical structures can we put in place to 
facilitate the deployment and adoption of a large-scale IT system thus 
reducing risk?’ 
• ‘How do we investigate and troubleshoot a large-scale IT system 
when it may be influenced by interactions between technical and non-
technical elements, and where each stakeholder has a partial view of the 
situation?’ 
1.3 Problem Space 
This thesis is specifically concerned with modelling SoS in order to ameliorate 
troublesome behaviour (troubleshooting) or identify potentially troublesome 
behaviour prior to its occurrence (threat identification). 
When modelling a SoS, it is insufficient to simply represent its technical parts. 
Instead a SoS must be analysed as a socio-technical system. This is because to 
understand the structure and behaviour of a SoS, factors that affect the 
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cooperation of humans interacting across organisational boundaries must be 
understood. These factors are not just technical since there is a need to identify 
and analyse problems that can arise due to interactions between groups or 
organisations that hold different commercial interests and perhaps operate in 
accordance to different laws, norms or domain standards. 
Because of this need to understand interactions between socio-technical elements 
that span organisational boundaries, SoS may be seen as a difficult class of socio-
technical systems to model. This is because they tend to be challenging to describe 
and understand due to their under-specification and their low comprehensibility. 
SoS are under-specified because: 
• their specific operating conditions and exact configuration are too 
vast or ephemeral to completely specify (Hollnagel, 2008). 
• their parts and interactions change over time and thus 
creating/maintaining complete structural and behavioural descriptions is too 
costly/difficult (Hollnagel, 2008). 
• the number and nature of parts and interactions may be disputed, or 
no one person has a complete view of the system, and so multiple potentially 
inconsistent views of the system may exist. 
SoS have a low comprehensibility because: 
• interactions between system parts may be non-linear and emergent 
(Hollnagel, 2008) 
• no individual stakeholder has a complete view of the system and its 
operating conditions 
• stakeholders may need to make sense of a large number of parts, 
interactions and views to understand the system’s structure and behaviour. 
1.4 Solution Space 
Modelling abstractions can help address the challenges of understanding SoS. 
They can help by minimising the effort or cost of describing and analysing them. 
A key challenge is to create modelling abstractions that provide the level of 
understanding required whilst being economical with respect to the quantity of 
information that must be collected and kept up-to date. To achieve this, a strategy 
for eliciting and representing a minimal set of necessary and sufficient parts and 
interactions is required. 
In this thesis we are concerned with understanding the behaviour of SoS in order 
to ameliorate troublesome behaviour (troubleshoot) or identify potentially 
troublesome behaviour prior to its occurrence (risk / threat identification). To do 
this we develop a way of specifying what constitutes troublesome behaviour from 
each stakeholder’s perspective using the notion of responsibilities. We also 
develop a way of establishing the bounds of the behaviour of a system so that 
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claims can be made as to whether it is possible, or likely, that the SoS will act in a 
troublesome manner. To do this we postulate and test the hypothesis that a 
system’s structure (as represented by a responsibility model) constrains the kinds 
of behaviour a system exhibits. 
1.5 Thesis & General Approach  
This thesis argues that the notion of ‘responsibility’ provides a suitable 
abstraction for the socio-technical analysis of SoS. We argue that it facilitates the 
enquiry, representation and understanding of situations by teasing out potentially 
intricate dependencies between technical and non-technical agents, whilst 
providing a suitable language for representing and discussing obligations, 
liabilities and norms which are important for understanding socio-technical threats 
and troubleshooting SoS. Our argument is evidenced by means of qualitative case 
studies that illustrate how the responsibility abstraction was used, or extended, to 
facilitate the analysis of real world systems. 
A case study approach was selected, as the plausibility of this thesis’ findings are 
dependent upon the phenomena of study being representative of SoS. 
Representative situations can only be found in-situ due to their nature and 
therefore a case study approach was selected. A mainly qualitative approach was 
selected as this enabled the exploration of situations via means of interviews and 
informal dialogue. Interviews and informal dialogue were selected because they 
are particularly effective at understanding the richness of ‘messy’, intricate and 
subtle situations. 
1.6 Aim and Objectives 
The principal aim of this research was to develop a modelling abstraction and an 
extensible technique that enables SoS to be analysed for socio-technical threats 
and troubleshot post-implementation. The objectives of this research were to: 
1. investigate how responsibilities can be used for understanding socio-
technical situations; 
2. carry out case studies to investigate the practicality and scalability of 
the agent-responsibility modelling abstraction. 
For the purposes of this thesis, an abstraction is said to be practical if it can be 
used to troubleshoot problematic systems and if it can be used to identify 
troublesome interactions prior to their occurrence. In other words an abstraction is 
practical if it enables the identification of socio-technical interactions that 
contribute to troublesome behaviour or that threaten to cause troublesome 
behaviour. For the purposes of this thesis an abstraction is scalable if it can be 
used for the practical analysis of SoS with non-trivial numbers of stakeholders and 
interacting components. That is to say that an abstraction can be used to 
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troubleshoot and identify threats in systems that are composed of multiple systems 
that are operated and managed by independent parties and are distributed across 
organisational boundaries or legal jurisdictions. 
This thesis claims that the ‘responsibility’ abstraction is practical as it provides 
ways of troubleshooting problematic socio-technical situations as well as ways of 
identifying socio-technical threats. This is illustrated through case studies that 
show that responsibility modelling can be used to: 
• identify socio-technical interactions contributing to problematic 
system behaviour 
• identify threats to system behaviour due to coalition partners 
holding incompatible commercial interests and so reneging on responsibilities 
• identify threats to system deployment and operational effectiveness 
due to human agents’ interests conflicting with those of the system being 
deployed/ in operation. 
This thesis claims that the ‘responsibility’ abstraction may be scalable, as when 
combined with techniques from network analysis, situations with non-trivial 
numbers of elements may be analysable without an analyst having to manually 
inspect each and every interaction thus reducing the burden of human effort. This 
thesis demonstrates that metrics can be used to rank the importance of interactions 
and thus enable an analyst to understand a situation. This may therefore increase 
the scale of situation an analyst may analyse, or decrease the time required for an 
analyst to understand a situation. This use of metrics to rank elements is illustrated 
through a case study of a problematic enterprise document management system in 
a multinational systems engineering organisation. 
1.7 Novel Contributions 
This thesis provides four key contributions. Firstly, that the notion of 
responsibility provides a suitable abstraction for assessing the socio-technical 
dependability of coalitions-of-systems – that is to say, systems whose continuing 
operation are dependent upon a coalition of technical and organisational agents 
fulfilling obligations. This contribution is illustrated in chapter 5 via means of a 
cloud computing based case study and is also discussed in (Greenwood & 
Sommerville, 2011b). 
The second contribution is that the notion of ‘responsibility’ provides a suitable 
abstraction for identifying threats to system deployment and adoption situations 
where threats to human agents’ cooperative behaviour need to be taken into 
account. This contribution is illustrated in chapter 6 via means of a health sector 
case study and a cloud computing based case study. 
The third contribution is that the notion of ‘responsibility’ provides a suitable 
component for a framework for troubleshooting enterprise-scale systems. This 
contribution is illustrated in chapter 7 via means of a case study of a problematic 
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enterprise document management system in a multinational systems engineering 
organisation and is also discussed in (Greenwood & Sommerville, 2011a). 
The fourth contribution is that responsibilities form part of a potentially scalable 
abstraction when used with techniques from network analysis. This contribution is 
illustrated in chapter 8 via means of re-analysing the case study in chapter 7 to 
demonstrate that a problematic situation can be represented as a directed graph 
and that analytical techniques may be used as indicators of element ‘importance’ 
and ‘complexity’. These techniques aid an analyst by indicating elements that may 
be important in situations where the number of nodes and their interconnections is 
to too large for a human to be able to analyze in a timely manner. This research is 
also discussed in (Greenwood & Sommerville, 2011c). 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured so that chapter 2 reviews work related to system-of-
systems (SoS) and their socio-technical analysis. The reader is introduced to the 
notion of system-of-systems and the problems faced when attempting to model 
SoS, followed by a survey of modelling paradigms and techniques from systems 
engineering and related disciplines. The survey considers approaches from 
systems engineering including functional decomposition based approaches (such 
as IDEF0 and FRAM) and agent-based approaches (such as responsibility 
modelling, I* and Tropos). Approaches from information systems and operations 
research are surveyed including Cultural Historical Activity Theory, Actor 
Network Theory, Rich Pictures and Cognitive maps. 
Chapter 3 consists of a review of research methods suitable for the study of 
system-of-systems. It investigates the advantages and disadvantages of 
quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques, including surveys, 
interviews, participant observation, and data analysis approaches including 
multivariate statistics, network analysis and qualitative approaches such as 
grounded theory and hermeneutics. 
Chapter 4 argues the practical and theoretical value of using responsibilities as an 
abstraction for the purpose of threat identification and troubleshooting. It is 
argued that responsibilities facilitate the enquiry, representation and 
understanding of situations by teasing out potentially intricate dependencies 
between technical and non-technical agents, whilst providing a suitable language 
for representing and discussing obligations, liabilities and norms which are 
important for understanding socio-technical threats and troubleshooting SoS. 
Having established the practical and theoretical value of responsibility modelling, 
chapter 5 is concerned with extending responsibility modelling to enable the 
identification of socio-technical threats to the dependability of coalitions-of-
systems. Coalitions-of-systems (CoS) are a sub-class of SoS that have the 
additional property that their subsystems interact to further overlapping self-
interests rather than achieving an overarching mission/goal as in the case of 
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typical SoS. Assessing the socio-technical dependability of CoS is an open 
research question of societal importance as existing socio-technical dependability 
analysis techniques typically do not assess threats associated with coalition 
partners reneging on responsibilities or leaving a coalition. We use a cloud 
computing based case study to demonstrate that a responsibility modelling based 
threat identification approach enables the identification of these threats. We 
provide first evidence that inspecting the distribution of liabilities among coalition 
partners may indicate the fragility of overlapping self-interests. 
Chapter 6 is concerned with extending responsibility modelling to take into 
account threats to human agents’ cooperative behaviour. Current approaches to 
threat analysis view stakeholders from a mechanistic means-end perspective 
where human agents are assumed to be passive and compliant. In this chapter, we 
use insights from conflict theory in social psychology to take into account factors 
that make stakeholders conflict with change. We make the case that this class of 
threat is an important class of threat that is missing from responsibility analysis. 
We used a cloud computing based case study to demonstrate that the conflict 
based threat identification approach enables the identification of this class of 
threats. 
Chapter 7 is concerned with extending responsibility-based analysis to 
troubleshoot a problematic enterprise IT system. In this chapter we make the case 
that ethnographic and social analyses have not been widely assimilated into 
industry practice because they did not fit practitioner’s practices. In response to 
this, we developed a lightweight qualitative approach to provide insights to 
ameliorate problematic system deployments. Unlike typical ethnographies and 
social analyses of work activity that inform systems analysis and design; we argue 
that analysis of intentional and structural factors to inform system deployment and 
integration can have a shorter time duration and yet can provide actionable 
insights. We evaluate our approach using a case study of a problematic enterprise 
document management system within a multinational systems engineering 
organisation. Our findings are of academic and practical significance as our 
approach demonstrates that structural-intentional analysis scales to enable the 
timely analysis of enterprise system deployments. 
In chapter 8 we argue that techniques and tools for social network analysis can 
enable the analysis of problematic enterprise-scale socio-technical systems 
comprising large numbers of nodes. By means of reanalysing the case study in 
chapter 7, we demonstrate proof-of-concept tools for SoS scale network analysis 
and visualisation that may provide a promising avenue for identifying problematic 
elements and interactions amongst an overwhelming number of socio-technical 
elements. We demonstrate the potential of this approach by showing that: i) a 
problematic situation may be represented as a directed graph such that the 
elements in the situation are represented as nodes, and interactions between nodes 
as edges; ii) that eigenvector centrality may be used to rank the importance of 
elements in a situation and that highly ranked elements match those identified as 
important by a human analyst; iii) the ‘complexity’ of a situation, or a part of a 
situation, may be characterised using a feedback degree score which provides an 
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indication of the extent elements are highly interconnected and involved in 
feedback loops. These findings indicate that computers may be used to aid the 
analysis of SoS situations by highlighting elements, or groups of interacting 
elements, that are important to the overall outcome of a problematic situation. 
In chapter 9 we conclude that the notion of ‘responsibility’ is a promising 
abstraction for representing and analysing systems that are composed of parts that 
are independently managed and maintained by agents spanning multiple 
organisational boundaries e.g. systems-of-systems, coalitions of systems, 
enterprise-scale systems. We also set a future research agenda for the socio-
technical analysis of systems from an engineering perspective. 
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2. System-of-Systems and their Socio-Technical Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to research relevant to the 
socio-technical analysis of system-of-systems (SoS). The first section introduces 
the concept of a SoS and subsequent sections review the current state of socio-
technical modelling and analysis abstractions and their applicability to SoS. 
2.2 System-of-Systems 
The study of ‘system-of-systems’ (SoS) is in a relatively embryonic form and as 
such the research community has not agreed upon a common definition of a SoS. 
The definitions that do exist are often domain dependent but tend to capture 
overlapping notions (Gorod, Sauser, & Boardman, 2008; Jamshidi, 2008; Pyster, 
2011). That is to say, they capture the notion of two or more systems that are 
separately defined but operate together to fulfil a common goal (Checkland, 
1999). They also typically postulate key characteristics such as: operational 
independence of component systems; managerial independence of component 
systems; geographical distribution; emergent behaviour; and evolutionary 
development processes (Maier, 1998). Other definitions of SoS include that of 
(Jamshidi, 2008) whom after reviewing six definitions of SoS favoured “systems 
of systems are large-scale integrated systems which are heterogeneous and 
independently operable on their own, but are networked together for a common 
goal” (Jamshidi, 2008, p. 4). 
This thesis defines a SoS as a class of system that delivers services or capabilities 
via the integration of independently managed and controlled systems. This 
definition is strongly influenced by (Maier, 1998) and is in line with the System 
Engineering Body of Knowledge (Pyster, 2011).  
It is believed by the research community that SoS pose a set of distinct 
engineering challenges as the services or capabilities they provide cannot, by 
definition, be centrally managed because of their component systems’ operational 
and managerial independence. It is believed that this independence creates a 
distributed control problem that needs to be understood throughout a SoS 
lifecycle. This independence presents challenges with respect to systems 
architecture, modelling and simulation, policymaking and standards (Jamshidi, 
2008). 
One important subset of these challenges are socio-technical (Jamshidi, 2008; 
McCarter & White, 2008). Socio-technical challenges arise since SoS are 
typically distributed across multiple organisational boundaries, geographies, or 
legal jurisdictions and their components often consist of individuals and 
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organisational agents. An important aspect of this is to ensure components are not 
just integrated at a technical level but also at an organisational and legal level. 
Another important challenge is to ensure that the way components are integrated 
at the organisational and legal level does not inadvertently introduce risks that 
undermine functional or non-functional requirements. Another important 
challenge is how-to troubleshoot problems after system deployment. This is 
perceived to be particularly problematic since SoS are distributed across 
organisational boundaries and have independent management. 
At present research in the area of the socio-technical analysis of systems of 
systems is in a nascent state. Due to a scarcity of SoS specific research, this thesis 
reviews approaches for representing and analysing socio-technical systems that 
are not necessarily SoS specific but assesses their potential applicability to SoS. 
2.3 Paradigms for Representing and Analysing Socio-Technical Systems 
In systems engineering, systems are often represented as models (Dickerson & 
Mavris, 2009). Models are representations of real/abstract things that are created 
for a purpose and only represent the details necessary and sufficient for that 
purpose (Anderson, Sweeny, Williams, 2000). Schematic models, the type of 
models this thesis focuses on, are conceptual representations that use notation to 
represent the entity being modelled. 
Systems can often be usefully represented from multiple views. Four common 
views are: 
• Structural views - representing the parts of a situation and their 
logical relations e.g. associations, aggregations, generalizations.  
• Behavioural views - representing the parts of a situation and their 
causal interactions i.e. material or energy transfers or the transmission of data. 
• Requirements views - specifying desired and undesired structural 
and behavioural properties of a system e.g. the system should not have a 
distributed architecture (structural property), the system should have the 
capability to process 1 billion transactions per second (behavioural property). 
• Parametric views - specifying the critical engineering parameters of 
the system including those involved in evaluation of performance, reliability 
and physical characteristics. For instance, a performance characteristic of 
vehicle system may be F≥ma, where m is its mass, a is its acceleration and F 
may be the maximum force produced by its braking system. 
In choosing how-to model a system, practitioners select amongst modelling 
paradigms and abstractions. A modelling paradigm, in this context, consists of a 
set of simplifying assumptions that enable a system to be modelled. It has been 
suggested by (Melão & Pidd, 2000) that there are four basic modelling paradigms 
that may be used to model systems: 
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• the ‘machine metaphor’; 
• the ‘organic metaphor’; 
• the ‘feedback loop metaphor’; 
• and the ‘socio-technical metaphor’. 
These paradigms are explained in the following subsections. Abstractions will be 
discussed in section 4. 
2.3.1 Machine Metaphor 
The ‘machine metaphor’ treats a system as a deterministic1 machine with a static 
structure that transforms inputs into outputs for some purpose. The metaphor is 
primarily concerned with representing a situation in terms of its static structure 
and factors that enable and constrain the system’s components to produce required 
outputs. It is assumed that components interact in a linear2 manner and if any of 
the components are human beings they are treated as mechanisms that simply 
perform actions that contribute to converting inputs to outputs. Typical examples 
of modelling approaches that adopt the machine metaphor include data flow 
diagrams (Gane & Satson, 1979), IDEF0 models (NIST, 1993) and UML 
sequence, activity, state machine and use case models (Bennett, Skelton, & Lunn, 
2005). 
The machine metaphor has two significant limitations. The first limitation results 
from its treatment of human beings as mechanisms. As we know, human beings in 
the workplace do not simply perform actions that contribute to converting inputs 
to outputs. Human beings have basic needs and they seek to satisfy them in ways 
that do not contribute to converting inputs into outputs. For instance they may be 
satisfied through procrastination, developing relationships or being involved in 
organisational politics - so as to change the ‘system’ or resist undesirable changes 
to the ‘system’. The implication here is that the machine metaphor is unsuitable 
for analysing systems where human interests and politics need to be taken into 
account. 
The second limitation of the machine metaphor results from its assumption that 
the system is static and its interactions are linear. This makes the machine 
metaphor unsuitable for understanding the behaviour of systems where 
components interact through feedback or their structure changes dynamically. 
This means that the machine metaphor is unsuitable for understanding systems 
that have non-linear3 interactions between components or those that adapt 
                                                
1 The term deterministic indicates that there is no randomness in the future states of the system i.e. the system 
will always produce the same output for a given initial state. 
2 The term linear is used to denote that a system’s behaviour is not influenced by feedback loops i.e. the prior 
output of the system does not influence its future output. 
3 The term non-linear is used to indicate that a system’s behaviour is influenced by feedback loops i.e. the 
prior output of the system influences its future output.  
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structurally to internal dynamics or environmental changes. In response to these 
limitations three other paradigms have emerged that attempt to rectify these 
issues. These paradigms are the ‘organic metaphor’, which attempts to take into 
account adaptation to the environment, the ‘feedback loop metaphor’, which 
attempts to take into account non-linear interactions and the ‘socio-technical 
metaphor’, which attempts to take into account human/group needs and interests. 
2.3.2 Organic Metaphor 
The ‘organic metaphor’ extends the machine metaphor by treating a system as a 
deterministic machine that monitors and adapts to its environment in-order to 
survive. The organic metaphor adds to the machine metaphor by stating that the 
machine has a need for environmental resources or conditions to survive, and thus 
will reconfigure its structure, and thus behaviour, to best serve those needs. 
To model this behaviour the organic metaphor introduces the notion of a boundary 
to supplement the mechanistic notions of input, transformation and output. The 
notion of boundary is used to indicate what is within the system, and thus may be 
restructured, and what is outside, thus acting as an environmental stimulus. This 
enables the organic metaphor to cope with situations where the system adapts to 
external factors. This can be useful when attempting to understand the effect of an 
increase in the cost of resources to operate a system, the effect of a system’s 
output on its own operation, or the effect of multiple systems sharing the same 
environment. According to (Melão & Pidd, 2000) discrete event modelling and 
simulation approaches such as SIMAN (de Vreede & van Eijck, 1998) form this 
paradigm. For further details on discrete event simulation see (Allen, 2011; Altiok 
& Melamed, 2007). 
The limitations of the organic metaphor are that it does not recognise that the 
system may adapt due to internal factors (e.g. due to the humans’ socio-political 
actions) and that the interactions between parts may be non-linear e.g. that 
positive or negative feedback between components may occur. In order to cope 
with feedback dynamics the feedback loop metaphor is widely used. In order to 
cope with socio-political aspects a socio-technical metaphor is used. 
2.3.3 Feedback loop metaphor 
The ‘feedback loop metaphor’ (Forrester, 1958, 1971) treats a situation to be 
studied as a non-linear system. The system has a static structure that performs 
transformations and has a boundary from which inputs and resources are received, 
and outputs are deposited. The system is modelled as a flow of multiple inputs 
being transformed at various rates into various intermediate products until they 
are transformed into the system’s outputs. The non-linear interactions between 
parts may be understood by using mathematical models or simulations to derive 
an understanding of the flow of inputs, resources, intermediate products and the 
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output. Typical examples of modelling approaches that adopt this paradigm 
include causal loop and stocks & flows approaches – for further information see 
(Sterman, 2000). 
The limitations of the feedback loop metaphor are that it treats human aspects in a 
shallow manner as it views humans as input-output mechanisms to be controlled 
and to exercise control. This does not do justice to the fact that humans experience 
a richer socio-political existence, which is motivated by their individual and group 
interests. Another limitation of the feedback loop metaphor is that it assumes that 
the structure of a system is static. This means the metaphor is unsuitable for 
modelling complex adaptive systems however paradigms such as agent-based 
simulation may enable their study – for further information see (Epstein, 2007; 
Miller & Page, 2007). 
2.3.4 Socio-Technical Metaphor 
The socio-technical metaphor (Trist, 1981) contrasts with the previous paradigms 
by rejecting the notion of representing human beings as simple input-output 
mechanisms. The socio-technical metaphor recognises that human beings have 
needs and interests that may not be satisfied by simply contributing to the 
conversion of system inputs to outputs. The socio-technical metaphor encourages 
the analysis of these human needs so as to understand to what extent the system 
satisfies them. 
A variety of differing approaches exist for doing this. Some focus on a human 
beings’ fit with the tasks they are required to perform (Avison, Wood-Harper, 
Vidgen, & Wood, 1998; Mumford, 1995). Others focus on the fit between group 
level phenomena and the system (Checkland, 1999; Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006) -  
for instance the implications of a system on departmental power, politics and 
general working culture. 
The limitations of the socio-technical metaphor are that it assumes that sufficient 
information on human beings and the groups they form can be elicited, thus 
enabling useful analysis to be performed. In practice the gathering of information 
on humans, their thoughts and beliefs can be particularly challenging, especially 
at a large-scale. This will be discussed further in chapter 3, which focuses on data 
collection and analysis. 
2.4 Modelling Abstractions for representing Socio-Technical Systems 
There are a number of modelling abstractions (functional decomposition, agent-
oriented decomposition, object-oriented decomposition ...) that enable the 
decomposition of a system in differing ways. Since the aim of this thesis is to 
provide an abstraction to enable analysts to represent and analyse SoS for the 
purpose of socio-technical threat identification and troubleshooting, this chapter 
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largely restricts itself to abstractions that have been used for structural or 
behavioural modelling of socio-technical systems. 
2.4.1 Functional Decomposition 
Functional decomposition in its simplest form provides the notion of functions 
and functional relationships to decompose a situation into constituent parts (NIST, 
1993). A function is a representation of an “activity, process, or transformation … 
identified by a verb or verb phrase that describes what must be accomplished” 
(NIST, 1993, p. 4). Each function has inputs, produces some output and is 
typically mediated by some controls and mechanisms. A mechanism represents 
the means by which a transformation is made and a control represents something 
that guides the mechanism. For instance, when representing the activity of 
‘system design’ as a function, the mechanism would be a design engineer, the 
control would be design requirements, the input would be preliminary design data, 
and the output a detailed design.  
Sophisticated functional modelling abstractions have been developed to enable the 
representation of elaborate systems from multiple perspectives using concepts 
such as viewpoints and hierarchical diagrams so that increasingly detailed 
information may be hidden and revealed when required. Once such approach is 
IDEF0 (NIST, 1993). IDEF0 uses the concept of parent-child diagrams in 
combination with the notion of purposes, viewpoints and environmental context to 
deliver this capability. Using IDEF0, a system is initially represented as a single 
‘top-level’ function that receives inputs from and outputs to an explicitly 
described environmental context. A feature of the functional paradigm is that 
every function (including the ‘top-level’ function) can be further elaborated using 
child diagrams that represent the decomposition as a combination of 
interconnected sub-functions. This enables the decomposition to be performed 
numerous times until the level of detail obtained is judged to be sufficient for the 
purpose of the analysis. 
IDEF0 has been used for the analysis of socio-technical systems although it has 
been used in a mechanistic manner. For instance (Imran, Foping, Feehan, & 
Dokas, 2010) used IDEF0 to model a water treatment plant (WTP) and found the 
notions of controls and mechanisms to be useful ways of identifying social 
aspects. They used these notions to represent relevant legislation and standards, 
capital funding, and human resources. They also found that the hierarchical 
decomposition that IDEF0 offers encouraged the identification of factors at 
different hierarchical levels. 
Whilst (Imran et al., 2010) found IDEF0 to be useful, they noted its treatment of 
the social was limited because the approach did not allow for social factors to 
influence each other. They also noted that the IDEF notation is difficult for non-
domain experts to understand. Their use of IDEF0 can also be further criticised, as 
although they claim to adopt a socio-technical approach, they do not consider the 
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fit between human needs and tasks, nor between the technical input-output system 
and individual and departmental interests. 
IDEF0 has been used and extended by (Romero, Company, Agost, & Vila, 2008) 
to represent an inter-organisational collaborative design system between 
organisations as a socio-technical system. Their extension, IDEF0+, extended the 
representation of functions to emphasise human collaboration (coordination and 
cooperation) aspects. They found that by distinguishing coordination and 
cooperation ICOM’s (inputs, controls, outputs and mechanisms) from production 
ICOM’s made their interpretation of diagrams easier. Again this use of IDEF0 
was mechanistic, as non-linear interactions were not considered, nor was the fit 
between human needs and their activities, nor between the technical input-output 
system and individual/departmental interests 
A similar critique is provided of the use of IDEF0 by (Pons & Raine, 2005) to 
model system design as a socio-technical system. Although IDEF0 was found to 
be useful as it assisted in identifying constraints on the design process and the 
sources of those constraints. For instance customer values and resources, market 
pressure, shareholder needs and so on. It did not go on to analyse factors that 
affect the fit between humans and their tasks, nor factors such as departmental 
power and politics that may influence the design process.  
In a rare instance, IDEF0 has also been used to perform socio-technical analysis. 
It was used by (Waring & Wainwright, 2002) to model the interfaces between an 
NHS hospital’s departments and facilitate communication in a highly political 
landscape. The processes in departments were represented as functions along with 
the information and resource flows between departments. Through this form of 
process modelling they found that participants were able to identify where power 
and politics was preventing new working practices. This was achieved by 
observing which departments and parties were controlling certain aspects of 
processes. The revelation of who had control over what, and for what purpose, 
opened opportunities for negotiation amongst staff to find improved states of 
affairs. In this study IDEF0 was successfully used to promote communication and 
understanding between departments by using IDEF0 as “means of a common 
language”(Waring & Wainwright, 2002, p. 408). IDEF0 was successfully used to 
focus on agreements, develop a shared understanding of customary behaviour, and 
maintain and develop social relationships. 
IDEF0 suffers from a number of drawbacks that affect its suitability for modelling 
SoS situations. It is unclear whether IDEF0 can be used to model worker-task fit 
and also the politics or group processes present in a system. Waring & 
Wainwright (2002) demonstrated that IDEF0 models may be used to infer politics 
but they did not extend the notation to depict the politics within the IDEF0 
notation. It is possible that IDEF0 may facilitate the analysis of worker-task fit as 
other functional approaches support this e.g. FRAM (Hollnagel, 2004; Hollnagel 
& Goteman, 2004). It is possible that politics or group processes may also be 
represented as a source of control for a function or a function itself. Further 
research in this area would help clarify this issue. 
- 16 - 
Within the resilience engineering community, functional decomposition has been 
demonstrated to be a useful abstraction for analysing and representing socio-
technical systems. Functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 
2004; Hollnagel & Goteman, 2004), also known as functional resonance accident 
model, uses functional decomposition to describe how systems and environmental 
conditions can combine to produce desirable or problematic outcomes. FRAM 
uses a theory based on four principles to explain the success or failure of a system 
to transform its inputs into outputs (Hollnagel, Pruchnicki, Woltjer, & Etcher, 
2008). These principles are: 
• The principle of equivalence of successes and failures – the 
mechanisms of adaptation that enable a system to cope with complexity and 
thus be successful are also the mechanisms that enable a system to fail. 
• The principle of approximate adjustments – the conditions that 
system operates in never completely match the conditions that have been 
specified or prescribed, so individuals and organisations must adapt/adjust the 
system to succeed in the current conditions. 
• The principle of emergence – variability of normal performance is 
rarely sufficient to cause an accident or a malfunction. Typically, it is the 
variability of multiple functions that combine in unexpected ways. Both 
successful performance and failures are emergent as they cannot be attributed 
to individual parts acting on their own. 
• The principle of functional resonance – the variability of functions 
can resonate causing the variability of another to exceed its normal limits. The 
consequences of this can then ripple through a system and result in a failure. 
The FRAM approach is similar to IDEF0 in the sense that it has inputs, outputs, 
resources and controls. However FRAM differs as its functions have the explicit 
notion of temporal constraints. FRAM also differs from IDEF0 as it incorporates 
principles for understanding system behaviour. 
FRAM also prescribes a number of steps to undertake to complete an analysis:  
1. the essential system functions are identified;  
2. the variability of these functions is characterised; 
3. the analyst identifies situations where the variability of these functions 
may ‘resonate’ (i.e. become self-reinforcing or otherwise and exceed 
levels of variability tolerated by the system) resulting in undesirable 
outcomes; 
4. barriers to prevent undesirable variability are identified. 
FRAM provides a compelling approach for representing and analysing SoS as it 
has been demonstrated to be a practical technique for identifying socio-technical 
threats to complicated socio-technical systems. 
FRAM has been used to analyse automated air traffic management systems 
(Woltjer & Hollnagel, 2008), explain the cause of air crashes (Hollnagel et al., 
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2008) and also financial crashes (Sundström & Hollnagel, 2008). In these studies 
FRAM supported the analysis of the human-task fit so as to understand what 
circumstances would result in humans not successfully contributing the 
conversion of inputs into outputs. For instance in (Hollnagel et al., 2008), it was 
identified that the pilot’s and co-pilot’s information needs were not satisfied due 
to incorrect signs, their checklist contained only a single challenge response 
question, and the co-pilot was kept extremely busy prior to take-off such that he 
was too overloaded to double check the pilots runway selection. 
Whilst FRAM is useful, its analysis falls short of the socio-technical paradigm. 
Humans-task fit is only understood with respect to the successful conversion of 
inputs to outputs. FRAM analysis neglects the analysis of job satisfaction and also 
group level interactions such as politics. It therefore misses threats due to workers 
altering standard procedures in-order to make their work more satisfactory and 
ignores threats that may arise due to political manoeuvring. In short, FRAM’s 
treatment of humans as mere input-output mechanisms limits its usefulness to 
analysing socio-technical systems where it may be assumed all humans are 
satisfied by their work and that politics does not influence the system. 
FRAM suffers from a number of other drawbacks that affect its suitability for 
modelling SoS situations. Firstly, without modification the approach does not 
appear to be suited for representing situations where the transformations being 
performed are uncertain, disputed, problematic, or where different stakeholders 
have different views on the desirability of their outcome. This limitation may 
perhaps be overcome as IDEF0 enables the representation of differing views and 
so further research is required to establish whether or not an IDEF0 style approach 
could deliver this capability.  A second limitation is that it is unclear whether 
FRAM could be used, or extended, to model the effect of politics or group 
processes. Further research in this area would help resolve whether such social 
factors are representable using functional decomposition. Further research is also 
required to ascertain whether FRAM can scale up to the analysis of SoS 
situations. This suggests that further research in the use of computer-based 
analytics to analyse FRAM models could be a useful contribution. 
2.4.2 Agent Oriented Decomposition 
Agent orientation (E. Yu, 2002) is an abstraction for modelling systems in terms 
of building blocks that have characteristics such as intentionality, autonomy and 
sociality. It represents a shift away from representing systems are functions or 
objects towards representing systems in terms of building blocks of social 
significance. Two notable ways of approaching agent orientation are agent goal 
decomposition and agent responsibility decomposition. 
2.4.2.1 Agent-goal Decomposition 
Agent goal decomposition as used by I* (E. Yu, Giorgini, Maiden, & Mylopoulos, 
2011; E. Yu & Mylopoulos, 1994) provides the notion of actors, goals and 
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dependencies as abstractions to decompose situations into constituent parts. In this 
paradigm the structure of a situation is represented as a set of ‘intentional’ actors 
that depend on other actors to achieve a set of explicit goals and soft-goals. The 
term ‘intentional’ is used to claim that the actors being modelled have 
motivations, intentions and rationales that shape their actions (E. Yu et al., 2011).  
The agent goal decomposition approach as used in I* is primarily a form of 
structural modelling - although it enables the creation of more sophisticated 
models that relate behavioural and structural views. Simple I* models comprise 
actors interacting via four causal dependencies. 
The four causal dependencies consist of resource dependencies, task 
dependencies, goal dependencies and soft goal dependencies. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Strategic Dependency model for a meeting (E. S. K. Yu, 1997) 
A resource dependency illustrates that an actor’s behaviour is causally dependent 
on another to provide a physical/informational entity (e.g. a desk, a worksheet). 
For instance in Figure 2.1 we can see that the meeting scheduler is dependent 
upon the information resource of an agreement on the meeting date, and that the 
meeting participants are dependent on the meeting scheduler proposing dates for 
the meeting. 
A task dependency illustrates that an actor’s behaviour causally depends on 
another to carry out a specified activity. For instance, the meeting scheduler is 
dependent on meeting participants entering dates that they are available. In a goal 
dependency an actor’s behaviour is causally dependent on another to bring about a 
certain state in the world. For instance, in Figure 2.1 we can see the meeting 
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initiator’s goal of scheduling the meeting is dependent upon the meeting 
scheduler. 
A soft goal dependency is where an actor’s behaviour is causally dependent on 
another to perform some task that meets a soft goal. A soft goal requires context 
sensitive conditions to be met for the goal to be attained. For example the goal of 
“attending to patients needs promptly” is a soft goal since the manner in which the 
activity needs to be performed to meet the criteria is context specific as it may 
depend on the number of patients vs. staff, the seriousness of patients conditions, 
the experience of the staff and so on, such that it cannot be specified in a 
prescriptive manner. In Figure 2.1 we can see that the meeting initiator’s softgoal 
of being assured that an important participant attends the meeting is dependent 
upon the important participant. 
Agent goal decomposition has also been used to help reason about situations via 
the use of strategic rationale models. These models may be used to represent 
actors’ reasoning about a situation using logical relations. 
 
Figure 2.2 - A Strategic Rationale model for Youth Counselling Organisation 
(Horkoff & Yu, 2009) 
Reasons are represented via the introduction of means-ends relationships (logical 
relations) that link the network of agent goal dependencies to actual or possible 
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configurations of activity. This provides a means of analysing the ability of 
different configurations’ to satisfy the agents’ goals. Granular representations of 
situations may be constructed using decomposition links (logical relations), which 
enable a task to be decomposed into components such as sub goals, subtasks, 
resources for tasks and soft goals for tasks. 
Even further granularity may be introduced by introducing concepts that 
distinguish between agents, roles and positions. In the language of I*, an agent is 
an actor with a physical manifestation such as a human being. A role is an abstract 
characterisation of a social actor within a specific context or domain e.g. 
Counsellor. A position is a set of roles typically played by one agent e.g. a person 
can simultaneously hold the roles of counsellor, tutor and doctoral student.  
Agent goal decomposition provides an interesting candidate approach for 
representing and analysing SoS. It is a practical approach as it has been used to 
identify risks / threats. It has also been used to identify system configurations that 
meet actors’ goal specifications. Within the domain of socio-technical systems, 
the I* framework has been shown to enable the identification of dependability 
threats and requirements for air traffic management (ATM) and enterprise systems 
(Maiden & Jones, 2004; Maiden, Kamdar, & Bush, 2006; Mayer, Dubois, & 
Rifaut, 2007). In the context of ATM this was achieved by means of exploring the 
consequences of agents fulfilling two or more roles and whether this affects the 
system’s overall goal attainment (Maiden & Jones, 2004; Maiden et al., 2006). 
In the context of enterprise systems, I* has been used to identify threats to 
security goals by modelling and discovering business assets, constraints and 
security requirements (Mayer et al., 2007). In these studies, human beings were 
treated as mere input-output conversion mechanisms and so human needs with 
respect job satisfaction and group level interactions such as politics were assumed 
to have no significant influence on the system. These assumptions limit these 
studies’ relevance to the study of SoS as we may not assume that politics and 
worker satisfaction has no influence on the SoS. 
The TROPOS Goal-Risk framework, a variant of I*, has also been used as an 
approach to analyse and mitigate threats to the goal accomplishment of an ATM 
system and a manufacturing organization (Asnar & Giorgini, 2007; Asnar, 
Moretti, Sebastianis, & Zannone, 2008). The TROPOS framework consists of a 
goal layer representing actor goals that should be obtained, an event layer that 
represents potential threats to goals, and a treatment layer that may be used to 
identify/represent possible threat management strategies. The systems under 
analysis were modelled as a configuration of related goals, tasks and events. This 
approach primarily focuses on the analysis of threats and the design of systems 
rather than the identification of threats. These studies also treated humans as mere 
input-output mechanisms and so the effects of politics and worker satisfaction 
were assumed to have no significant effect on the system. 
An attractive aspect of the agent goal approach is that it supports scalability of 
analysis through the use of logics to support the satisfaction of actors’ goals. It has 
been demonstrated that forward and backward propagation (Horkoff & Yu, 2009, 
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2010) enables analysts to infer whether a configuration meets actors’ goals, 
identify configurations that do meet the actors’ goals, and identify aspects of a 
configuration that result in the failure of goals. This characteristic of the agent 
goal approach is particularly promising for the analysis of SoS. 
Agent goal decomposition has been used to analyse dependencies between actors 
to ensure the dependence is bidirectional and is thus ‘sustainable’ (Guizzardi, 
Perini, & Dignum, 2011). Agent goal decomposition has also been used to elicit 
and explain the dynamics of trust, confidentiality and distrust (Gans, Jarke, 
Kethers, Lakemeyer, & Schmitz, 2011). 
However few studies have analysed the fit between human beings needs for job 
satisfaction and group level interests such as politics. One notable exception is the 
work of (Sutcliffe, 2011) that has extended agent goal modelling using complex 
adaptive systems theory to enable the analysis of power and motivation of actors 
in a situation. Despite this effort it is unclear whether this approach is scalable as 
the models produced require a subject matter expert to interpret and apply 
heuristics. It is also unclear to what extent the predictions of these models 
correlate with the observed behaviour of individuals or organisations. 
More fundamentally it is unclear whether representing situations as 
interdependent goal-seeking actors is appropriate. The notion of a goal is a 
modelling construct rather than a notion that people commonly use to describe 
their working lives. Goals seem to be asocial constructs in that they merely 
represent states of affairs that an actor intends/desires to achieve, avoid or 
maintain. They provide little information about the organisational, social or 
cultural environment that may shape an actors behaviour, not what incentivises 
some behaviours over others. Perhaps it is unnecessary to capture and represent 
actor goals. Perhaps what is necessary is an understanding of constructs that shape 
the kinds of goals that actors pursue so that one may bound the kinds of behaviour 
actors will pursue without the cost of having to keep up-to-date models of what 
their goals are. This leads us to discuss agent responsibility decomposition. 
2.4.2.2 Agent Responsibility Decomposition 
Agent responsibility decomposition, as used in responsibility modelling (Dobson 
& Martin, 2007; Sommerville, 2007), provides the notion of responsible agents, 
responsibilities and dependencies to decompose a situation. This paradigm seeks 
to represent situations as a set of responsible agents, dependent on certain 
resources, seeking to fulfil their responsibilities. In this paradigm a responsibility 
is defined as a “duty, held by some agent, to achieve, maintain or avoid some 
given state, subject to conformance with organisational, social and cultural 
norms” (Lock, Storer, & Sommerville, 2009). The term duty is carefully defined 
to capture notions of obligation and accountability such that if an agent does not 
appropriately discharge their obligation they will be held liable. This modelling of 
obligations and liabilities attempts to tap into the social forces compelling agents 
to act in particular ways and thus is hoped to provide information about possible 
agent behaviours. The phrase conformance with organisational, social and cultural 
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norms captures the fact that responsibilities must be discharged in accordance 
with legal and domain standards. 
Agent responsibility decomposition is both a structural and behavioural modelling 
approach. Responsibilities represent units of behaviour that an agent has a duty to 
perform. Resources represent information or equipment that an agent requires to 
fulfil a responsibility. Hence a responsibility model is a description of the 
behaviours that agents have a duty to perform and the resources they require to 
perform these behaviours. 
In its simplest form the relationships between agents, resources and 
responsibilities comprise the ‘responsible for’ relation that denotes that an agent is 
responsible for the performance of a duty, the ‘has’ relation that denotes the 
allocation of a resource to an agent or to a responsibility – see Figure 2.3 below. 
 
Figure 2.3 - Responsibility Model of e-Counting System in Scottish Elections 
(Lock, 2009) 
In more complicated uses of the approach, relations such as: the ‘subordinates to’ 
are used to indicate that one agent is under the authority and control of another; 
the ‘assignment’ relation to indicate that one agent has assigned a responsibility to 
another; the ‘membership’ relation to indicate that an agent, responsibility or 
resource is also part of another e.g. the police service, ambulance service and fire 
service are parts of ‘Silver command’ - a crisis response organisation – see Figure 
2.4 below. 
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Figure 2.4 - Responsibility Model of Responsibilities during a Civil 
Emergency (Sommerville, 2009) 
The agent responsibility paradigm can be seen as an alternative to the agent goal 
paradigm as it takes the stance that situations can be understood by understanding 
factors that provide a social / legal bound on the behaviour of agents, such as 
obligations and liabilities, rather than framing the agents’ behaviours in terms of 
explicit goals or soft goals. 
The agent responsibility approach has been successfully used by (Lock et al., 
2009; Sommerville, Storer, & Lock, 2009) to analyse the failure of an E-counting 
system in the Scottish elections and to analyse UK civil emergency plans. In the 
E-counting case, agent responsibility decomposition was used to represent the 
dependencies between human/organisational agents and resources that were 
required for the socio-technical e-counting system to operate successfully. The 
identification and analysis of failures was achieved through the use of a HAZOPS 
style approach. This comprised considering the implications of hazard keywords 
on each dependence and identify threats that could emerge should agents renege 
on their responsibilities, resources fail, or become available too early, too late or 
in insufficient number (Lock et al., 2009). When used to analyse civil emergency 
plans a similar HAZOPS approach was used along with a rich set of structural 
relations to describe the complicated relationships between agents and the 
assignment of responsibilities. 
Agent responsibility decomposition is an interesting candidate for modelling SoS 
situations as it is a simple and practical approach. Its minimalist structural 
representations seem less effortful to elicit than task/process level approaches and 
can be used to identify threats and potentially for troubleshooting situations. The 
approach also promises to be relatively scalable as computer support has been 
developed that identifies weaknesses in models, incomplete models, and models 
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where responsibilities have not been assigned to agents (Lock et al., 2009; 
Sommerville et al., 2009). 
A drawback of agent responsibility decomposition is that its socio-technical 
analysis is weak. The agent responsibility approach treats human beings as mere 
mechanisms for fulfilling responsibilities. It does not consider the fit between 
assigned responsibilities and the human or organisational agent, or whether an 
agent would find a responsibility satisfying or otherwise.  Equally the approach 
does not take into account politics, group processes and other factors that can arise 
when responsibilities are assigned and distributed amongst differing groups. More 
research is required in this area to determine how these ‘social factors’ could be 
incorporated into responsibility modelling. 
Another drawback of agent responsibility decomposition is that, to date, analyses 
have assumed that interactions between system parts will not exhibit non-linear 
properties for instance triggering cascades or forming feedback loops. This 
limitation is significant as in reality threats can trigger a sequence of events that 
ripple through a system. More research is required so that the analysis of non-
linear behaviour may be incorporated to agent responsibility decomposition 
approaches. Further research may also be required in exploring how logics or 
other analytical techniques could be used to improve support for computer-aided 
analysis of these models. 
2.4.3 Information Systems 
Insights from the discipline of ‘Information Systems’ (IS) may be relevant to the 
socio-technical analysis of system-of-systems this is because an ‘information 
system’ is “the system that emerges from the mutually transformational 
interactions between the information technology and the organization” (Lee, 
2004, p. 11). This means that the discipline of information systems is interested in 
understanding the relationship between people and information technology at the 
organisational scale. This suggests that theories and approaches to understanding 
information systems may be applicable to the modelling and socio-technical 
analysis of system-of-systems. This section will cover two interesting approaches 
to the analysis of information systems – cultural-historical activity theory and 
actor-network theory. 
2.4.3.1 Cultural-Historical Activity Theory 
Cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) is a theoretical framework for 
describing and understanding human activity within its broader socio-cultural 
context (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006). For the purposes of system engineering, 
CHAT may be thought of as a set of theories for understanding human behaviour 
at an individual and group level.  
Compared to typical systems engineering approaches, CHAT re-orients analysis 
to understand how an information technology contributes to satisfying a human’s, 
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or an organisation’s, needs rather than analysing how a human may contribute or 
hinder the conversion of inputs into outputs. This flipping of the orientation of 
analysis provides a human-centred analysis of systems. 
Central to activity theory is the notion of activity. Activity is the purposeful 
interaction of a subject (an intentional agent such as a person or an organisation) 
with the world. Purposeful interaction is defined as a process by which mutual 
transformations occur between the ‘subject’ and ‘object’ – the ‘object’ of an 
activity is some prospective outcome that the human or organisation needs or 
desires.  
According to CHAT, activities have hierarchical structures that are composed of 
three layers.  
• Motives - The top most layer is the motive of an activity. A motive 
is a need or desire that motivates an activity. 
• Goals - At the next layer, the action layer, a subject’s goals are the 
object of analysis. Goals are conscious such that a subject is aware of their 
existence and that they structure their actions. This is in contrast to motives, 
which are subconscious unless actively elicited by an individual. For instance, 
in the mornings I am acutely aware that my goal is to get to a bus stop on time 
so I can get to work by 9:30am. Because of my awareness of this goal, I 
structure my actions such that the route I walk to the bus stop and the type of 
breakfast I prepare in the morning is compatible with attaining this goal. 
• Operations - The next layer comprises the operations layer. This is 
where analysis is directed towards the conditions under which a subject is 
trying to attain a goal. Operations are routine processes (that require almost no 
conscious thought) that provide an adjustment to an action due to the ongoing 
circumstances. A common example of an operation is the avoidance of people 
whilst walking along a crowded high street. This requires little thought and 
occurs in the background whilst a person typically focuses on their goals, such 
as getting to their bus stop on time or posting their mother’s birthday card. 
In CHAT, a socio-technical system is cast as a mediator of the subject-object 
relationship. This means the socio-technical system is regarded as something that 
may facilitate, inhibit, or alter the subject’s abilities to satisfy their various needs. 
This facilitation, inhibition or alteration is achieved by means of influencing a 
subject’s operations, goals and motives. For instance the system may provide a 
means of achieving what was previously unachievable or may prevent previously 
achievable goals. The system may also have the ability to alter a subject’s 
operations, goals or motives through a process termed development. Development 
is the idea that subjects alter their behaviours in response to their experiences. 
According to CHAT development is a socio-cultural process and therefore to 
understand the behaviour of subjects it requires an understanding of cultural 
practices that may influence their development. 
CHAT provides a useful framework for troubleshooting problematic socio-
technical systems by understanding the ways in which subjects motives are 
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unsatisfied. CHAT may be used to analyse whether a subject’s work activity and 
environment enables them to satisfy their motives. 
When an organisation is the subject of study it is treated as socially distributed 
human activity and so the role of specialisation and the division of labour is given 
much attention. This is because socially distributed work activity results in actions 
that are motivated by one object (say the need for food and shelter) but are 
directed at another (say the goal of writing an excellent textbook). 
In modern organisations and society, there can be complex relationships between 
objects of motivation and objects of action sometimes resulting in disconnections 
between motivating objects and objects of action, thus resulting in dysfunctional 
organisational behaviour. These situations can become further complicated by 
incompatibilities between the motives and goals of the organisation and those of 
the individuals whom are members of the organisation. Symptoms of this include 
bureaucracy reigning over common sense and local optimisations at the expense 
of the organization as a whole. CHAT enables the analysis of these 
inconsistencies within socio-technical systems. 
The work of Yrjö Engeström (Engestrom, 1999, 2000) on activity systems 
provides a useful framework for analysing and troubleshooting socio-technical 
systems. Engeström has added to activity theory by introducing a third component 
to subject-object interactions, the notion of the community. This means that 
activity is defined as a process by which mutual transformations occur between 
the ‘subject’, ‘object’ and the ‘community’. Engeström further elaborates this 
model by introducing three different types of mediator: tools, rules and the 
division of labour. These six elements enable the description of complex 
technology mediated social practices (e.g. a problematic situation) and enable the 
identification of incompatibilities between elements that may be resulting in 
dysfunctional situations – see Figure 2.5 which provides a schematic of the 
interactions that occur during human activity according to his activity systems 
perspective 
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Figure 2.5 – The structure of human activity systems (Engestrom, 2001) 
Figure 2.5 provides a schematic of the interactions that occur when a subject 
performs purposeful activity. It shows that the subject-object relationship is 
influenced by the tools and signs available in the situation, the formal/informal 
rules of the situation, the norms/expectations of the community that the subject is 
a part of, and the way work is divided up in the situation. It also shows that the 
subject-object relationship mediates the activity that is performed and the 
interpretation of the outcome of the activity. The diagram is considered to be 
useful as it highlights aspects of a situation an analyst may want to investigate to 
identify mediators that encourage behaviour that is inconsistent with a desirable 
outcome. 
Engeström’s framework has been used to analyse a variety of problematic socio-
technical systems. For instance it has been used to support the study and 
organisational redesign of a children’s hospital outpatient clinic (Engestrom, 
2000, 2001), understand conflicting goals of judging in legal cases (Engestrom, 
1996), studying the problematic nature of inter-organisational partnerships in the 
construction industry (Hartmann & Bresnen, 2011), and studying the use of 
technology in a higher education context to support learning (Isssroff & Scanlon, 
2002). 
In early use, the activity systems framework was limited to simple unitary views 
of systems. For instance in (Engestrom, 2000) the framework is used to analyse 
the sequence of actions that form the process of assessing an outpatient and 
deciding whether the patient requires inpatient care. This analysis was limited 
because it solely focused on disturbances / incompatibilities that inhibited the 
transformation of system inputs (sick patients) into system outputs (less sick 
patients). There was little systematic analysis of whether the needs of each human 
being involved in the system was being satisfied. The result was an analysis that 
focused on improving the manner in which system outputs (less sick patients) 
were produced without explicit consideration of satisfying physicians, nurses, 
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managers and patients’ needs. These socio-technical factors are only treated 
implicitly when hospital staff are brought together to negotiate new ways of 
working that minimise disturbances / incompatibilities. 
In later work (Engestrom, 2001) pluralist views of systems were adopted. The 
notion of a ‘boundary crossing laboratory’ was developed so that the differing 
views, for instance of patients, health centre practitioners and hospital 
practitioners could be aired and discussed. This enabled the attending participants 
to generate a shared understanding of the interactions between their activity 
systems and their consequences for patient care. This particular approach is 
interesting as it uses the conflicting needs and views of participant to drive a 
resolution that satisfies or at least improves upon the current system. 
The drawbacks of this approach are with respect to its scalability. The approach 
does not appear to be scalable to large situations since representatives from each 
viewpoint to be considered must be present and attend the boundary crossing 
laboratory meeting. Another drawback of the approach is that it relies on the 
participants identifying incompatibilities on the fly during the meeting. This can 
be troublesome in some situations as expertise and judgement is required to spot 
subtle incompatibilities between objects. Another limitation arises from the fact 
that incompatibilities are identified through discussion. This lack of more formal 
representation of interactions makes systematic analysis more challenging as it is 
difficult to track the effect of multiple interactions. 
To address these limitations, the activity systems framework was expanded by 
Halloran (Halloran, 2000, 2001). His extension provides a visual way of 
representing incompatibilities between subjects’ activity systems at both the 
individual and organisational level. This enables the analyst to bridge between the 
individual level and the organisational levels of analysis in a systematic manner – 
See Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6 - Activity Space Framework (Halloran, 2000) 
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The activity space framework has been used to study the introduction of new 
technology in a radiology department (Halloran, 2000), and the use of groupware 
technology in the higher education (Halloran, 2001). 
The CHAT approach is an interesting approach to modellers of SoS situations. It 
is practical in the sense that it may be used to troubleshoot problematic situations 
and may be used to identify potential issues if a technology is to be deployed. The 
approach also appears to scale when representing small to medium scale situations 
and there exists some computer support to enable this – see (Halloran, 2000). 
Another useful feature of CHAT is that it encourages the analysis of the ‘social’ 
by eliciting tensions between subjects, objects and mediators thus enabling the 
development of an understanding of the ‘social’ in terms of intervenable entities. 
Another interesting characteristic is its focus on learning and development. 
Successful interventions are those where the organisation learns to adapt to its 
situation and so theories that facilitate this are beneficial.  
A key limitation of the CHAT approach is that its data collection and analysis 
approach would be extremely arduous for studying large-scale systems. This is 
because its interpretivist approach relies upon a human analyst identifying 
important or influential sets of interactions / inconsistencies in a situation. There 
are no case studies to my knowledge indicating that analytical techniques may be 
used to support an analyst in understanding situations that are too large or 
complicated for a human being to keep track of the many interactions. Another 
limitation is that CHAT is typically used to guide and interpret ethnographic 
studies and therefore this style of enquiry may be too time consuming should it be 
used to systematically analyse a SoS situation. 
2.4.3.2 Actor Network Theory 
Actor network theory (ANT) is a school of thought that attempts to understand the 
‘social’ in terms of networks of associations. ANT attempts to expose what the 
‘social’ is by means of tracing associations between human and non-human actors 
(Latour, 2005). By analysing ‘assemblages’ of associations ANT aims to provide 
explanations of how the ‘social’ is constructed. This is in direct contrast to other 
forms of sociology where ‘social phenomena’ are often explained in terms of 
other ‘social phenomena’ - for instance poverty and inequality being explained in 
terms of asymmetries of social power. Instead ANT seeks to decompose the 
‘social’ in terms of anything that can be seen to be acting in a situation (Latour, 
2005) - for instance explaining poverty and inequality in terms of geographical 
resources, scarcity of reliable transportation links and so on. 
For the purposes of systems engineering, ANT provides a way of representing and 
analysing socio-technical systems without first dividing the focus of enquiry into 
‘socio’ and ‘technical’ parts and then attempting to understand their ‘interface’. 
Instead it tries to account for systems by describing: 
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• how they emerged from a number of associations among 
heterogeneous human and non-human actors spread out across time and 
geographical space; 
• how the network of human and non-human actors resulted in some 
sort of stable or otherwise configuration. 
ANT is unlike typical systems paradigms as it avoids the notion of a system and 
rejects the notion that human and non-humans may be assumed to be input-output 
mechanisms4. Instead it advocates that there are networks of interacting human 
and non-human actors that have their own ideas about what is going on, how it’s 
going on and why they behave in a certain way. In some ways ANT may be 
thought of as being a radical example of the socio-technical metaphor as it 
attempts to understand the needs and perspectives of non-human actors in addition 
to human actors. 
The reason why ANT attempts to understand the needs and perspectives of non-
human and human actors is that ANT does not want to preclude anything from 
being an actor a priori. Another reason is that human designed objects can 
embody their designers perspectives or promote certain social or cultural values 
(Lash, 2001; Winner, 1997). Therefore ANT permits an actor to be “any thing that 
does modify a state of affairs by making a difference” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). This 
means material objects such as clothes, hammers, and speed bumps count as 
actors if their presence in a situation modifies/mediates the state of affairs. For 
instance, walking along a high street with/without clothes changes the state of 
affairs considerably. Similarly ANT also does not preclude any types of 
association, for instance, actors may be associated by authorize, enable, allow, 
forbid, make possible, block, and so on. By building up networks of these 
associations between actors one hopes to describe the phenomena of interest in an 
unprejudiced manner. 
To avoid privileging certain actors’ perspectives ANT does not assume any 
particular ontology. Instead situations are represented using the actors’ own 
concepts of reality. This means ANT focuses on actors’ definitions and ideas of 
what, how and why things are going on. ANT strongly rejects the notion that 
analysts should translate the actors’ worlds into a normalized scientific form made 
from a number of standardized concepts. Instead it encourages the understanding 
of situations by comparing and contrasting the subtleties between actors’ 
incommensurable worldviews. 
To understand a socio-technical system the analyst should seek to understand 
‘controversies’. Metaphorically, ‘controversies’ may be thought of as tensions that 
attempt to steer actors in different directions. In ANT, the most important 
‘controversies’ to understand are those with respect to group formation and 
agency. The group formation controversy seeks to understand why actors are 
                                                
4 ANT does not claim a priori that systems do not exist. It simply claims that one may not assume that the 
phenomenon of study is a system. Whether something is a system is something to be investigated by 
tracing associations between actors. 
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arranged in one particular configuration rather any other. In practice this means 
identifying actors that make the present group boundaries the way they are, rather 
than some other configuration. This often comprises identifying human actors, 
such as spokespersons, and material actors, such as legal documents, that define 
what the group should be about and its history. 
The agency controversy seeks to understand what agencies are at work in 
producing the situation. This question is important as it recognizes the intuition 
that in ‘social’ situations people are not free to do literally anything they want, but 
instead play ‘social roles’ because of ‘social forces’ compelling a person to act in 
a ‘socially acceptable’ way. The aim here is to trace associations amongst actors 
to understand how these roles, forces and standards emerge. In practice this means 
gathering actors’ accounts of their actions and understanding the influences as 
they perceive them. 
Since some actors may be non-human, i.e. objects such as clothes, hammers and 
speed bumps, gathering actors’ accounts of their actions may initially appear 
impossible - if not ludicrous. To workaround this snag, observational techniques 
have been invented to make objects offer non-verbal descriptions of themselves. 
These techniques consist of visiting locations where their behaviours and 
characteristics may be observed such as in innovation settings like engineers’ 
workshops, marketers’ focus groups and end-users’ homes. In these locations an 
object’s ‘social life’ is observable as it is in the process of being created and so 
associations between plans, regulations, standards and so on are visible. Other 
techniques may also be used to gather accounts - for instance: 
• studying situations where the object is distanced from its usual 
location; 
• observing the absence of an objects effects when it is broken;  
• examining historical records of its development. 
Situations where objects are distanced from their usual locations includes places 
where objects are distanced in time (such as in archaeology), distanced in 
geography so that it occupies a different ‘socio-cultural space’, or distanced in 
skills such that other actors need to learn how to associate with it. In all these 
locations, a process of learning, trial and error and innovation takes place and so it 
helps reveal a description of the non-human actors’ needs and their view of the 
world. 
ANT has been used in many case studies to understand problematic situations. For 
example, disputes surrounding the development of a web portal at the world bank 
(Marres, 2004), how the reliability of health information on the web is negotiated 
and attained (Adams & Berg, 2004), the contested evolution of web browser 
technology (Faraj, Kwon, & Watts, 2004) and IT project escalation (Mähring, 
Holmström, Keil, & Montealegre, 2004). 
ANT is an interesting paradigm to modellers of SoS situations as its analysis of 
the ‘social’ is extremely thorough in the sense that it demands the creation of 
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descriptions that are grounded in the observable interactions of human and non-
human actors. This is particularly attractive if one is trying to troubleshoot a 
problematic situation as the descriptions provided explain how the situation is 
assembled and maintained by the behaviour of people and materials rather than 
intangible constructs. 
The downside of ANT style analyses are that they are typically time intensive 
since they comprise a meticulous form of ethnography and so further research is 
required to investigate whether these accounts can be generated in a timely 
manner by using ANT style analyses sparingly in particularly critical parts of a 
situation. Another limitation of ANT style analyses are that they comprise dense 
textual accounts of a situation and therefore as a method of representation for 
articulating, analysing and understanding a situation they can be unwieldy and are 
unlikely to scale up to large-scale SoS situations. Further research would be 
required to develop a means of representing this information in a condensed form 
that could be analysed by analytic means thus supporting the SoS analyst. 
2.4.5 Operations Research 
Operations research (OR) is a discipline concerned with analysing complex 
problems and helping decision-makers work out the best means of achieving a 
desired outcome, or even figuring out what a desired outcome might be. Since the 
1970s a sub-discipline of OR, called soft OR, has developed many techniques to 
support decision-making in ‘soft’, ‘messy’, ‘wicked’ or difficult to quantify 
situations. In this subsection we will review a selection of the pioneering work on 
abstractions for representing and analysing socio-technical situations that have 
emerged from this discipline. 
2.4.5.1 Rich Pictures 
The rich picture technique provides the notion of free form sketches as 
abstractions to decompose a situation into its constituent parts (Checkland, 1999). 
The paradigm does not presuppose a set of modelling abstractions but instead 
suggests that the analyst includes elements that are representations of ‘structure’, 
‘process’ and ‘climate’. Structure is suggested to include the physical layout of a 
situation, the power hierarchy of people or groups, their reporting structures and 
patterns of formal and informal communication. Process is suggested to include 
what activities are performed, how decisions are made, how monitoring is done, 
and the external effects of these activities. Climate is suggested to include the 
relationship between the situation’s structure and the processes performed. This 
includes social and political aspects of a situation such as attitudes, beliefs, roles, 
norms or values as it is hypothesised that it is these that mediate the activities of 
the people and groups acting within the situations structure. 
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Figure 2.7 - A Rich Picture reflecting the development of a wind tunnel 
(Vidgen, 1997) 
Rich pictures have been used as part of soft systems methodology (SSM) on 
numerous projects that have consisted of understanding problematic socio-
technical situations ranging from general problem solving through to 
organisational design (Mingers & Taylor, 1992). These projects have included: 
• understanding the information support needs of research scientists 
and technologists at a multi-national laboratory and manufacturer, and how its 
IT and information department should be re-organised (Checkland & Holwell, 
1998); 
• supporting the development of an automated and integrated wind 
tunnel system (Vidgen, 1997); 
• representing the complexity and uncertainty of construction 
projects (Sutrisna & Barrett, 2007). 
The rich picture approach is interesting to modellers of SoS situations as it 
appears to be versatile way of building up an understanding of a socio-technical 
situation. Whilst the approach is flexible and enables the representation of group 
processes and politics it does have limitations that may make it unsuitable for 
identifying threats and troubleshooting SoS situations. The first limitation is that it 
has a limited scalability as it does not support computer supported reasoning as 
neither the entities nor the relationships are formally defined. The second 
limitation is that the technique does not come with a set of principles to interpret 
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how the different entities will influence each other and therefore it is up to 
individual interpretation and experiences to identify threats or causes of 
problematic behaviour. 
These limitations have been recognised for some time by the IS community and 
attempts have been made to create tool support (Avison, Andrews, & Shah, 1992; 
J. Zhang, Smith, & Watson, 1997). Checkland has rejected this need for tool 
support on the basis that rich pictures are sketches for enabling sensemaking and 
communication rather than complete descriptions for the purposes of formal 
analysis. 
2.4.5.2 Cognitive Maps 
A cognitive map is a representation of a person’s thinking about a problem that 
uses a directed graph to represent the situation (Eden, 1988; Eden, Ackermann, & 
Cropper, 1992). The nodes represent either a goal or a ‘bipolar’ description of a 
part of a situation that is believed to cause (or influence) another part of the 
situation. The directed links represent the believed direction of causality between 
nodes. There are two kinds of link between nodes. Positive links represent a 
causal relationship between the first pole of a node to the first pole of the node it 
is connecting to. Negative links represent a causal relationship between the second 
pole of a node and the first pole of the node it is connecting to - hence providing 
the notion of an inverse/negative relationship. See Figure 2.8 for an example of a 
cognitive map of a typical managerial situation. 
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Figure 2.8 - A section of cognitive map of a managerial situation (Eden, 2004) 
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An essential feature of cognitive maps, that makes them distinct from influence 
diagrams, is their use of ‘bipolar’ statement nodes (Eden, 2004). Each statement 
node is composed of a ‘bipolar’ opposite that acts to highlight the potential 
variability in the situation e.g. ‘management involved in the long term thinking … 
fire fighting and short-termism’. The ‘…’ should be read as ‘rather than’ thus 
expressing a contrasting pole. This is intended to bring to attention the potential 
range of variables so that the situation can be modified to promote goal 
satisfaction. 
Cognitive maps have been used extensively in action research projects to 
represent complicated / messy socio-technical situations and to make policy 
decisions. For instance they have been used to: 
• identify and explore policy options within the Prison Service of 
England and Wales (Eden & Ackermann, 2004) 
• understand the relationships between patient quality and hospital 
activities and programmes in the NHS (Telford, Cropper, & Ackermann, 
1992) 
• perform risk analysis of portfolios of complex projects 
(Ackermann, Eden, Williams, & Howick, 2007) 
• perform stakeholder and conflict assessment in the context of 
natural resources management situations (Hjortso, Christensen, & Tarp, 2005), 
and complex projects (T. Williams, Ackermann, & Eden, 2003). 
The cognitive map approach is potentially applicable by modellers of SoS 
situations. This is because the abstraction is both scalable and practical. The 
approach scales as computer aided analysis may be performed on the directed 
graphs to simplify models, highlight important clusters of interacting parts, 
virtuous or vicious circles, or other parts that metrics suggest may be of 
significance to an analyst. The approach is also practical as it can be used to 
understand the dynamics of complex situations and identify threats as illustrated 
by the above case studies. 
The limitation of the cognitive map abstraction for modelling SoS situations is 
that it is purely a behavioural model. It has no means of representing a system’s 
parts and therefore it does not support the systematic elicitation of interactions 
based on a situation’s structure, context and processes. This is a rectifiable 
weakness as structural models can be produced using other approaches, which can 
be used to prompt the systematic identification interactions causes and effects. 
These interactions could then be represented and analysed using the cognitive 
map. For instance, it is plausible that a simple structural model such as a 
responsibility model could complement the systematic elicitation of cognitive 
maps. 
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2.5 Comparative Analysis 
A diverse range of abstractions for representing systems were reviewed as part of 
this literature review. No single form of abstraction was found to be an off-the-
shelf SoS modelling abstraction for socio-technical threat identification and 
troubleshooting. Therefore this section characterises the strengths and limitations 
of each of the approaches. 
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Table 2.1 - Summary of Strengths and Limitations of Abstractions for SoS Modelling 
Approach Functional 
Models 
Agent Goal 
Models 
Agent Responsibility 
Models 
Cultural-Historical 
Activity Theory 
Actor-network 
Theory Rich Pictures 
Cognitive 
Maps 
Paradigm 
Typically 
Machine 
Metaphor 
Typically 
Machine 
Metaphor 
Typically Machine 
Metaphor 
Socio-Technical 
Metaphor 
Socio-Technical 
Metaphor 
Socio-
Technical 
Metaphor 
Dependent 
on Analyst. 
Capable of describing the ‘socio-
technical’ structure of a SoS 
Partial Partial Partial Yes Yes Yes No 
Capable of aiding in the identification 
of risks due to distribution across 
organisational / social / cultural / legal 
boundaries 
Possible Yes Possible Yes Yes Possible Possible 
Capable of aiding in the identification 
of human / organisational agents’ 
potential to conflict / resist a system 
Possible Possible Possible Yes Yes Possible Possible 
Capable of describing ‘large systems’ Yes No Possible Possible Possible No Yes 
Capable of being analysable either 
algorithmically or quantitatively 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
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2.5.1 A model capable of describing the ‘socio-technical’ structure of a system 
CHAT, ANT and rich pictures all provide the capability to describe the socio-
technical structure of a system. This capability is delivered by the fact that their 
descriptions of systems are textual, or textual and pictorial and thus may describe 
anything of interest to an analyst. 
Functional models, agent goal models and responsibility models all partially 
provide the capability to describe the socio-technical structure of a system. These 
models are limited, or partial, as the kinds of entity that they are able to represent 
are limited by their choices of concepts for abstraction. Functional decomposition, 
agent goal models and responsibility models are limited as their capability to 
describe politics and groups processes is unclear and requires further research. 
Cognitive maps do not provide the capability to describe a system’s socio-
technical structure. They describe the structure of behavioural interactions. E.g. 
how the performance of one activity influences another. This is in contrast to a 
structural description of a system as it would describe the logical 
relationships/dependencies between the parts that are producing the behaviour. 
2.5.2 A model capable of aiding in the identification of threats that may arise 
due to a system being distributed across organisational / social / cultural / 
legal boundaries 
Agent goal models, CHAT, ANT accounts are capable of aiding in the 
identification of risks arising from interacting technical and non-technical parts 
and there is research demonstrating their capability to identify risks specifically 
associated with crossing organisational/social/legal boundaries. 
Agent goal models have also been used to analyse the influence of power, trust 
and social cohesion on systems that cross-organisational boundaries – see 
(Sutcliffe, 2011). This form of analysis appears limited for our purposes. 
Differences of organisational / social / cultural / legal norms were not explicitly 
considered although they appear important to analysing the success/failure of 
interactions across organisational boundaries. 
CHAT has been used to understand the behavioural implications of parts being 
distributed across organisational / social / cultural / legal boundaries (Engestrom, 
2001). CHAT was used to analyse incompatibilities, or tensions, between the 
objects and mediators of the interacting subjects and these identified tensions can 
be regarded as risks to the system. 
ANT has been used to understand the behavioural implications of parts being 
distributed across organisational / social / cultural / legal boundaries (Mähring et 
al., 2004). ANT was used to analyse the failure of Denver International airport in 
terms of networks of interacting actors supporting the escalation of the project and 
then its implosion when additional actors destabilised the configuration. 
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Functional models, responsibility models, rich pictures and cognitive maps are all 
capable of aiding in the identification risks arising from interacting technical and 
non-technical parts. For these approaches however there is no research 
specifically demonstrating their capability to identify risks specifically associated 
with crossing organisational/social/legal boundaries. 
2.5.3 A model capable of aiding in the identification of human / 
organisational agents’ potential to conflict / resist a system 
ANT and CHAT descriptions are capable of aiding in the identification of human 
/ organisational agents’ potential to conflict / resist a system and case studies 
demonstrate how this may be done. 
Functional models, agent goal models, responsibility models, rich pictures and 
cognitive maps may be capable of aiding in the identification of human / 
organisational agents’ potential to conflict / resist a system however this survey of 
the literature did not find case studies demonstrating how this may be done. This 
type of description and analysis may require a supplementary framework that 
indicates what kinds of social entity should be analysed to identify conflict / 
resistance.  
2.5.4 A model capable of describing large systems 
Functional models and cognitive maps are capable of describing large systems 
and case studies suggest they have been used to do so. The IDEF0 language is 
used by the US DoD agencies and is supported by major vendors such as IBM. 
Tool support is available that scales up to enable the visualisation and 
representation of large-scale systems engineering projects. Cognitive mapping 
software, such as Baxia Decision Explorer, has been developed to enable it use in 
commercial settings. 
Responsibility models, CHAT descriptions and ANT descriptions may be capable 
of describing large systems. However this literature review did not find case 
studies suggesting they have the capability to describe systems with 1000s of 
socio-technical parts in a useful manner. 
Agent goal models and rich pictures may not be capable of representing large 
systems. Agent goal models have been acknowledged to be limited in their ability 
to scale (Pastor, Estrada, & Martinez, 2011). Rich pictures are not hierarchical so 
the size of system that may be described is limited by the size of the drawing 
media. No evidence suggests that it would be possible to describe systems with 
1000s of socio-technical parts in a useful manner using agent goal models or rich 
pictures. 
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2.5.5 A model capable of being analysable either algorithmically or 
quantitatively so that the maximum size and complicatedness of an 
analysable system is not restricted by human beings limited faculties 
Functional models, agent goal models, responsibility models and cognitive maps 
are capable of being analysable either algorithmically or quantitatively and case 
studies demonstrate its use. 
Functional models may be more formally represented, for instance as petri nets or 
as system dynamics models, and analysed to identify problematic interactions and 
run simulations – see for instance (Peters & Peters, 1997; Plaia & Carrie, 1995; 
Ruinan, Qing, Xin, & Qing, 2004). 
Agent-goal models support computer analytics that enables the analysis of events 
on goal satisfaction (Asnar, 2009; Horkoff & Yu, 2009). These approaches are 
potentially highly scalable as goal models may be expressed in GRL (Goal 
Requirements Language) and algorithms applied to assess the satisfiability of 
goals in specific situations (Amyot et al., 2010). At present these algorithms only 
have partial support for cyclic graphs and thus do not have full support for non-
linear interactions. 
Responsibility models support basic computer aided analysis to help identify 
agents that may be overloaded or responsibilities that are unassigned (Lock et al., 
2009). At present computer aided analysis does not support more sophisticated 
analysis such as identifying non-linear interactions. 
Cognitive maps are perhaps the most promising type of model as they comprise 
directed graphs and thus are analysable using computational methods and support 
the analysis of non-linear behaviour See (Eden, 2004) for details on cognitive 
maps. See (Boccaletti, Latora, Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006) for a review of 
complex network analysis. 
CHAT descriptions, ANT descriptions and rich pictures may not be capable of 
being analysable either algorithmically or quantitatively. Their style of 
representing a system in natural language or a picture does not lend itself to 
benefit from computer analytics (using current technologies) unlike more formal 
models. Analysis is therefore limited by the number elements a human analyst can 
comprehend. 
2.5.6 Lesson Learned 
Comparison of the abstractions’ ability to scale and their available analytic 
support (in Table 2.1) suggests functional models and cognitive maps (directed 
graphs) may provide promising avenues for further research. The key limitation of 
the functional models (IDEF0 / FRAM) is that they would require to be 
transformed into petri-nets or system dynamic models for analysis. The key 
limitation of the cognitive map approach is that it does not provide a structural 
view of a system and so it requires a structural model of a system to be 
transformed into a cognitive map of the system.  
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Functional decomposition and agent responsibility decomposition may 
complement the cognitive map approach as they provide a sound basis for 
structural modelling and their models may be used to systematically elicit 
interactions between parts. For the purposes of SoS risk identification and 
troubleshooting, functional models, agent goal models and agent responsibility 
models are all viable candidates for being used as structural models. Functional 
modelling is a strong candidate since it has good tool support for visualising and 
managing models. The agent responsibility abstraction is also strong candidate 
due to its minimalist notation and its focus on analysing norms, which may be 
important to both analysing work across organisational boundaries and for 
identifying potential conflict. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we reviewed existing approaches to representing and analysing 
socio-technical situations. We identified that within systems engineering there are 
two promising forms of decomposition namely functional decomposition and 
agent based decomposition. We identified the strengths and drawbacks of these 
approaches and recognised that there were a number of research opportunities 
with respect to representing and analysing politics and group processes within 
these modelling representations. It was also noted that further research with 
respect to analytical techniques that would support the analysis of large models 
would also be beneficial. 
Outside of the field of systems engineering we identified that cultural historical 
activity theory, actor network theory, rich pictures and cognitive maps may 
provide interesting modelling frameworks that could be used to inform the 
modelling of SoS. Cultural historical activity theory is a promising and potentially 
scalable framework for analysing tensions that can exist within organisations and 
across organisations. Actor network theory provides a radical framework for 
analysing socio-technical systems that provides explanations that avoid invoking 
‘social forces’ or other invisible social structures. Rich pictures provide a simple 
yet powerful approach of sketching out how social and political factors are 
influencing and problematising a situation. And finally cognitive maps illustrate 
the practical usefulness and analytic power of representing situations as directed 
graphs. 
In the final section of this chapter we identified the strengths and weaknesses of 
the abstraction approaches and identified that cognitive maps (a directed graph 
approach) would provide a sound basis for a SoS modelling approach when 
complemented with an appropriate structural modelling approach that enables 
social analysis. 
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3. Research Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
“If a thing can be observed in any way at all, it lends itself to some type of 
measurement method. No matter how ‘fuzzy’ the measurement is, it’s still a 
measurement if it tells you more than you knew before.” (Hubbard, 2010, p. 3) 
Measurement is used in a wide range of situations from understanding the 
usability of a device in a quantitative manner through to understanding why 
people do not use a system for the purpose it was intended. The purpose of this 
chapter is to review research methods that enable the study, or measurement, of 
socio-technical systems (including SoS) in situ. This means we will review 
methods or approaches that are available to researchers to collect and analyse data 
that enables the troubleshooting, or threat identification, of socio-technical 
systems that operate outside of controlled laboratory settings. 
3.2 Data Collection 
Data collection is the process by which a researcher attempts to collect evidence 
that reduces uncertainty over the answer to a research question. For example, 
when troubleshooting a system a researcher seeks gather evidence that reduces the 
uncertainty of whether a possible cause is a probable cause (Hubbard, 2010). This 
is usually achieved by gathering evidence that either excludes possible causes or 
that suggests probable causes. 
Data collection methods must be carefully selected because they have limitations 
that may introduce bias or uncertainty into the data they collect. Investigations 
must be carefully designed to minimise the effect bias and uncertainty may have 
on the outcome of research (Creswell, 2009). The following section reviews 
commonly used approaches to data collection and identifies their strengths and 
limitations to indicate their suitability for the study of socio-technical SoS. 
3.2.1 Surveys 
A survey is “a well defined and well-written set of questions to which an 
individual is asked to respond” (Lazar, Feng, & Hochheiser, 2010, p. 100). 
Surveys are commonly used for the study of phenomena that involves large 
groups of people. For instance surveys are used to gather data to describe the 
behaviour of a population of employees with respect to their adoption of a system 
and its perceived success – see for instance (Delone & McLean, 2003; Venkatesh, 
Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). The strengths of the survey method are that for a 
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low cost it can reach a large number of geographically dispersed people in a short 
period of time. In SoS contexts, this enables a single researcher to capture the ‘big 
picture’ in a short period of time. 
Whilst surveys do scale up to large situations they suffer from a number of 
drawbacks. The first drawback of surveys is that they are typically self-
administered so it is not possible ask immediate follow up questions or change the 
survey instrument once it has been sent. The second drawback is that they are not 
suitable for collecting ‘rich data’ as open questions often receive terse responses 
and surveys with many open questions are costly to analyse due to the time and 
resources necessary to read a large number of textual responses. The third 
drawback is that the validity of survey data is dependent on sampling variance and 
non-sampling errors such as response bias, non-response bias or recall bias 
(Assael & Keon, 1982). This can result in the introduction of uncertainty with 
respect to how representative the data is of the phenomenon being studied. 
Techniques have been developed to estimate the effects of these errors and 
therefore the level of uncertainty associated with a result from a survey can 
typically be bounded (Assael & Keon, 1982). 
3.2.2 Interviews 
Interviews comprise conversations and interactions with a participant with the aim 
of receiving responses to a set of questions that are intended to generate data 
about a phenomenon being studied. Interviews are a commonly used research 
method for the study of phenomena that can be understood by means of collecting 
‘in-depth’ data from a small number of individuals (Lazar et al., 2010). For 
instance they can be used to understand a person’s view of a problem, its context 
and explore a wide range of concerns with unforeseen follow up questions. This 
enables the interviewer to capture data that would be difficult to capture using less 
costly approaches such as questionnaires. 
Whilst interviews enable the capture of data that would be difficult to capture 
using surveys, they suffer from a number of notable drawbacks. Firstly, they are 
costly to perform as an interviewer must meet each interviewee and spend a 
period of time asking and answering questions. This means that the method is 
costly to scale-up to situations where a large number of participants are involved. 
This limitation can be addressed to some extent through the use of focus groups. 
However, this approach has its own drawbacks since it may introduce response 
bias due to people responding in the presence of others. 
The second drawback of interviews is that the analysis of the data they produce is 
costly since transcribing recordings or writing up interview notes is time 
consuming. A third drawback, similar to that of surveys, is that the validity of data 
is dependent on sampling variance and non-sampling errors. In some situations, 
this limitation can be minimised by combining interviews with observations so as 
to detect recall bias if it occurs. Of course, the observations themselves are subject 
to response bias since the individual may act differently whilst being observed – 
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this is known as the observer-expectancy effect. Observer-expectancy effects can 
be identified using additional techniques such as concealed observation to see if 
the subject’s behaviour changes when they believe they are not being observed. 
3.2.3 Ethnography and its scalability 
Ethnography is a research method used by anthropologists and sociologists to 
study people in their naturally occurring settings through the use of observations, 
interviews and participation (Lazar et al., 2010; Rouncefield, 2011). Ethnography 
is founded on the notion that to understand complex human activities in-depth 
participative study is required. Participative study is intended to overcome the 
limitations of surveys, interviews and observational studies. This is because 
participation minimises subject recall bias as the participant observer may observe 
the subject performing tasks and may also learn how to perform the task for them 
self thus triangulating their findings from two sources. Participative methods may 
also reduce response bias because the researcher spends a long time onsite and so 
the researcher is perceived to be part of the group, hence observer-expectancy 
effects are minimised.  
The main limitation of ethnography for studying SoS is that it is a time consuming 
research method (John Hughes, King, Rodden, & Andersen, 1995). An 
ethnographer must visit each geographical location where a socio-technical 
component is present, they must attempt to embed themselves within that context, 
and participate in the activities of that community or group. This may require a 
large team of ethnographers to perform, especially if a system is geographically 
dispersed. Once this has been performed the textual descriptions of each group 
must then be analysed and aggregated. This again is a time consuming process, 
especially if multiple researchers perform the ethnographies.  
Attempts have been made to lower the cost of ethnography via the use of “quick 
and dirty ethnography” or “rapid  ethnography” (John Hughes et al., 1995; Millen, 
2000). The quick and dirty approach comprises short focused studies to quickly 
gain the general picture of a setting. The phrase “quick and dirty” is used because 
the duration of the fieldwork is of a short (weeks or months) duration relative to 
the phenomenon of study and that at the outset it is recognised that gathering a 
complete and detailed account of the phenomenon is highly unlikely. To use the 
duration of fieldwork as efficiently as possible, ‘quick and dirty’ ethnographies 
are theoretically informed by drawing on insights from previous studies (John 
Hughes et al., 1995). The primary purpose of the ‘quick and dirty’ approach is to 
focus on portions of the phenomenon that are likely to inform strategic decision-
making rather than being exploratory as per traditional ethnography. 
Rapid ethnography is similar in nature to quick and dirty ethnography. The 
approach suggests that the fieldwork should have a narrow focus, it should use 
multiple interactive observational techniques and should use collaborative and 
computerised data analysis methods (Millen, 2000). To speed up analysis it is 
suggested that field site experts guide the analyst or act as a “field guide” (Millen, 
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2000), that “fringe members” should be focused on as they move freely around 
groups and that multiple analysts can be used in the same field site. 
Rapid or quick approaches also suffer limitations once the scale of a situation is 
increased. As the scale increases the depth to which participants may be studied in 
a given time and the representativeness of selected participants become issues that 
limit the validity of the study (John Hughes et al., 1995). These issues are not 
problematic when studying single sites such as control rooms but become 
troublesome when studying multiple interacting sites as the researchers’ decisions 
on where to be, when and for how long, may result in accounts that are not 
representative of the phenomenon of study. 
Although ethnography is more time intensive than the use of surveys and 
interviews, surveys and interviews are more limited in their ability to elicit ‘in-
depth’ data. This can make them unsuitable data collection methods for 
troubleshooting certain situations. This implies that there is a time cost vs. 
completeness trade-off when deciding between ethnography and other methods. 
This therefore poses an interesting and extremely challenging research question: 
• ‘what is the most appropriate data collection and analysis strategy 
for troubleshooting or identifying risks in a SoS situation?’ 
I am prima facie inclined to hypothesise that one should adopt the strategy of 
using cheaper methods to develop a ‘big picture’ view and use ethnography 
sparingly in areas that the big picture data suggests finer grain data may be 
required. This, of course, would result in theoretically informed, multi-site, multi-
method studies that may include the strategic use of ethnography. 
Other researchers when faced with research questions of a similar scale have 
suggested similar research strategies. For instance (Pollock & Williams, 2010, p. 
531) have proposed a need for “strategic ethnography - whereby the choice of 
research settings and the scope of the studies is informed by provisional 
theoretical/empirical understandings of the locales … as well as by the specific 
research concerns and issues under examination”. Their proposal is motivated by 
the fact the studies of large-scale systems in science and technology studies have 
typically been single site studies over a short duration and thus have given 
piecemeal accounts of what they see to be a multifaceted historically evolving 
phenomenon. They also acknowledge that performing these studies will be non-
trivial as it will require team projects or even community sized efforts to resource 
these studies. 
Similarly (Hine, 2007, p. 618) has proposed the notion of connective ethnography 
to facilitate the study of e-science’s “diverse sites, connected in complex and 
heterogeneous ways.” Connective ethnography comprises multi-site ethnography 
that endeavours to explore global connections suffusing sites. This is achieved by 
visiting and participating in both online and offline sites to understand the cultural 
activities that enable infrastructure assist in the users meaningful activities as e-
scientists. Other approaches such as network ethnography (Howard, 2002) have 
also been proposed. 
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Network ethnography (Howard, 2002) is the process of using ethnographic field 
methods on cases and field sites selected using social network analysis. It is a 
particularly interesting approach from a SoS perspective as the gathering and 
analysis of social network data can be particularly low cost and its enables the 
management of sample bias as might appear when selecting informants using 
snowball sampling or similar approaches. Additionally, the researcher can use the 
data to identify communities and well connected individuals that may be able to 
arrange meetings with other important figures. Another attractive characteristic is 
that the researcher can monitor the dynamics of the situation over time by 
monitoring the changes in communities, important figures and interactions. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is the process by which a researcher interprets the data they have 
collected to determine whether it reduces uncertainty over the answer to their 
research question. Data can be analysed in a quantitative manner and in a 
qualitative manner. Analysing data in a quantitative manner means that the data is 
interpreted and represented numerically and is analysed using statistical 
techniques. The outputs of these statistical techniques suggest what can be 
inferred from the gathered data with a certain level of confidence.  An alternative 
to quantitative analysis is qualitative analysis where data is treated as units of 
linguistic meaning, and analyses are performed in an attempt to identify patterns, 
interconnections or themes. The outputs of qualitative analysis may be used to 
suggest what kinds of description of a situation are more plausible than others. In 
this section, we review a number of quantitative and qualitative approaches that 
may be useful for the analysis of SoS situations. 
3.3.1 Quantitative Approaches 
Multivariate statistical analysis is a useful approach for analysing and 
understanding large-scale phenomena where quantitative data may be gathered. 
Multivariate analysis refers to statistical techniques that simultaneously analyse 
multiple measurements of the phenomenon of interest (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2008). Multivariate techniques are often extensions of bivariate 
techniques – for instance a regression with one predictor variable is extended in 
the multivariate case to include multiple predictor variables. Multivariate 
techniques may be split into two groups based on their purpose: 
1) interdependence techniques - that aim to analyse the extent that a set of 
variables are interrelated. 
2) dependence techniques - that aim to analyse the extent that a set of 
independent variables can predict/explain a set of dependent variables.  
Factor analysis (including principal component analysis) is an interdependence 
technique that can analyse the interrelationships between large numbers of 
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variables and explain these variables in terms of their common underlying 
dimensions (or factors). The purpose of this technique is to understand the factors 
that influence a broad set of variables. For instance, it could be used to identify 
‘critical success factors’ in a portfolio of successful projects. 
Dependence techniques analyse changes to a dependent metric variable in 
response to changes to independent metric variables. These techniques are useful 
for the analysis of SoS as they enable a researcher to predict the effect of 
changing an aspect of a situation on variables of interest. In situations where the 
single dependent variable is dichotomous (Yes/No) or multichotomus (low-
medium-high) techniques such as multiple discriminant analysis may be used 
(Hair et al., 2008). This enables the prediction of the likelihood that an entity will 
belong to a particular category based on several independent variables. 
Logistic regression may be viewed as an extension of this technique as it enables a 
single dichotomous or multichotomus dependent variable to be predicted by any 
types of independent variables regardless of whether they are metrics, 
dichotomous or multichotomus. Canonical correlation may be viewed as a further 
extension of multiple regressions enabling the correlation of multiple dependent 
metric variables based on multiple independent metric variables. 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) are 
further techniques that are widely used as they allow multiple dependent variables 
to be predicted by multiple independent variables (Hair et al., 2008). SEM may be 
viewed as providing a technique for simultaneously estimating a series of separate 
multiple regression equations. A SEM analysis comprises two components: the 
structural model that describes the paths between dependent and independent 
variables; the measurement model that enables the use of several indicators of a 
single independent or dependent variable. CFA enables the researcher to assess 
the contribution of each indicator to a variable as well as determine how reliably 
the indicator measures the concept represented by the independent / dependent 
variable. In a SoS situation this technique might be used to develop and validate a 
model that predicts whether a person or team is likely to resist, support or be 
neutral towards a particular system based on their responses to a survey. 
Network analysis is also an interesting quantitative approach for analysing and 
understanding large-scale situations. Network analysis enables the analysis of 
systems with multiple interconnecting parts if their interconnections are known. 
Network analysis has enabled the analysis of systems of thousands to millions of 
nodes such as electric power grids, the Internet and social networks. This ability 
to analyse vast numbers of nodes and interactions makes network analysis 
attractive for understanding large-scale situations. 
There exist a number of candidate metrics that may lend themselves to 
understanding SoS situations. Firstly, the ‘influence’ or ‘importance’ of an 
element (node) in a socio-technical system (graph) may be identifiable using 
network centrality metrics. Network centrality metrics have been used for this 
purpose in other domains such a social network analysis (Boccaletti, Latora, 
Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006). Secondly the ‘complexity’ 
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(interconnectedness and extent of feedback) of an element may be estimable by 
combining existing techniques to count the number of loops a node is involved in 
and its number of links to other nodes. The counting of loops, referred to as k-
cycles, is a well-established practice (Vázquez, Oliveira, & Barabási1, 2005) as is 
counting the links of node (Opsahl, Agneessens, & Skvoretz, 2010). 
In anthropology, network analysis has also been used to aid the analysis of 
ethnographic data. Ethnographic materials can be coded into network databases so 
that they can be analysed using techniques from network analysis (White & 
Johansen, 2005). The use of network analysis in this manner has enabled 
researchers to understand how local interactions (observed using ethnography) 
form networks of interactions that have a macro structure with global properties 
that alter the context of interactions thus providing an understanding between the 
dynamics between micro-level interactions and macro level phenomena. This use 
of network analysis is again a particularly interesting approach from a SoS 
perspective as understanding how micro-level interactions induce macro level 
phenomena is important to both troubleshooting systems and identifying threats to 
systems. 
3.3.2 Qualitative Approaches 
Qualitative data analysis is often used in situations where a researcher wants to 
understand a system’s social and cultural context (Myers & Young, 1997). This is 
useful when a researcher wants to: 
o understand how a system’s stakeholders perceive and evaluate a 
system; 
o understand the influence of social and organisational context on 
system use; 
o explore causal mechanisms for the phenomenon of study; 
o provide formative evaluation that is aimed to improve a system 
underdevelopment; 
o contextualise quantitative evaluation (Kaplan & Maxwell, 2005) 
Qualitative analysis may be characterised by its reliance on a researcher’s 
interpretation of a text, or text analogue such as an interview transcription or 
observational data, to obtain a sense of a phenomena being studied (Creswell, 
2009). Qualitative analysis is often associated with: 
o the interpretation of data collected from humans in their natural 
settings e.g. their places of work, or in the geographical location of the 
phenomena of interest; 
o data collection prior to hypothesis formation; 
o evolving research designs and sampling strategies; 
o studying subjects’ perceptions of a phenomena by understanding and 
negotiating meanings and interpretations; 
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o utilising tacit knowledge to make sense of the nuances and differences 
between subjects’ multiple realities; 
o using coding to develop themes and identify interactions between 
themes to facilitate a researcher’s sense-making of the phenomena. 
Although making clear distinctions between different modes of qualitative data 
analysis is difficult, one may characterise them according to three broad types: (1) 
grounded theory; (2) hermeneutics; (3) narratives, metaphor and semiotics 
(Myers, 1997; Myers & Avison, 2002). 
3.2.1 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) is an inductive method of research that 
attempts to generate theories that are grounded in the qualitative data gathered 
during a study. Unlike experimental research that begins with a hypothesis to test, 
grounded theory begins with the collection of data and uses this data to influence 
the ongoing design of the research and also the research outcome e.g. a theory to 
explain an emerging research question (Jim Hughes & Jones, 2003; Matavire & 
Brown, 2008). 
Grounded theory approaches analyse data using the notions of constant 
comparison, coding and theoretical sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Jim 
Hughes & Jones, 2003; Matavire & Brown, 2008).  
Constant comparison means using comparison to evaluate data sources against 
each other data in order to determine their accuracy and generalisability, in 
addition to identifying concepts and verifying theory. 
Constant comparison is performed using: (1) open coding, which facilitates 
development of concepts and categories; (2) axial coding, which identifies 
relationships between categories; and (3) selective coding, which means to cease 
open coding and restrict coding to categories that are relevant to the formation of 
theory. The categories that remain should explain variation and account for 
contradicting evidence5. 
Coding is a technique for deriving concepts that emerge from data and developing 
those concepts so as to understand their properties (Lazar et al., 2010). Concepts 
emerge by viewing/reading the data and making comparisons between data so that 
commonalities and distinctions become apparent and concepts emerge.  
Depending on the style of grounded theory adopted, the data-coding scheme may 
be constructed on an ongoing basis, or may be an ‘a priori coding scheme’ based 
on an established theory or framework. Once coding is complete another party 
may check the reliability of the coding. The coding process is often supported by 
software packages that enable the storage of data in a searchable format, thus 
                                                
5 It should be noted by the reader that grounded theory is not a unified approach and that there exist at least 
two differing accounts of the approach – commonly referred to as Glaserian and Straussian camps. For 
discussion on the differences between the camps refer to (Matavire & Brown, 2008). 
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enabling a researcher to code and compare data in a manner that can be more 
efficient than hand-coding. Popular software packages include Atlas.ti6 and QSR 
NVivo7. 
Theoretical sampling is the notion that a grounded theory sampling strategy is 
influenced by an emerging research question and theory, rather than using a pre-
determined sample strategy as per traditional quantitative research. This means 
that a researcher may alter their sampling method to ensure that they are able to 
validate or falsify their theory using saturation sample. 
The grounded theory method of qualitative research is considered to be 
particularly well suited for the analysis of systems (Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 
1999; Jim Hughes & Jones, 2003). This is because it encourages the creation of 
theory rather than detailed description. This is considered advantageous since 
theory may be used to guide practice e.g. troubleshooting a situation (Baskerville 
& Pries-Heje, 1999; Kaplan & Maxwell, 2005). Grounded theory also provides a 
rigorous way of analysing data for the purposes of action research (Baskerville & 
Pries-Heje, 1999; Wastell, 2001). Grounded theory has been used to study many 
systems and contexts including the study of system adoption (Orlikowski, 1993), 
the success and failure of knowledge management systems (Wastell, 2001), the 
evaluation of IT systems in the public sector (Jim Hughes & Jones, 2003). 
The main disadvantage of the grounded theory approach is that it relies on the 
expertise of the researcher not to inject bias, and their open-mindedness to 
produce reliable and useful findings that may be used to inform a situation. Also it 
should be noted that grounded theory can be at odds with interventionist systems 
research as grounded theory tends to be broad exploratory technique. However in 
practice, studies suggest that this theoretical limitation is not problematic as 
researchers adapt the scope and nature of the grounded theory approach to suit 
their own purposes (Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 1999; Matavire & Brown, 2008). 
3.2.2 Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is a mode of analysis that is concerned with the meaning of text or a 
text analogue (Myers, 1997, 2004). Hermeneutic analysis attempts to make sense 
of a text, or text analogue, that is confused, incomplete, messy, or seemingly 
contradictory. Although there are a variety of hermeneutic styles from differing 
philosophical traditions, broadly speaking hermeneutic analysis attempts to elicit 
the underlying meaning and coherence of a text using five key principles: (1) 
historicity; (2) hermeneutic circle; (3) prejudice; (4) autonomization and 
distanciation; (5) appropriation and engagement (Myers, 2004). 
Historicity is the notion that the way a person interprets and acts is influenced by 
their past experiences, and that their past experiences are shaped by the habits and 
                                                
6 For further details on the capabilities of Atlas.ti see http://www.atlasti.com/ 
7 For further details on the capabilities of QSR NVivo see 
http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx 
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practices of the communities they have interacted with (Myers, 2004). This 
implies that a person’s interpretation of the present day, such as a problematic 
information system, is historically informed and that to understand a person’s 
interpretation of a situation requires an understanding their historicality. 
The hermeneutic circle refers to the proposition that the meaning of a text is 
elicited by interpreting the text as a whole and as a set of parts – this iterative 
process is referred to as a hermeneutic circle (Myers, 1997, 2004). The 
hermeneutic circle is based upon the premise that there is dialectic between the 
understanding of a text as a whole and the interpretation of its parts. It is 
postulated that the anticipation of the meaning of the whole shapes the 
interpretation of the parts. Similarly the meaning of the parts shapes the 
interpretation of the whole. Therefore to understand a text an interpreter must 
iterate between studying the parts and studying the whole until a coherent 
meaning can be elicited. 
Prejudice is the notion that prior knowledge plays an important role in an 
interpreter’s understanding of a text (Myers, 2004). It is postulated that an 
interpreter’s attempt to understand a text always involves some prior knowledge 
or expectation. E.g. a person requires prior knowledge of the language a text is 
written in, the domain specific terms, and its historical context. Prejudice also 
implies that an analyst requires an awareness of their own historicality, and that it 
is necessary to reflect on how it may be shaping their understanding of a text. In 
the context of studying information systems this means that when attempting to 
understand a problematic system a researcher must not only be aware of his 
subjects’ historicality but also his own when attempting to understanding the 
problem.  
Autonomisation and distanciation are notions that describe the properties of a 
written text (Myers, 2004). Autonomisation refers to that fact that once an author 
writes a text its becomes autonomous in the sense that the meaning of the text 
exists independently of the author and the author may no longer control the 
context in which it is interpreted. Distanciation refers to the distance in time, 
geography and social space between the original author and reader of the text. In 
the context of studying information systems this means that the meaning/purpose 
of a system changes over time and space. For instance, the outcome of an 
information system development becomes distanced from its original purposes or 
justification for development, and thus may be interpreted in multiple ways by 
multiple interpreters. 
Appropriation and engagement is the notion that a reader can only understand the 
meaning of a text if the reader appropriates its meaning (Myers, 2004). That is to 
say that the readers must make the text their own by critically engaging with the 
text. In the context of information systems this means that a researcher attempting 
to understand a problematic system needs to critically engage in the problem by 
iteratively forming hypotheses, searching for falsifying evidence and 
reformulating hypotheses until a theory (or explanation) of the problem can be 
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generated that accounts for apparent contradictions or tensions between different 
stakeholders’ perspectives. 
Hermeneutics has been used in a number of case studies to understand messy 
situations involving information systems. For instance the study of the social and 
political context of email communications by managers in a corporation (Lee, 
1994), the study of power, assumptions and hidden agendas in a large public 
sector IT project (Myers & Young, 1997), the analysis of myths concerning call 
centre based customer services (Corea, 2006), the analysis and amelioration of 
information systems development practices (Boland, Newman, & Pentland, 2010; 
Butler & Fitzgerald, 1997). 
The strength of hermeneutic approaches are that they provide the researcher with 
freedom to pursue anomalous findings and enables them to put their interpretation 
on the data rather than simply attempting to determine the meaning of a text (Cole 
& Avison, 2007). Another strength of hermeneutic research is that researcher 
‘bias’ is documented and used in an explicit and systematic manner to generate 
insights. The researcher builds a framework of understanding that outlines their 
set of assumptions, concepts and practices that constitutes their way of viewing 
reality. The prejudices that structure the construction of meaning are explicitly 
documented when identifying themes for discussion during interview and also 
when providing ideas for coding. 
The disadvantages of hermeneutic approaches are that, unlike grounded theory, 
studies do not aspire to build theory to explain the relationship between a set of 
propositions that have been repeatedly tested (Cole & Avison, 2007). 
Hermeneutic approaches are also difficult to learn as there is not a single well-
defined approach, and their focus on accounting for anomalies may also be at 
odds with troubleshooting and interventionist style research. 
3.2.3 Narrative, Metaphor and Semiotics 
Narrative, metaphor and semiotics are modes of analysis that attempt to 
understand the nature of IS related social practices by understanding the nature of 
the stories, metaphors or symbols that are used by participants describing the 
practice (Myers, 1997; Myers & Avison, 2002). Stories, metaphors or symbols are 
studied because they facilitate the communication of meaning between individuals 
and are critical for organisational sense-making and therefore their study may 
impart insights (Hirschheim & Newman, 2002). The state and popularity of this 
research is difficult to ascertain as surveys and criticism of this approach of 
studying of information systems is non-existent or too superficial to enable a 
detailed discussion in this thesis. 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
Our review of research methods indicates that to study SoS, in a cost effective 
manner, the use of research strategies that manage a time cost vs. completeness 
trade-off is essential. In order to meet this time cost vs. completeness trade-off our 
research suggests the use of theoretically informed multi-site, multi-method 
studies. During the review we observed that low cost methods such as surveys and 
focus groups might be suitable for eliciting the ‘big picture’ context of a SoS and 
that this information could be used to focus further efforts. We also noted that 
qualitative data analysis might be a useful approach for analysing data as it 
enables analysis of the social and political context of SoS as perceived by 
different stakeholders. 
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4. A Modelling Abstraction for Socio-Technical Troubleshooting 
and Threat Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to formulate a basic modelling abstraction for socio-
technical troubleshooting and threat identification of SoS. To achieve this aim we: 
(1) identify a practical strategy for analysing the behaviour of SoS that copes with 
under-specification and low comprehensibility; 
(2) identify information requirements and practical requirements of the above 
strategy; 
(3) develop a responsibility-based modelling abstraction that meets these 
requirements; 
(4) compare the responsibility-based abstraction with other prominent modelling 
abstractions.  
This chapter is structured so that in section 2 we seek to identify a practical 
strategy for analysing the behaviour of a SoS. We begin by considering the 
challenges of modelling SoS that are under-specified and that have a low 
comprehensibility. We then propose that a strategy of creating models that bound 
the possible behaviour of a SoS may be useful and realistic. We then postulate 
that high-level structural models may be sufficiently invariant and informative to 
enable analyses that bound the behaviours of a SoS. 
In section 3, we propose six classes of information and two practical requirements 
to ensure that the modelling abstraction captures the necessary information to 
enable analysis of SoS. In section 4 we use an example SoS to illustrate that the 
responsibility modelling abstraction meets the requirements set out in section 3 
and thus may be used for SoS socio-technical threat identification and 
troubleshooting. Our example comprises a simplified SoS, called 
‘MegaFileShare’, that is implemented using a number of cloud-based systems. 
The case study in this chapter is intended to be illustrative, rather than thorough, 
as subsequent chapters will contain such analyses. The purpose of this example is 
to simply demonstrate that it is feasible that the notion of responsibility modelling 
(supported by causal models of risk clauses) meets these requirements. 
In section 5, we explain that responsibility modelling is a promising abstraction 
for troubleshooting and threat identification because of its stakeholder centric 
focus. Rather it focuses on desirable and undesirable behaviours and their 
contextualised importance to each stakeholder in a model. The responsibility 
abstraction enables the analysis of which stakeholders are ultimately liable for 
what system behaviours, thus enabling stakeholders in boundary crossing systems 
to understand the risks they are accepting and those that they are transferring to 
- 56 - 
other agents. Section 5 also explains that responsibility modelling is of practical 
use as responsibilities tend to be unproblematic to elicit and that the notions used 
in responsibility modelling are grounded on notions used in the behavioural 
sciences to predict human behaviour. This is notable as it enables the analysis of 
‘socio’ issues using insights from the behavioural sciences. 
Finally in section 6, the responsibility abstraction is contrasted with other 
abstractions including IDEF, UML and I* to demonstrate how their affordances 
compare, and to what extent they are able to meet the information and practical 
requirements defined in section 3. 
4.2 A Strategy for the Socio-Technical Analysis of a SoS 
SoS may be seen as a difficult class of system to model and analyse. This is 
because they are challenging to describe and understand due their under-
specification and low comprehensibility. They are under-specified because: 
• their specific operating conditions and exact configuration are too 
vast or ephemeral to completely specify (Hollnagel, 2008; Montibeller & 
Belton, 2006). 
• their parts and interactions change over time and thus 
creating/maintaining complete structural and behavioural descriptions is too 
costly/difficult (Hollnagel, 2008). 
• the number and nature of parts and interactions may be disputed, or 
no one person has a complete view of the system, and so multiple potentially 
inconsistent views of the system may exist. 
SoS have a low comprehensibility because: 
• interactions between system parts may be non-linear and emergent 
(Hollnagel, 2008) 
• no individual stakeholder has a complete view of the system and its 
operating conditions 
• stakeholders may need to make sense of a large number of parts, 
interactions and views to understand the system’s structure and behaviour. 
Whilst acknowledging these challenges, an analyst attempting to understand the 
socio-technical behavioural properties of a SoS must adopt a strategy of analysis 
that ‘makes the best of a bad lot’. Since it has been acknowledged that creating 
and maintaining descriptively complete structural and behavioural models of a 
SoS is unrealistic we must instead set our sights on a more modest strategy. 
One such strategy is to develop models that attempt to bound the possible 
behaviour of a SoS. Using this line of reasoning one can attempt to identify 
attributes of SoS that are sufficiently high level to inform the analysis of the 
systems behavioural properties (as a totality) and are sufficiently invariant so that 
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once information is collected about these attributes it is not ‘out-of-date’ prior to 
analysis.  
The structural attributes of SoS, such as the dependencies between high-level 
components, may be sufficiently high-level and invariant to enable analysis that 
bounds their behaviour. We know from the study of complex networks that the 
analysis of structural properties of network systems (including social networks) 
can enable the bounding of their behavioural properties in certain situations e.g. 
percolation, epidemic spreading, diffusion (Boccaletti et al., 2006; Newman, 
2003; Vespignani, 2012). We also know from prior research on I* models, and 
agent responsibility models, that potential system behaviours (e.g. threats) may be 
identified by inspecting their structural properties (Asnar, 2009; Asnar & 
Giorgini, 2006; Lock et al., 2009; Sommerville et al., 2009). 
To systematically identify the potential behaviour of SoS, I suggest that the 
development of a structural model is of practical importance. Whilst it may be 
possible to create behavioural models, such as cognitive maps or system dynamic 
models, without first creating a structural model, I propose that this is unwise as it 
relies upon stakeholders and subject matter experts having correct mental models 
of the system’s structure. I do not want to make this assumption as it is 
acknowledged that SoS are vast and that people may have differing mental models 
of these systems. Therefore by creating a structural model I want to ensure that 
inconsistencies between stakeholders’ high-level views of a system are identified, 
discussed and resolved (or are at least ‘in the open’) prior to analysis beginning. 
To systematically identify potentially complicated linear and non-linear 
behaviours of a SoS, I suggest that the development of a behavioural model is also 
of importance. The purpose of the behavioural model is to understand how the 
identified potential behaviours may combine and perhaps create complicated 
linear or non-linear behaviours. I suggest that the creation of a high-level 
behavioural model is of particular importance since we have acknowledged that 
SoS have a low comprehensibility and therefore we cannot assume that a 
stakeholder, or even a subject matter expert, will have a mental model of all the 
possible behaviours and their interactions. 
A crucial aspect of the bounding strategy with respect to its practicality is the 
extent that these structural and behavioural models will need to be complete 
descriptions of a SoS. I hypothesise that this will depend upon the purpose of the 
analysis and the nature of the system being analysed. It may be the case in some 
situations that a small amount of information about the structure of a system is 
sufficient to create a behavioural model that bounds its behavioural properties to 
within a range that meets an analysts needs e.g. a small amount of information 
about the structure of a system may enable the analyst to a claim that a system has 
a property p. The case studies in this thesis shed light on the extent descriptions 
may be high level and incomplete, and the kinds of claims that may be made. 
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4.3 Requirements of the Modelling Abstraction 
To execute the strategy described above, a modelling approach is required to 
capture the necessary information and represent it in a manner that makes it 
amenable to analysis. Below I propose that the required modelling abstraction 
must meet the following information requirements and practical requirements to 
ensure its scalability. 
1. It must capture the following classes of information: 
A. desirable and undesirable behaviour; 
B. the consequences of undesirable behaviour for a component and its 
interdependent components; 
C. the consequences  of desirable behaviour not occurring for a 
component and its interdependent components; 
D. the person/organisation that is accountable for the (non)occurrence 
of behaviour; 
E. the resources that a component depends on to perform the 
behaviour that is accountable for; 
F. the dependencies between system-level behaviour and component 
level behaviour. 
2. The model should have the potential to represent systems with non-trivial 
numbers of components and interactions. 
3. The analysis of the models should have the capability to be algorithmic, or 
computer assisted, such that the number of components a person can 
interpret does not limit the scale of an analysable system. 
Requirement 1-A is important because it enables undesirable and desirable 
behaviours to be compared to the system’s potential behaviour. This comparison 
enables the identification of threats from undesirable behaviours that are potential 
system behaviours and desirable behaviours that are not potential behaviours. 
Requirements 1-B and 1-C are important because the consequences of undesirable 
behaviour on behavioural properties of interest need to be understood so that 
threats are identified. It is also vital to capture the consequences of desirable 
behaviour not occurring so its impact on system behaviour may also be assessed. 
Requirement 1-D is important because the capture of which human/organisation is 
accountable for certain behaviours, provides insights into the differing interests of 
the human/organisational agents composing the system. This is particularly 
important in assessing systems that cross organisational boundaries as ‘who is 
responsible for what’, and what the rewards/repercussions are if desired 
behaviours are unmet becomes important. 
Requirement 1-E is important because agents may depend on certain resources to 
perform behaviour that they are accountable for. To troubleshoot and perform 
threat analysis an analyst requires information on these dependencies because 
their absence or variance may be a cause of undesirable behaviour. 
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Requirement 1-F is important for the purpose of troubleshooting and threat 
analysis because an analyst needs to trace component level behaviours to system 
level behaviours and vice versa. Troubleshooting can be thought of as tracing 
problematic system level behaviours (or properties) to component level 
behaviours (or properties). Threat analysis can be thought of as tracing component 
level behaviours (or properties) to system level behaviours (or properties). 
Requirement 2 is important because an abstraction that does not enable the 
representation and analysis of a large number of components and interactions may 
not be practical for the analysis of SoS. 
Requirement 3 is important because an abstraction that is limited by the number 
of nodes an unaided person may analyse and understand in a timely manner may 
not be practical for the analysis of SoS. 
4.4 Responsibility Modelling 
Responsibility modelling has been proposed by several researchers as a useful 
abstraction for analyzing the dependability of socio-technical systems (Blyth, 
Chudge, Dobson, & Strens, 1993; Dobson & Martin, 2007; Strens & Dobson, 
1993). I use responsibilities as part of a graphical modelling notation that 
represents ‘responsibilities’, ‘agents’ and ‘resources’ interconnected by 
relationships. 
For the purposes of responsibility modelling, a responsibility is defined as: 
“A duty, held by some agent, to achieve, maintain or avoid some given state, 
subject to conformance with organizational, social and cultural norms” (Lock et 
al., 2009) 
The term duty in this definition captures obligation and accountability aspects of 
responsibilities such that if an agent does not appropriately discharge their 
obligation they will be held liable. The phrase conformance with organisational, 
social and cultural norms captures the fact that responsibilities must be discharged 
in accordance with legal and domain standards. 
For the purposes of modelling the SoS analysed in this thesis we use the following 
entities and relationships: 
• Responsibility: An entity representing a duty to achieve, maintain or avoid a 
specified state subject to conformance with norms. 
• Resource: An entity representing physical material or information that 
contributes to meeting an obligation e.g. documents, databases, servers, tape 
drives, machines. 
• Human Agent: An entity representing a human being often referred to by their 
role e.g. Support Manager. 
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• Organisational Agent: An entity representing an organisation e.g. an enterprise 
or government agency. 
• Responsibility For: A relationship representing the allocation of a 
responsibility to an agent 
• Has: A relationship representing the allocation of a resource to an agent or 
responsibility 
• Depends: A relationship representing that the fulfilment of a responsibility is 
dependent on the fulfilment of another 
• Association: A relationship representing that an entity is related to another. 
The association relationship may be annotated to clarify the relationship if 
necessary. 
To identify threats responsibility modelling is combined with a HAZOPS style 
approach to identifying risks (Sommerville et al., 2009). Threats are identified via 
the means of ‘risk clauses’ – see for an example see Table 4.4 in this section. Risk 
clauses are composed from a target, a hazard, a condition, a set of 
consequences/threats and an estimation of their severity and likelihood (when 
appropriate). 
Definitions of these terms are provided below. 
Target: The entity or relationship to which the risk clause refers. E.g. an entity 
may be the responsibility to support and maintain a virtual machine instance. A 
relationship may be the allocation of a responsibility or resource to an agent. 
Hazard: Using a restricted set of keywords we aim to provide a checklist of 
hazard source categories to consider. The hazard keywords we used are outlined 
below: 
• Early - Occurrence of entity/relationship before required. 
• Late - Occurrence of entity/relationship after required. 
• Never - Non-occurrence of entity/relationship. 
• Incapable - Occurrence did not take place although attempts were made to 
fulfil the obligation. 
• Insufficient - Occurrence of the entity/relationship at an incorrect level. 
• Impaired - Occurrence of the entity/relationship in an incorrect manner. 
• Changes - The entity/relationship changes on a ‘permanent’ basis. 
Condition: A description of the potential conditions that could manifest as a result 
of the hazard category considered. 
Consequences: A threat to a behavioural property of the system e.g. availability, 
reliability, safety, integrity, or maintainability. 
Severity: Liabilities resulting from the hazard manifesting. 
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To illustrate that responsibility modelling provides a suitable abstraction for 
modelling SoS for the purposes of troubleshooting and threat identification. 
Responsibility modelling will be performed on a simple example of a SoS called 
‘MegaFileShare’. ‘MegaFileShare’ consists of a website for sharing files and 
serving advertisements to users as they consume the content. 
The ‘MegaFileShare’ example demonstrates how desirable and undesirable 
behaviour and their consequences are captured using responsibilities described in 
terms of obligations, liabilities and norms. It shows how human/organisational 
agents are represented as being accountable for their behaviour, how resource and 
causal dependencies are captured and represented. And how dependencies 
between system-level behaviour and component level behaviour is represented 
using a causal map. 
The example SoS, ‘MegaFileShare’, consists of a web server running on a virtual 
machine that is independently managed and operated by ‘Website Host Ltd’ and a 
‘file storage as a service’ system, similar to Amazon S3, which is independently 
managed and operated by ‘Simply Storage Ltd’. The website itself is designed and 
maintained by ‘MegaFileShare Ltd’ and users of the site upload its content, 
normally in the form of videos or eBooks. 
The desired behaviour of this SoS is described using the responsibility abstraction 
in terms of obligations, liabilities and norms. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 describe a partial 
set of the obligations, liabilities and norms of the storage system provider, which 
we call ‘Simply Storage Ltd’, and the Website host, which we call ‘Website Host 
Ltd’. We can see that Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are partial since the responsibilities with 
respect to abiding by specific laws and legislation have not been listed for 
simplicity. We could however specify these should it be desired but for illustrative 
purposes this intricacy is unnecessary. 
Table 4.1 –Description of responsibilities between Simply Storage and 
Website Host 
 Simply Storage Ltd. Website Host Ltd. 
# Obligation Liability Norms Obligation Liability Norms 
1 Write 
received files 
to storage 
If Uptime 
<99.9% then 
refund 10% of 
customer 
service credit. 
If Uptime <99% 
then refund 25% 
if customer 
service credit. 
If availability is 
impacted by 
factors other 
than those used 
in our 
calculation of 
the error rate, 
1. Uptime is 
measured on 
availability 
of service 
within the S3 
demarcation 
area. 
Downtime 
due to 
problems 
outside the 
demarcation 
area such as 
internet 
issues are not 
included. 
Pay for file 
storage @ 
$0.14 per GB 
If 
payments 
are not 
received 
then liable 
for legal 
action due 
to breach 
of contract 
and 
account 
will be 
suspended 
until 
payment 
is 
Payme
nt 
taken 
by 
credit 
card on 
monthl
y basis. 
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we may issue a 
Service Credit 
considering 
such factors at 
our sole 
discretion 
2. Data will 
be stored on 
an 
infrastructure 
with 
99.99999999
% 
‘durability’ 
over a year.  
received. 
2 Read 
requested file 
from storage 
See above See above Pay for data 
transfer @ 
$.012 per GB 
See above See 
above 
 
Table 4.2 – Description of Responsibilities between Website Host and 
MegaFileShare 
# Website Host Ltd. MegaFileShare Ltd 
# Obligation Liability Norms Obligation Liability Norms 
3 Provision web 
server and file 
storage 
If uptime  < 
99.9% then 
financially 
liable for the 
resultant lost 
advertisement 
revenue during 
periods of 
unavailability. 
Uptime is 
measured on 
availability 
of the service 
(including 
file 
download 
and upload) 
within 
hosting 
demarcation 
area 
including the 
internet 
gateway. 
Pay for 
provision of 
web servers 
and file 
storage @ 
$2.64 per 
server per 
hour, $.12 
per GB 
transmitted, 
$.14 per GB 
stored. 
If 
payments 
are not 
received 
that 
liability 
for legal 
action due 
to breach 
of contract 
and their 
account 
will be 
suspended 
until 
payment 
is 
received. 
Payme
nt 
taken 
by 
credit 
card on 
monthl
y basis. 
 
Table 4.1 and 4.2 describe the desired behaviour of the SoS. We can observe that 
‘Simply Storage Ltd’ is responsible for writing files to storage, reading files from 
storage and to provide this behaviour with an availability of 99.9% during a 
billing period. It is specified in the table that if this behaviour is not met then 
refunds are owed to the customer depending on the severity of the breach. It is 
also specified in the table that the files should be stored on infrastructure with a 
‘durability’ of 99.99999999%, meaning over the lifetime of the only one in every 
billion files may be lost/corrupted. We can also see that in return for this desired 
behaviour ‘Website Host Ltd’ is obligated to pay for file storage and for data 
transfer and that they must pay on a monthly basis using a credit card. 
Additionally it is specified that if this is not met then ‘Website Host Ltd’ is liable 
to be sued for breach of contract and their account will be suspended until 
payment is received. 
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In Table 4.2 we can see the responsibilities between ‘Website Host Ltd’ and 
‘MegaFileShare Ltd’. ‘Website Host Ltd’ should provide a web server and file 
storage that that has an uptime over 99.9%. If this desired behaviour is not met 
then ‘Website Host Ltd’ is financially liable for the resultant lost advertisement 
revenue during periods of unavailability. In return for this behaviour 
‘MegaFileShare Ltd’ must pay for the services at a specified rate on a monthly 
basis. If they do not do so then ‘MegaFileShare Ltd’ is liable to be sued for breach 
of contract. 
Having captured a specification of desirable and undesirable behaviour and the 
consequences of this behaviour in terms of responsibilities (obligations, liabilities 
and norms), one may now attempt to identify resources and interactions that 
produce the behaviours that have been specified. To do this one needs to identify 
the entities that constrain/enable the behaviours that the agents are interested in. 
One should first focus on those entities that contribute to fulfilling obligations that 
stakeholders are interested in. The most important class of entity to model are the 
resources that enable the responsible agent to fulfil their obligations in accordance 
with the norms specified. The most important class of relationship to model is the 
fulfilment dependency between responsibilities. A fulfilment dependency 
represents that for a responsibility to be fulfilled it is dependent upon the 
fulfilment of another. Table 4.3 below specifies the resources that are required for 
each of the stakeholders to fulfil their obligations as specified in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2. We can see, from Table 4.3, that the file storage service provider requires a 
storage system with 99.9% availability and a durability of 99.999999999% in 
addition to an Internet gateway that provides an availability of 99.9%. We can 
also see that ‘Website Host Ltd’ requires a credit card for payment and a web 
server (or set of web servers) with an availability of 99.9%. 
Table 4.3 - Partial description of the resources required to meet 
responsibilities within ‘MegaFileShare’ SoS 
Rsp Obligation Resource Requirement Obligation Resource 
Requirement 
1 Write file to 
storage 
-Storage system with 99.9% 
uptime and durability of 
99.999999999% 
-Internet gateway with 
uptime of 99.9% 
Pay for file 
storage @ $0.14 
per GB 
-Credit card for 
payment 
2 Read 
requested file 
from storage 
See above Pay for data 
transfer @ 
$.012 per GB 
See above 
3 Provision 
web server 
and file 
storage 
-Web server with 99.9% 
uptime 
-File storage system with 
99.9% uptime 
-Internet gateway with 
uptime of 99.9% 
Pay for 
provision of 
web servers and 
file storage @ 
$2.64 per server 
per hour, $.12 
per GB 
transmitted, 
$.14 per GB 
-Credit card for 
payment 
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stored. 
 
Once the responsibility model has been completed the behaviour of the system 
must be bounded to determine if it provides the behaviour that agents are 
responsible for. To bound the behaviour of a SoS, and thus identify potential 
behaviours that threaten the system’s desired behavioural properties, one should 
consider how the failure of specific agents, or combinations of agents, to meet 
their obligations will affect the fulfilment of other obligations. A diagram of the 
relationships between agents, responsibilities and resources can help achieve this 
by encouraging analysis to be performed in a systematic way. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Responsibility Model Of MegaFileShare SoS 
The responsibility model above (Figure 4.1) simply describes the relationships 
between agents, responsibilities and resources as described in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 
4.3. We can see that ‘Simply Storage Ltd’ is responsible for file storage and file 
retrieval, ‘Website Host Ltd’ is responsible for paying for storage, paying for data 
transfer and provisioning the web server and storage for ‘MegaFileShare Ltd’. We 
can see that the write file to storage and read requested file from storage 
responsibilities are dependent on two resources (the storage system and internet 
gateway). We can see that payment responsibilities are dependent on resources 
(credit cards). We can also see that there are multiple fulfilment dependencies 
between the responsibilities. For instance, write file to storage is dependent upon 
‘Website Host Ltd’ paying for storage at the end of every month. Similarly 
‘Website Host Ltd’ paying for storage is dependent upon ‘Simply Storage Ltd’ 
providing file storage the previous month. 
To illustrate that we may capture the organisational agents commercial interests, 
the ‘Generate Revenue’ responsibility of each organisational agent has also been 
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included to highlight the interdependencies between the agents’ commercial 
interests. Hence the model describes that ‘Simply Storage Ltd’ may only fulfil it 
responsible to generate revenue if ‘Website Host Ltd’ meet their responsibility of 
paying for storage and data transfer. Similarly ‘Website Host Ltd’ may only fulfil 
their responsibility to generate revenue if ‘MegaFileShare Ltd’ fulfil their 
responsibility of paying for server provisioning and storage, and ‘MegaFileShare 
Ltd’ may only generate revenue if ‘Website Host Ltd’ fulfil their responsibility to 
provision a website and storage. 
Having prepared a graphical responsibility model, threats to the desired behaviour 
of the system can be captured using ‘risk clauses’. A risk clause is composed of a 
target, a condition, a set of consequences and an estimate of their severity and 
likelihood. A target is the entity or relationship to which the risk clause refers. 
Typically the target of a risk clause will be a responsibility. A condition is a 
description of a particular state that could manifest to threaten the target, e.g. a 
lack of appropriate resources to fulfil an obligation. The consequences describe 
the effects of the condition on the target e.g. the responsibility will be reneged 
until adequate resources are obtained. The severity describes the liabilities 
resulting from the threat manifesting e.g. that the agent faces a financial penalty 
for reneging the responsibility. Table 4.4 below describes the risk clauses 
associated with the ‘MegaFileShare’. 
Table 4.4 - Risk Clauses for 'MegaFileShare' 
Target Condition Consequences Severity 
<Simply Storage 
Ltd> Write received 
file to storage 
<1> Storage system incapable 
of storing additional files e.g. 
insufficient capacity, system 
offline for maintenance, … 
<5> Internet gateway 
incapable of transfer files to 
storage system e.g. 
insufficient bandwidth, 
gateway down for 
maintenance, … 
<2> Service outage 
impacting uptime. 
-Lost revenue from 
downtime. 
<3> -If Uptime <99.9% then 
refund 10% of customer 
service credit. 
<4> -If Uptime <99% then 
refund 25% of customer 
service credit. 
Severity dependent on 
duration of down time. 
-Larger the down time larger 
the refund 
<8> WebsiteHost Ltd billed 
for $0.00 because no files 
written 
<9> Renege Generate Revenue 
<Simply Storage 
Ltd> Read requested 
file from storage 
<1> Storage system incapable 
of retrieving files e.g. file 
corruption, insufficient IO 
bandwidth to retrieve file, 
system offline for 
maintenance, … 
<5> Internet gateway 
incapable of transfer files to 
storage system e.g. 
insufficient bandwidth, 
gateway down for 
maintenance, … 
<6> Service outage 
impacting uptime. 
-Lost revenue from 
downtime. 
<3> -If Uptime <=99.9% 
then refund 10% of customer 
service credit. 
<4> -If Uptime <99% then 
refund 25% if customer 
service credit. 
Severity dependent on 
duration of down time. 
-Larger the down time larger 
the refund 
<8> WebsiteHost Ltd billed 
for $0.00 because no files 
written 
<9> Renege Generate Revenue 
<Simply Storage 
Ltd>Generate 
Revenue 
<14> <Website Host Ltd> 
renege responsibility to pay 
for Storage used 
<8> <Website Host Ltd> 
billed for $0.00 because no 
files read or written e.g. 
technical problems 
<9> Renege Generate 
Revenue 
Severity dependent on the 
duration. 
<WebsiteHost Ltd> <10> Web servers incapable 
of serving the website e.g. 
<12> If uptime  < 99.9% 
then financially liable for the 
High severity 
- 66 - 
Provision web server 
and file storage 
insufficient bandwidth, 
gateway down for 
maintenance, … 
<2> <Simply Storage Ltd> 
renege responsibility to write 
file to storage 
<6> <Simply Storage Ltd> 
renege responsibility to read 
requested file from storage 
resultant lost advertisement 
revenue during periods of 
unavailability. 
<18> <MegaFileShare> 
billed $0.00 because service 
not provisioned 
<20> <MegaFileShare> 
renege generate revenue. 
Website host financially liable 
for lost revenue of 
‘MegaFileShare Ltd’.  
<16> <Website Host> renege 
generated revenue 
<Website Host Ltd> 
Pay for storage 
<13> 1. Credit card with 
insufficient funds 
<14> Account is suspended 
until payment is received. 
If payments are not received 
then liable for legal action 
due to breach of contract and 
their  
Extreme severity 
<2><6>No longer able to fulfil 
responsibility to provision web 
servers and file storage 
 
<Website Host Ltd> 
Pay for data transfer 
As above <15> As above As above 
<Website Host Ltd> 
Generate revenue 
<17> <MegaFileShare Ltd> 
renege on payment for web 
server and storage usage 
<18> <MegaFileShare Ltd> 
billed $0.00 because zero 
servers used e.g. due to 
technical problems 
<16> <Website Host Ltd> 
Renege generate revenue 
None specified 
<MegaFileShare 
Ltd> Pay for 
provision of servers 
and file storage 
<19> <MegaFileShare Ltd> 
Credit card with insufficient 
funds 
<17> <MegaFileShare Ltd> 
renege on payment for 
webserver and storage usage. 
<11> <Website Host Ltd> 
Account is suspended until 
payment is received. 
If payments are not received 
then liable for legal action 
due to breach of contract and 
their 
Extreme severity 
<16> <Website Host Ltd> No 
longer able to generate 
revenue since web server and 
storage will not be provisioned 
until payment received 
<20> <MegaFileShare> 
Renege generate revenue 
<MegaFileShare 
Ltd> 
Generate Revenue 
<11> <Website Host Ltd> 
renege on provisioning web 
server and storage 
<18> <MegaFileShare> 
billed $0.00 because service 
not provisioned 
Extreme severity 
<20> <MegaFileShare> 
Renege generate revenue 
<16> <Website Host Ltd> No 
longer able to generate 
revenue since web server and 
storage will not be provisioned 
until payment received 
The above risk clauses can be made more easily interpretable by representing 
them as a causal map. This assists in the identification of relationships between 
clauses hence it enables the representation of relationships between specific 
resource conditions or agent conditions to desired system level behaviours as may 
be represented using responsibilities. Below is the causal map of the risk clauses 
in Table 4.4.
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Figure 4.2 - Causal map of Risk Clauses 
By inspecting the causal map of the risk clauses one may identify the relations 
between risk clauses. One can identify the responsibilities that are reneged as a 
result of certain conditions by following the arrows from condition up to a 
reneged responsibility. One can identify the conditions that cause a responsibility 
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being reneged by following the arrows in reverse thus enabling threat 
identification and troubleshooting using the diagram. For instance we can identify 
that an insufficiency of storage resources in ‘Simply Storage Ltd’ storage system 
is a threat to ‘Website Host Ltd’s responsibility to generate revenue. Equally we 
can identify that the threats to ‘MegaFileShare Ltd’ generating revenue include 
‘Website Host Ltd’ having insufficient funds on their credit card resulting in a 
suspension of the storage system, the ‘Simply Storage Ltd’ storage system 
becoming incapable to meet demand, the ‘Simply Storage Ltd’ internet gateway 
becoming incapable to meet demand, the ‘Website Host Ltd’ web servers being 
incapable to meet demand, or their own credit card having insufficient funds pay 
for ‘Website Host Ltd’ services.  
In later chapters of this thesis, we will develop tactics for identifying ‘socio’ 
causes of undesirable behaviour by illustrating how it may be possible to identify 
overlapping self-interests (or otherwise) by inspection of obligations and 
liabilities, and agents’ potential to conflict/resist a system. 
4.5 Why Responsibilities are a Useful Abstraction 
Responsibilities are a useful abstraction for socio-technical threat analysis and 
troubleshooting as they enable the modelling of systems in manner that makes the 
desires of a stakeholder and the importance of each desire a focal point of 
analysis. For instance, the website owner of ‘MegaFileShare’ wanted a file 
sharing website with 99.9% uptime, and this behavioural property is worth 
making the web host liable for the value of the revenue lost for the duration of 
downtime. 
Responsibilities are also useful because they present a system in manner that 
makes accountability a focal point of analysis. This is particularly important for 
threat identification and troubleshooting across organisational boundaries as it 
enables the analysis of who is ultimately liable for what, and therefore can aid in 
understanding whether threats/risks have been transferred to partners or otherwise. 
Responsibilities are also useful because their capture of norms can help in the 
analysis of misunderstanding when working with agents across organisational 
boundaries. For instance the way ‘Uptime’ is calculated by the storage service 
provider may be different to what another agent believes is the norm. However by 
capturing this explicitly as norm it is brought to the fore. 
Responsibilities are also useful for practical reasons. They are straightforward to 
elicit as they are a concept that is in common verbal use. It is also relatively trivial 
to ask stakeholders about their norms. For example, how is this normally done? 
How would you expect this to be done? Responsibilities are also particularly 
useful for representing large systems as they can be used to abstract away 
task/process level information. 
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Perhaps most importantly responsibilities ground the model on important 
mediators of social action e.g. obligations, liabilities norms. We know from 
behavioural studies that human behaviour is strongly related to a human’s beliefs 
about the consequences of behaviour, social normative pressures and the presence 
of factors that may facilitate or impede performance (Ajzen, 1991; Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). Responsibility modelling captures these notions as the 
consequences of behaviour can be captured using obligations and liabilities to 
detail benefits or sanctions associated with performance and non-performance of 
behaviour. Social normative pressures can be captured by using norms, and 
presence of facilitating factors can be captured using the idea of resource 
availability and being dependent on others fulfilling their interdependent 
responsibilities. 
4.6 A Comparison with other Modelling Abstractions 
In this section we can consider the extent that three prominent systems modelling 
approaches (IDEF, UML, I*) and responsibility modelling meet the requirements 
of an abstraction for socio-technical troubleshooting and threat analysis. 
Our findings are that responsibility modelling meets all of the information and 
practical requirements. IDEF meets four of the six information requirements and 
both practical requirements. UML meets three of the six information requirements 
and both practical requirements. And I* modelling meets all six of the information 
requirements but meets only one of the two practical requirements. These findings 
are summarised in Table 4.5 below and explained in more detail in the relevant 
sections below. 
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Table 4.5 - Summary of mapping between requirements and systems 
modelling approaches 
 
Requirement IDEF UML I* Responsibility 
1-A desirable and 
undesirable behaviour; 
 
Yes – satisfied by 
IDEF0 functions 
and control 
No – requires some 
modification to use 
case to capture 
undesirable 
behaviour e.g. 
‘non-use cases’. 
Yes – satisfied by 
use of goal in a 
strategic 
dependency model 
 
Yes – satisfied by 
use of 
responsibilities and 
norms 
 
1-B the 
consequences of 
undesirable behaviour for 
a component and its 
interdependent 
components; 
Yes – satisfied by 
IDEF3 transition 
schematics 
Yes – satisfied 
using sequence 
diagrams 
 
Yes – satisfied by 
use of goal, 
resource, and task 
dependencies in a 
strategic 
dependency model 
 
Yes – satisfied by 
use of 
Agent liabilities and 
Risk clauses. 
1-C the consequences of 
desirable behaviour not 
occurring for a component 
and its interdependent 
components; 
Yes – satisfied by 
IDEF3 transition 
schematics 
Yes – satisfied 
using sequence 
diagrams 
 
Yes – satisfied by 
use of goal, 
resource, and task 
dependencies in a 
strategic 
dependency model 
 
Yes – satisfied by 
use of 
Agent liabilities and 
risk clauses. 
1-D the component that is 
accountable for the 
(non)occurrence of 
behaviour; 
No - requires some 
modification to 
semantics so that 
accountability is 
representable by 
associating 
functions with 
human 
mechanisms or by 
adding an 
additional attribute 
to functions 
No – requires some 
imaginative use of 
use case pre and 
post conditions to 
prescribe 
accountability 
Yes – satisfied by 
associating a goal 
with an agent in a 
strategic 
dependency model 
 
Yes – satisfied by 
associating 
responsibilities to 
agents using the 
‘responsible for’ 
relation 
1-E the resources that a 
component depends on to 
perform behaviour; 
Yes – satisfied by 
IDEF0 
dependencies 
represented as 
functions inputs, 
mechanisms and 
controls 
Yes – satisfied by 
dependencies in 
class and sequence 
diagrams 
Yes –satisfied 
using strategic 
rational resource 
dependencies 
Yes – satisfied 
dependencies 
using resource 
dependencies 
1-F the dependencies 
between system-level 
behaviour and component 
level behaviour. 
No – requires 
derivation by 
tracing relations 
between functions 
using IDEF3 
transition 
schematics and 
IDEF0 models.  
No – requires 
derivation by 
tracing relations 
between use cases 
and sequence 
diagrams  
Yes – satisfied 
using hierarchies 
of system level 
goals and 
component level 
goals 
Yes – satisfied 
using causal map 
of risk clauses that 
represents 
dependencies 
between system 
level behaviour and 
component level 
behaviour 
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4.6.1 IDEF 
A combination of IDEF0 and IDEF3 may be used to meet four (1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-
E) of the six information requirements and meet both of the practical requirements 
(2, 3). With some modification IDEF could meet all six information requirements. 
IDEF meets Requirement 1-A the capability to capture desirable and undesirable 
behaviour. The requirement is met using IDEF0’s capability to capture desirable 
behaviour using functions and its capability to capture undesirable behaviour by 
specifying controls on functions. 
IDEF meets Requirement 1-B the capability to capture the consequences of 
undesirable behaviour for a component and its interdependent components. The 
requirement is met using IDEF3 transition schematics that may be used to 
describe consequences of actions on interdependent components. 
IDEF meets Requirement 1-C the capability to capture the consequences of 
desirable behaviour not occurring for a component and its interdependent 
components. The requirement is met using IDEF3 transition schematics that 
represent behavioural interactions between components. 
IDEF does not meet Requirement 1-D the capability to capture the component that 
is accountable for the (non)occurrence of behaviour. IDEF may be modified to 
met this capability by adding additional semantics to IDEF0 models so that 
humans acting as ‘mechanisms’ are deemed accountable for that function. 
Alternatively an additional ‘responsibility of’ attribute could be added to functions 
to capture this information. 
IDEF meets Requirement 1-E the capability to capture the resources that a 
component depends on to perform behaviour. This requirement is met using 
IDEF0 models that capture inputs, controls and mechanisms. Resources may be 
represented as either: inputs of functions (if they are consumed); controls (if they 
mediate the conversion of inputs to outputs), or mechanisms that perform the 
conversion or aid in the conversion. 
IDEF does not meet Requirement 1-F the capability to capture dependencies 
between system-level behaviour and component level behaviour. IDEF provides 
no concise representation of these dependencies however dependencies between 
system level behaviour and component level behaviour may be derived by 
manually tracing component level functions up the IDEF0 functional hierarchies 
to identify their impact on higher-level functions. 
IDEF meets Requirement 2 ‘the model should have the potential to represent 
systems with non-trivial numbers of components and interactions’. IDEF enables 
the representation of large systems using hierarchies of models of interdependent 
functions, controls, mechanisms, calls, inputs and outputs. 
IDEF meets Requirement 3 ‘the analysis of the models should have the capability 
to be algorithmic, or computer assisted, such that the scale of an analysable 
system is not limited by the number of components a person can interpret’. IDEF3 
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models support computer-aided analysis by being converted into stocks and flows 
simulations using tools such as PROSIM8 or IBM Rational System Architect9. 
4.6.2 UML 
A combination of use cases, class diagrams and sequence diagrams, may be used 
to meet three (1-B, 1-C, 1-E) of the six information requirements and meet both of 
the practical requirements (2, 3). With some modification UML could meet all six 
information requirements. 
UML do not meet Requirement 1-A the capability to capture desirable and 
undesirable behaviour. Desirable behaviour maybe captured using use case 
diagrams however capturing undesirable behaviour is not supported as standard. 
UML use cases could be extended to support ‘non-use case’ to meet the 
requirement. Alternatively high-level sequence diagrams could be used to capture 
high-level desired and undesired behaviour. 
UML meets Requirement 1-B the capability to capture the consequences of 
undesirable behaviour for a component and its interdependent components. 
Sequence diagrams may be used to capture consequences of undesirable 
behaviour. 
UML meets Requirement 1-C the capability to capture the consequences of 
desirable behaviour not occurring for a component and its interdependent 
components. Sequence diagrams may be used to capture consequences of non-
occurrence of desirable behaviour. 
UML does not meet Requirement 1-D the capability to capture the component that 
is accountable for the (non)occurrence of behaviour without some adjustments. 
With some imagination accountability may be included as pre and post-conditions 
of use-cases. Otherwise class diagrams could be modified to include attributes 
linking accountable persons to component behaviours. 
UML meets Requirement 1-E the capability to capture the resources that a 
component depends on to perform behaviour. This is met using class models and 
sequence diagrams that capture interdependent objects and actors. 
UML does not meet Requirement 1-F the capability to capture dependencies 
between system-level behaviour and component level behaviour. UML provides 
no concise representation of the relationship between system behaviours and 
component behaviours. However system level behaviour and component level 
behaviour may be traced by manually tracing which object interactions implement 
which use cases thereby linking system behaviours with component level 
behaviours. 
                                                
8 http://www.kbsi.com/COTS/ProSim.htm 
9 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/awdtools/systemarchitect/features/simulation.html 
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UML meets Requirement 2 ‘the model should have the potential to represent 
systems with non-trivial numbers of components and interactions’. UML enables 
the representation of large systems using hierarchies of models that provide 
perspectives of different granularity. 
UML meets Requirement 3 ‘the analysis of the models should have the capability 
to be algorithmic, or computer assisted, such that the scale of an analysable 
system is not limited by the number of components a person can interpret’. 
Sequence diagrams support computer-aided analysis by being converted into 
stocks and flows simulations using tools such as IBM Rational Software 
Architect10 or by being converted into Petri nets or queuing models (King & 
Pooley, 2000; Li & Yao, 2009; Pooley & King, 1999). 
4.6.3 I* 
I* strategic rationale models may be used to meet all six (1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 
1-F) of the information requirements but meet only one of the two practical 
requirements (3). With some modification strategic rationale models could meet 
all six information requirements and both practical requirements. 
Strategic rationale models meet Requirement 1-A the capability to capture 
desirable and undesirable behaviour. Desirable behaviour maybe captured as a 
goal or soft goal. Undesirable behaviour may be captured as a goal or soft goal to 
avoid/prevent an undesirable behaviour or state. 
Strategic rationale models meet Requirement 1-B the capability to capture the 
consequences of undesirable behaviour for a component and its interdependent 
components. This is because the consequences of an agent’s behaviour on 
themselves are captured in terms its impact on their goals. The consequences on 
interdependent agents are also captured through its impact on other agents’ goals. 
Strategic rationale models meet Requirement 1-C the capability to capture the 
consequences of desirable behaviour not occurring for a component and its 
interdependent components. It is met because strategic dependencies capture the 
consequences of goals being satisfied or otherwise. 
Strategic rationale models meet Requirement 1-D the capability to capture the 
component that is accountable for the (non)occurrence of behaviour without some 
adjustments. Accountability may be captured by claiming that agents are 
accountable for the goals that are associated to them. 
Strategic rationale models meet Requirement 1-E the capability to capture the 
resources that a component depends on to perform behaviour. This is met using 
the notion of resource dependencies. 
                                                
10 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/rational/products/swarchitect/simulation/ 
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Strategic rationale models meet Requirement 1-F the capability to capture 
dependencies between system-level behaviour and component level behaviour. 
This is because dependencies between system level behaviour and component 
level behaviour are represented using hierarchies of goals. 
Strategic rationale models do not meet Requirement 2 ‘the model should have the 
potential to represent systems with non-trivial numbers of components and 
interactions’. In practice, I* models are acknowledged to be limited in size due to 
a lack of model hierarchies which results in models that are difficult to 
comprehend and manage at scale. This limitation may be rectifiable through the 
use of viewpoints or other ways of hiding information that is irrelevant for a 
certain purpose.  
Strategic rationale models meet Requirement 3 ‘the analysis of the models should 
have the capability to be algorithmic, or computer assisted, such that the scale of 
an analysable system is not limited by the number of components a person can 
interpret’. Some computer-aided analysis is provided to analyse goal models and 
assess whether goals are satisfied (Horkoff & Yu, 2009, 2010). 
Overall, the findings mean that whilst the analysis of I* strategic rationale model 
do scale due to the scalability of computer-aided analysis, the graphical 
representations do not scale as they do not currently support hierarchies of 
models, viewpoints or other ways of representing large volumes of modelling 
data. 
4.6.4 Responsibility models 
Responsibility models may be used to meet all six (1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F) 
of the information requirements and meet both of the practical requirements. 
Responsibility models meet Requirement 1-A the capability to capture desirable 
and undesirable behaviour. Desirable and undesirable behaviour may be 
represented as responsibilities to attain, maintain or avoid a given state. Desirable 
/ undesirable ways of attaining given states can be specified as norms. 
Responsibility models meet Requirement 1-B the capability to capture the 
consequences of undesirable behaviour for a component and its interdependent 
components. The consequences of undesirable behaviour (of a component) may 
be captured using the notion of a liability. The consequences of undesirable 
behaviour on interdependent components may be captured using the notion of a 
risk clause. 
Responsibility models meet Requirement 1-C the capability to capture the 
consequences of desirable behaviour not occurring for a component and its 
interdependent components. The consequences of desirable behaviour (of a 
component) not occurring may be captured using the notion of a liability. The 
consequences of desirable behaviour not occurring on interdependent components 
may be captured using the notion of a risk clause. 
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Responsibility models meet Requirement 1-D the capability to capture the 
component that is accountable for the (non)occurrence of behaviour. 
Accountability is represented by associating responsibilities to agents using a 
‘responsible for’ relation. 
Responsibility models meet Requirement 1-E the capability to capture the 
resources that a component depends on to perform behaviour. This is met using 
the notion of resource dependencies. 
Responsibility models meet Requirement 1-F the capability to capture 
dependencies between system-level behaviour and component level behaviour. 
Dependencies between system level behaviour and component level behaviour 
may be represented using a causal map of risk clauses. 
Responsibility models meet Requirement 2 ‘the model should have the potential 
to represent systems with non-trivial numbers of components and interactions’. 
Responsibility models enable the representation of large system by using 
hierarchies of models and viewpoints. For instance (Ramduny-Ellis & Dix, 2007) 
use hierarchies of models to represent and analyse the responsibilities associated 
with book production and represent a high-level responsibility by breaking it 
down into sub-models that represent the responsibilities associated with book 
planning, entering into a contract, producing the text and transferring ownership 
to the publisher. Another example is the work of (Dobson, 2007) that uses 
differing viewpoints of a system to identify inconsistencies between the ways 
responsibilities are allocated for different operational tasks such as project 
management vs. quality management, and project management vs. system 
development. 
Responsibility models meet Requirement 3 ‘the analysis of the models should 
have the capability to be algorithmic, or computer assisted, such that the scale of 
an analysable system is not limited by the number of components a person can 
interpret’. Basic computer aided analysis supports identifying unassigned 
responsibilities and finding agents that are overloaded with responsibilities (Lock 
et al., 2009). Tools for computer-aided analysis of causal maps such as Banxia 
Decision Explorer11 are also available (Montibeller & Belton, 2006). 
In summary, responsibility modelling is a promising abstraction for meeting the 
requirements set out for modelling and analysing SoS for the purpose of threat 
analysis and troubleshooting. In subsequent chapters the responsibility abstraction 
is applied to real-world case studies to demonstrate its efficacy in practice. In the 
next section this claim is illustrated by means of a case study that shows that the 
responsibility abstraction may be used to identify threats to the dependability of a 
system. 
                                                
11 http://www.banxia.com/dexplore/ 
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4.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter demonstrated the feasibility of using responsibility modelling as an 
abstraction for SoS threat identification and troubleshooting. It was argued that 
whilst creating and maintaining a descriptively complete structural and 
behavioural model of SoS is unrealistic, the more modest strategy of creating 
models that bound the possible behaviour of a SoS may be realistic. It was 
proposed that high-level structural models might be sufficiently invariant and 
informative to enable analysis that bounds the behaviour of a SoS. It was then 
proposed that a model should capture six classes of information to enable the 
socio-technical threat identification and troubleshooting of a SoS. These consisted 
of the capture of: 
1. desirable and undesirable behaviour; 
2. the consequences of undesirable behaviour for a component and its 
interdependent components; 
3. the consequences  of desirable behaviour not occurring for a component 
and its interdependent components; 
4. the person/organisation that is accountable for the (non)occurrence of 
behaviour; 
5. the resources that a component depends on to perform the behaviour that is 
accountable for; 
6. the dependencies between system-level behaviour and component level 
behaviour. 
It was then demonstrated using an example SoS, called ‘MegaFileShare’, that 
responsibility modelling can be used to capture these six classes of information 
and thus be used for SoS threat identification and troubleshooting. 
Furthermore, it was explained that responsibility modelling is a promising 
abstraction for socio-technical troubleshooting and threat identification because of 
its stakeholder centric focal point, I.e. it focuses on desirable and undesirable 
behaviours and their contextualised importance to a stakeholder. It analyses which 
agents (stakeholders) are ultimately liable for system behaviours, and thus enables 
stakeholders in boundary crossing systems to understand the risks they are 
accepting and those that they are transferring to other agents. Another important 
dimension was that the analysis of norms can be used to verify the way 
responsibilities are to be fulfilled and whether this meets the stakeholder’s 
expectations. 
It was also explained that responsibility modelling is of practical use because 
responsibilities tend to be unproblematic to elicit and that the notions used in 
responsibility modelling are grounded on notions used in the behavioural sciences 
to predict human behaviour and thus may enable the analysis of ‘socio’ issues. 
Finally, the responsibility modelling abstraction was compared against the 
prominent modelling abstractions UML, IDEF and I*. It was observed that the 
responsibility modelling abstraction was the only abstraction to meet all six 
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information requirements and practical requirements without significant alteration 
of the abstraction. The affordances of the others abstractions were also discussed. 
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5. Responsibility Modelling for Threat Identification 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the use of responsibility modelling for 
threat identification and risk analysis. What I mean by ‘threat identification’ is the 
identification of configurations of responsibilities, agents, and resources that may 
lead to system behaviours that are deemed undesirable by stakeholders. What I 
mean by ‘risk analysis’ is the assessment of the likelihood and impact of these 
threats on behavioural properties, or system behaviours, which are of interest to 
stakeholders. In practice this may mean, the identification of configurations of 
responsibilities, agents, and resources that lead to a system failing to meet a 
desired level of dependability or a specific functional requirement. 
To illustrate the use of responsibility modelling for threat identification and risk 
analysis this chapter provides a case study of the risk assessment of a cloud 
computing based system-of-systems (SoS). This SoS is a particularly interesting 
system, as unlike some classes of SoS, its ongoing operation is dependent upon 
the organisational agents’ overlap of self-interests. We call this subclass of SoS, a 
coalition-of-systems (CoS) to emphasise the vital role of the overlap of agents’ 
interests in the ongoing operation of the system. The fact that the system is a CoS 
makes the analysis of this system’s dependability particularly interesting. This is 
because the fragility of the coalition’s overlapping self-interests needs to be 
analysed to understand the system’s ongoing behaviour. I will demonstrate how 
this may be achieved. 
In the next chapter I further illustrate the use of responsibility modelling for threat 
identification and risk analysis by demonstrating how it can be used to identify 
threats arising from a system conflicting with agents’ interests. 
5.2 Coalitions of Systems and Socio-Technical Threat Identification 
System-of-Systems (SoS) are a class of system whose interacting parts comprise 
systems, that are owned and managed by independent parties, and whose parts 
evolve over time (Maier, 1998). Typical examples are integrated supply chain 
management systems, integrated healthcare networks, and cyber-physical systems 
such as integrated embedded systems within ships, land vehicles, aircraft, or 
industrial plants. Coalitions-of-systems (CoS) are a sub-class of SoS that have the 
additional property that their subsystems interact to further overlapping self-
interests rather than achieving an overarching mission/goal as in the case of 
typical SoS. The distinction between SoS and CoS is useful when conducting a 
socio-technical analysis as it indicates whether the alignment of partners interests 
needs to be analysed. When analysing commercial SoS this distinction is often 
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required as organisations are driven by profit and the rewards/risks will be 
distributed between partners so understanding these interests become important to 
understanding its ongoing operation. 
The dependability of a system, in this context, is definable as the property of a 
system where “reliance can justifiably be placed on the services it delivers” 
(Sommerville, Dewsbury, Clarke, & Rouncefield, 2006). We define threats to 
dependability as events or conditions that affect a systems availability, reliability, 
safety, integrity, confidentiality, and maintainability (Avizienis, Laprie, Randell, 
& Landwehr, 2004; Sommerville et al., 2006). 
Socio-technical threats are an important factor when analysing the dependability 
of a CoS. This is because coalition partners overlapping self-interests may be 
fragile and subject to change. For example, a change in a cloud provider’s 
interests may result in the withdrawal of certain services, or changes to their 
behavioural properties, thus resulting in threats to the availability, reliability and 
maintainability of the overall CoS. Understanding the distribution of liabilities 
among coalition partners is also important to understanding CoS as this provides 
an indicator of consequences of a partner’s action and its implications for their 
interests. For instance, in resource constrained situations coalition partners that 
seek to further their self-interest by generating profit will fulfil responsibilities 
with large liabilities and renege on those where the liability is small. 
There are a number of candidate socio-technical modelling approaches relevant to 
identifying and assessing dependability threats. Recently there has been a trend 
for agent goal model based frameworks such as I* (E. Yu et al., 2011) and the 
TROPOS Goal-Risk framework (Asnar & Giorgini, 2007), however this thesis 
advocates an agent responsibility based identification approach. Below we 
provide an overview of agent goal based modelling approaches prior to 
distinguishing them from our agent responsibility based approach (Lock et al., 
2009; Sommerville et al., 2009). 
The I* framework has been extended by (Maiden & Jones, 2004; Maiden et al., 
2006; Mayer et al., 2007) in order to identify dependability threats and 
requirements for air traffic management (ATM) and enterprise systems. In the 
context of ATM this was achieved by means of exploring the consequences of one 
actor fulfilling two or more roles and whether this affects the system’s overall 
goal attainment (Maiden & Jones, 2004; Maiden et al., 2006). This work primarily 
focused on identifying system dependability related to overloading operators. In 
the context of enterprise systems, threats to security goals were identified by 
modelling and discovering business assets, constraints and security requirements. 
This work primarily focused on gathering security requirements and transforming 
these requirements into high-level controls. 
The TROPOS Goal-Risk framework was used in (Asnar & Giorgini, 2007; Asnar 
et al., 2008) as an approach to analyse and mitigate threats to the goal 
accomplishment in an ATM system and a manufacturing organisation. The 
systems under analysis were modelled as a configuration of related goals, tasks 
and events. The framework comprises a goal layer representing the goals of actors 
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that should be achieved, an event layer that represents potential threats to goals, 
and a treatment layer that comprises possible threat management strategies. This 
approach primarily focuses on the analysis of threats and the design of appropriate 
high level controls rather than their identification. 
Despite the agent responsibility abstraction having some similarities to goal 
modelling based approaches it differs significantly. Responsibility modelling uses 
the concept of responsible agents (human / organisational agents) and their 
interactions to represent a situation and identify hazards in terms of failures of 
agents to fulfil responsibilities. The concept of responsibility foregrounds notions 
of obligations, liabilities, and conformance to norms, or standards, such that it is 
important how an agent acts. For example, a doctor that has performed procedures 
in accordance with legal and domain standards may have successfully discharged 
their responsibility for patient care even if their patient dies. Similarly if a patient 
lives but their treatment was unethical then the doctor will be held accountable. 
Unlike responsibilities, goals principally focus on what has to be achieved. 
The responsibility modelling based approach offers a number of attractive 
characteristics that may make it suitable for identifying threats to CoS. Firstly the 
agent responsibility abstraction provides a natural way of identifying the threats 
associated with relying on other parties to discharge responsibilities. Secondly 
responsibilities are relatively unproblematic to elicit as people find them ‘natural’ 
to articulate in comparison to ‘technical’ constructs such as functions or goals. 
Thirdly responsibility modelling is relatively rapid to perform as, unlike typical 
goal based identification approaches, tasks and their dependencies are not elicited. 
The responsibility modelling approach presented here is primarily a threat/risk 
identification technique and should be viewed as complementary to the previous 
approaches discussed and more general threat/risk analysis approaches such as 
CORAS (Braber et al., 2003). Responsibility modelling has been used to analyse 
the failure of socio-technical systems including E-counting systems in the Scottish 
elections and UK civil emergency planning (Lock et al., 2009; Sommerville et al., 
2009). 
5.3 Developing Responsibility Models for Threat Identification 
Responsibility-based threat identification aims to identify conditions that result in 
a system not exhibiting required behaviours or behavioural properties. In terms of 
the responsibility abstraction a system in represented as an aggregate of agents, 
resources and responsibilities. Required behaviours are represented by 
responsibilities which represent units of behaviour that an agent has a duty to 
perform; a responsibility model is thus a description of the behaviours that agents 
(within the scope of analysis) have a duty to perform and the resources they 
require to perform these behaviours. 
As a note of caution, it is important to define the boundaries of the responsibility 
model so that it includes the system’s various stakeholders including those whom 
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are the source of its behavioural requirements and those whom have to maintain 
or operate the system. 
Responsibility models may be developed and analysed in any manner that is 
flexible enough to meet an analysts needs. For the purposes of performing 
responsibility-based threat identification a two-part process may be followed. Part 
1 consists of building a model; part 2 consists of analysing the model. 
5.3.1 Building a responsibility model 
A responsibility model may be built using the following process: 
1. Identify the focal system of the study; 
2. Identify its key stakeholders (e.g. agents that consume the systems 
outputs, agents that provision the system); 
3. Identify agents’ responsibilities (obligations, liabilities, norms); 
4. Identify the resources that the agents’ require to fulfil their 
responsibilities (information, equipment); 
5. Identify non-resource related dependencies the agents’ require to 
fulfil their responsibilities (dependent upon other agents fulfilling 
their responsibilities); 
6. Represent the information graphically using the responsibility 
modelling notation; 
The model may be analysed once the analyst is satisfied that the elicited 
responsibilities (obligations, liabilities, norms) represent the behaviours required 
of the system. As previously described the obligation part of a responsibility 
specifies a unit of behaviour that an agent has duty to perform e.g. attain, maintain 
or avoid a given state. The liability captures the consequences, or penalty, of not 
fulfilling the responsibility. Norms specify the manner in which the behaviour 
should be performed e.g. in accordance with specific domain standards, laws or 
regulations. 
5.3.2 Analysing a responsibility model for threats 
Analysis of a responsibility model for threats may be performed by: 
1. Identifying risk clauses - possible conditions that trigger events that threaten to 
result in a responsibility being reneged. This can be performed by: 
a. inspecting the dependencies of each responsibility for resource related threat 
conditions. 
e.g. insufficient/inadequate resource to fulfil responsibility. 
b. inspecting the dependencies of each responsibility for agent related threat 
conditions. 
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e.g. insufficient time, insufficient/inadequate skill, insufficient interest to 
fulfil responsibility. 
2. Identifying dependencies between risk clauses. This can be performed by: 
a. inspecting a set of risk clauses to identify dependencies that may result from 
the occurrence of one risk clause triggering another. 
During step 1 of analysis, HAZOPS style keywords may be used to aid in the 
identification of risk clauses by encouraging the analyst to systematically consider 
different types of condition that may threaten the fulfilment of responsibilities and 
thus the desired behavioural behaviour of a system. 
During step 2 of analysis, causal maps can be used to aid the identification and 
representation of dependencies between risk clauses. To do this, the condition, 
threat and severity attributes of risk clauses are represented as a nodes and the 
belief that the condition causes the threat and the threat has consequences due to a 
responsibility may be represented as an arrow from one node to another. By 
representing all identified risk clauses in this manner one may visually inspect the 
causal map in a bottom up manner thus enabling the identification of threats that 
specific conditions trigger (including triggering cascades of threats). One may 
also inspect the causal map in a top-down manner to identify all the possible 
triggers of a responsibility being reneged. 
5.4 Case Study 
5.4.1 The Situation 
The case study organisation is a UK based company (Company B) that provides 
bespoke IT solutions for the oil & gas industry. It comprises around 30 employees 
with offices in the UK and the Middle East. It has an organisational structure 
based on functional divisions (e.g. administration, engineering and support). We 
became involved with the organisation as a result of their interest in exploring the 
cost saving opportunities that cloud computing could offer them. We therefore 
collaborated with the organisation to assess the feasibility of migrating one of 
their primary service offerings (a quality monitoring and data acquisition system) 
to Amazon EC2 – an infrastructure-as-a-service offering from Amazon Web 
Services. Naturally, we were aware that the introduction of cloud technology 
could have adverse effects on the dependability of their service so along with cost 
analysis and conflict analysis (described in the next chapter), we analysed 
potential threats to the system’s dependability as a result of its reliance upon EC2. 
The situation was as follows: Company C is a small oil and gas company that 
owns some offshore assets in the North Sea oilfields. Company C needed a data 
acquisition system to allow them to manage their offshore operations by 
monitoring data from their assets on a minute-by-minute basis. Company C’s 
assets rely on the production facilities of Company A (a major oil company), 
therefore the data comes onshore via Company A’s communication links. 
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Company C does not have capability to develop their own IT systems; hence they 
outsourced the development and management of the system to Company B, which 
is an IT solutions company with a small data centre. The existing system was 
composed of two parts: 
• A database server that logs and archives the data coming in from offshore into 
a database. A tape drive is used to take daily backups of the database, the 
tapes are stored off-site. 
• An application server that hosts a number of data reporting and monitoring 
applications. The end users at Company C access these applications using a 
remote desktop client over the Internet. 
The system infrastructure was deployed in Company B’s data centre and went live 
in 2005. Since then, Company B’s support department have been maintaining the 
system and solving any problems that have risen. This case study investigated the 
dependability threats of deploying the same system using the cloud offerings of 
Amazon Web Services. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of this scenario, where 
Company B deploys and maintains the same system in the cloud. 
 
Figure 5.1 Logical structure of the 'to-be' system 
5.4.2 Fieldwork and Results 
To perform the responsibility-based threat identification we followed the two-part 
build-analyse process described in section 5.3. To do this we performed a series of 
interviews to identify the focal system of study, key stakeholders and their 
responsibilities. Our investigative remit was to consider the effect the deployment 
would have on Company B. Since we did not have permission to speak to 
suppliers or customers this limited our interviewees to: a project manager; a 
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technical manager; a support manager; two members of support staff; and a 
business development manager. The interviewees were encouraged to discuss 
their concerns regarding the proposed project and also the opportunities that it 
could afford. 
The resulting responsibility model (see Figure 5.2), which is a representation of 
the identified agents, resources and responsibilities (see Table 5.2 and Table 5.3), 
was then analysed to identify risk clauses (Tables 5.4 – 5.10) and 
interdependencies between risk clauses (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.2 - Responsibility Model of System 
Figure 5.2 describes the configuration of responsibilities, agents and resources 
that composes the focal system. Organisational agents are represented by their 
name surrounded by double triangular brackets, responsibilities as rounded edged 
rectangles, resources by square brackets and human agents as single triangular 
brackets. The responsibilities that each organisational agent has a duty to perform 
are contained within a dashed rectangle. For clarity these organisational agents 
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and responsibilities are also colour coded to remind the analyst of who is 
‘responsible for’ for what. For instance we can see that ‘Company B’ is 
responsible for the metering service, metering service technical support, paying 
for AWS Gold Support, AWS usage and for offshore telecoms bills. We can also 
observe the resource dependencies of the responsibilities. For instance we can 
observe that to fulfil the responsibility of the metering service ‘Company B’ must 
have a metering system engineer e.g. an agent with the necessary skill set and 
availability to provision the service. 
Table 5.2 describes the focal systems agents and their allocated responsibilities in 
terms of obligations, liabilities and norms. For instance one may observe that 
‘Company B’ is responsible for attaining and maintaining the metering system 
and that ‘Company C’s responsibility to pay for the metering system depends on 
the ‘Company A’ fulfilling their responsibility. The relationship may also be 
observed graphically (Figure 5.2) as the depends relationship between the two 
responsibilities. 
Table 5.2 - Specification of Agent Responsibilities 
# Agent Obligation  Liability Norm Agent Obligation  Liability 
1 Company 
B 
Attain and 
maintain 
Metering 
system 
 
Financial liability for 
failing to meet SLA 
within terms of SLA Company 
C 
Pay for metering 
system 
Financial liability for 
breach of payment 
2 Company 
B 
Attain 
responses to 
Metering 
system 
requests for 
technical 
support 
Financial liability for 
failing to meet SLA 
within terms of SLA Company 
C 
Pay for metering 
system technical 
support 
Financial liability for 
breach of payment 
3 AWS Attain and 
maintain 
EC2 virtual 
machine 
If uptime based on 
“Regional 
Availability” < 99.5% 
then refund service 
credit amounting to 
10% of monthly bill 
“Regional 
Availability” excludes 
the failure of 
individual instances 
not attributable to 
“Region 
Unavailability”. 
Company 
B 
Pay for AWS usage 
~$0.085 per hour + 
other fees 
Financial liability for 
breach of payment 
4 AWS Attain 
responses to  
AWS Gold 
Support 
requests 
None. 
(No liability for 
advice nor non-
adherence to support 
“guidelines”) 
Adhere to Premium 
Gold Support 
Guidelines 
-1 hour first response 
time for “urgent” 
issues 
Company 
B 
Pay for AWS 
Support $400 per 
month or 10% 
usage bill (greater 
amount) 
Financial liability for 
breach of payment 
5 Company 
A 
Attain and 
maintain 
offshore to 
internet 
telecoms 
Unknown Unknown Company 
B 
Pay for offshore 
telecoms 
Financial liability for 
breach of payment 
Table 5.3 Specification of Agent and Resource Dependencies 
# Agent Obligation  Agent / Resources Agent Obligation  Resources 
1 Company 
B 
Attain and maintain 
Metering system 
 
-EC2 virtual machines 
-Internet gateway 
-Offshore internet gateway 
-Metering system 
-Metering system engineer 
Company 
C 
Pay for metering 
system 
-Means of payment 
2 Company Attain responses to -Metering system support staff Company Pay for metering -Means of payment 
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B Metering system 
requests for technical 
support 
-AWS support staff 
-Internet gateway 
-Documentation for troubleshooting 
and configuration of metering service 
-Documentation for managing and 
maintaining EC2 infrastructure 
C system 
3 AWS Attain and maintain 
EC2 virtual machine 
-EC2 virtual machines Company 
B 
Pay for AWS usage 
~$0.085 per hour + 
other fees 
-Credit card 
4 AWS Attain responses to  
AWS Gold Support 
requests 
-AWS support staff 
-Documentation for EC2 
infrastructure and configurations 
Company 
B 
$400 per month or 
10% usage bill 
(greater amount) 
-Credit card 
5 Company 
A 
Attain and maintain 
offshore to internet 
telecoms 
-Offshore internet gateway Company 
B 
Pay for offshore 
telecoms 
-Means of payment 
Table 5.3 describes the resource dependencies of the responsibilities. For instance 
to fulfil the responsibility to attain and maintain the metering system the agent 
must have EC2 virtual machines, the internet gateway, the offshore internet 
gateway, the metering system and a metering system engineer. This is represented 
graphically (Figure 5.2) as the ‘has relationship’ between the responsibility, the 
resources and the agent. 
Tables 5.4-5.10 described the ‘risk clauses’ identified as part of the analysis 
process. These were identified using HAZOPS keywords to encourage the analyst 
to consider the consequences of potential conditions on the fulfilment of each 
responsibility. Each table represents identified conditions associated with a 
specific resource or agent that could lead to a responsibility being reneged. For 
instance Table 5.4 describes the risk clauses for EC2 virtual machines and 
identifies 7 combinations of condition that may threaten AWS or Company B’s 
responsibilities. An example risk clause from Table 5.4 consists of the an EC2 
virtual machine being created late resulting in an availability threat which if not 
rectified results in Company B reneging on its responsibility to attain and 
maintain the metering system in accordance to its SLA. 
Table 5.4 Risk clauses for EC2 Virtual Machine 
# Hazard 
Keyword 
Condition Threats Severity Recommended 
Action 
1 Late EC2 virtual 
machine is late 
in its creation 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Availability Threat 
-Customer temporarily does not receive service. 
Medium 
Company B Liability: 
Possible financial liability 
if failing to meet SLA 
When machine 
instance is available 
fetch back-log of 
polled data 
If server is 
significantly late then 
create an instance on 
temporary 
infrastructure  
2 Never / 
Incapable 
EC2 virtual 
machine is 
never created 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Availability Threat 
-Customer does not receive service. 
AWS:EC2VirtualMachines 
Availability Threat 
-AWS Region becomes unavailable 
Medium 
Company B Liability: 
Possible financial liability 
if failing to meet SLA 
AWS Liability: If “region 
unavailable” for t > AWS 
SLA then service credit 
amounting to 10% of bill 
Attempt to create 
another instance or 
create an instance on 
temporary 
infrastructure 
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3 Insufficien
t 
EC2 virtual 
machine has 
insufficient 
resources to 
execute 
application 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Reliability Threat 
-Metering system would have degraded 
performance. 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
Medium 
Company B Liability: 
Possible financial liability 
if failing to meet SLA 
Attempt to create an 
EC2 instance with 
more resources. 
Transfer instance to 
in-house 
infrastructure. 
4 Impaired Incorrect 
configuration 
of EC2 virtual 
machine is 
created. 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Reliability Threat 
-Metering system may have degraded 
performance 
-Billing data may be come incorrect 
-Customer may receive degraded service 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
Medium 
Company B Liability: 
Possible financial liability 
if failing to meet SLA 
Create appropriate 
configuration of 
instance and remediate 
billing data prior to 
reaching customer 
account. 
5 Impaired Incorrect EC2 
infrastructure 
configuration 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Availability Threat + Reliability Threat+ 
Integrity Threat 
-Metering system may have degraded 
performance 
-Metering system may become unavailable, 
unreliable or accessible by unauthorised parties 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
AWS:EC2VirtualMachines 
Availability Threat 
-Region may become unavailable 
AWS:GoldSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
High 
Company B Liability: 
Financial liability for 
failing to meet SLA 
 
AWS Liability: If “region 
unavailable” then service 
credit amounting to 10% of 
monthly usage bill 
 
 
6 Changes EC2 services 
being used to 
support 
customers are 
withdrawn 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Accessibility Threat + Reliability Threat + 
Integrity Threat 
-Customer may have service disrupted or 
degraded 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
AWS:GoldSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
Depends on changes 
Company B Liability: 
Potential financial liability 
for failing to meet SLA or 
breach of contract. May be 
liable for cost of migrating 
to a different if necessary 
infrastructure. 
Find alternative way 
of provisioning 
service to customers. 
Consider 
implementing back 
out plans to a different 
infrastructure. 
7 Changes EC2 service 
offerings are 
changed but 
Company B not 
informed until 
after the 
change 
CompanyB:MeteringServic Accessibility 
Threat + Reliability Threat + Integrity Threat 
-Customer may have service disrupted or 
degraded 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
AWS:GoldSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Increased number of support calls. 
Depends on changes 
Company B Liability: 
Potential financial liability 
for failing to meet SLA or 
breach of contract. May be 
liable for cost of migrating 
to a different if necessary 
infrastructure. 
AWS Liability: 
None 
Contact EC2 on a 
regular basis to obtain 
information on 
changes to service 
offerings 
 
Consider 
implementing back 
out plans to a different 
infrastructure. 
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Table 5.5 - Risk clauses for Internet Gateway 
# Hazard 
Keyword 
Condition Threats Severity Recommended 
Action 
8 Impaired Company B 
System 
engineers and 
support staff 
unable to 
access EC2 
virtual 
machines 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Accessibility Threat + Reliability Threat 
-Customer may have service disrupted or 
degraded as metering system engineers may not 
be able to access systems temporarily. 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Resolution of customer support calls is untimely 
 
Medium 
Company B Liability: 
Possible financial liability 
if failing to meet SLA. 
Gateway provider: Liable 
for refunding monthly 
connection costs if SLA 
not met 
Review SLA 
agreements with 
gateway provider and 
consider implementing 
fall-back gateway to 
provide redundant 
infrastructure 
Table 5.6 – Risk clauses for AWS Gold Support Contract 
# Hazard 
Keyword 
Condition Threats Severity Recommended Action 
9 Late EC2 Support 
staff respond 
with fix after 
the time period 
required 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Resolution of customer support calls is untimely 
 
High 
Company B Liability: 
Financial liability for 
failing to meet SLA. May 
be liable for cost of 
migrating to a different if 
necessary infrastructure. 
AWS Liability: None. 
No liability for non-
adherence to support 
“guidelines” nor advice 
given 
Review SLA 
agreements with service 
provider and consider 
implementing back-out 
plan to alternative 
infrastructure 
10 Never / 
Incapabl
e 
EC2 Support 
staff does not 
respond with 
fix. 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport
Maintainability Threat 
-Resolution of customer support calls is untimely 
-Support staff or system engineers must chase 
Amazon rather than performing fixes. 
High 
Company B Liability: 
Financial liability for 
failing to meet SLA. May 
be liable for cost of 
migrating to a different if 
necessary infrastructure. 
Review SLA 
agreements with service 
provider and consider 
implementing back-out 
plan to alternative 
infrastructure 
Table 5.7 – Risk Clauses for Documentation for troubleshooting and 
configuration of metering service 
# Hazard 
Keyword 
Condition Threats Severity Recommended Action 
11 Insuffici
ent 
Documentation 
does not 
provide 
sufficient or 
adequate 
knowledge of 
Metering 
system to 
maintain 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Data acquisition system is not maintainable in 
the long term. 
 
High 
Company B Liability: 
Financial liability for 
failing to meet SLA. Will 
need to invest in re-
documenting the system or 
re-engineer the system so it 
may be documented. 
Assess adequacy of 
documentation prior to 
launching the metering 
system in a production 
environment risk. 
 
Monitor fitness of 
purpose for system 
documentation. 
12 Insuffici
ent 
Available 
documentation 
does not 
provide 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Data acquisition system is not maintainable on 
EC2. 
High 
Company B Liability: 
Financial liability for 
Assess adequacy of 
documentation prior to 
migration and perform 
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sufficient or 
adequate 
knowledge of 
EC2 
infrastructure 
to maintain a 
commercial 
systems 
AWS:GoldSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Support staff unable to assist users 
AWS:EC2VirtualMachines 
Availability Threat 
-Regions may become unavailable due to 
maintainability issues resulting in loss of 
availability 
failing to meet SLA. May 
be liable for cost of 
migrating to a different 
service if necessary 
infrastructure. 
 
AWS Liability: None 
pilots to minimise risk. 
13 Late Available 
documentation 
does not 
provide 
sufficient or 
adequate 
knowledge of 
EC2 
infrastructure 
to maintain a 
commercial 
systems 
CompanyB:MeteringServiceTechnicalSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Timely resolution of support calls is not 
manageable. 
AWS:GoldSupport 
Maintainability Threat 
-Timely resolution of support calls is not 
manageable. 
High 
Company B Liability: 
Financial liability if failing 
to meet SLA. May be 
liable for cost of migrating 
to a different if necessary 
infrastructure. 
AWS Liability: None 
-Contact Amazon for 
up-to-date 
documentation 
-Implement a back out 
strategy to switch to 
different infrastructure 
Table 5.8 – Risk clause for Offshore Internet gateway 
# Hazard 
Keyword 
Condition Threats Severity Recommended 
Action 
14 Impaire
d /  
Insuffici
ent 
Offshore 
gateway 
becomes 
impaired such 
that valid data 
does not 
transfer 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
   Availability Threat + Reliability Threat 
   -Customer may have service temporally 
disrupted or degraded until causes can be 
identified and treated. 
 
Medium 
Company B Liability: 
Financial liability if failing 
to meet SLA. May be 
liable for cost of migrating 
to a new gateway 
infrastructure if necessary. 
 
Company A liability: 
unknown 
 
Assess adequacy of 
SLA with Company 
A. Consider whether 
risks are appropriately 
shared between 
parties. 
Table 5.9 – Risk clause for Company C – Means of payment 
# Hazard 
Keyword 
Condition Threats Severity Recommended 
Action 
15 Insuffici
ent 
Company C 
Insufficient 
funds to pay 
for service 
CompanyC:PayForMeteringSystem 
-Payment not made 
CompanyC:PayForMeteringSystemTechnical
Support 
-Payment not made 
Low 
Company C Liability: 
Financial liability for 
missing payment. 
NA 
Table 5.10 – Risk clause for Company B – Means of payment 
# Hazard 
Keyword 
Condition Threats Severity Recommended 
Action 
16 Insuffici
ent 
Company B 
Insufficient 
funds to pay 
for service 
CompanyB:PayForAWSUsuage 
-Payment not made 
CompanyB:PayForAWSGoldSuppor 
-Payment not made 
If payment late > 15 days 
CompanyB:MeteringService 
Accessibility Threat + Reliability Threat 
Low 
Company C Liability: 
Financial liability for 
missing payment. 
High 
Company B Liability: 
Make payment as soon 
as possible 
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-Customer may have service halted until payment 
made 
Financial liability if failing 
to meet SLA. 
 
We identified 16 unique conditions that threatened the dependability properties 
(availability, reliability, integrity, maintainability) of the CoS. These included: 
• Threats to availability due to the delayed creation of virtual machine 
instances, failures to create instances, misconfiguration of infrastructure, 
withdrawal of services, or notification of service withdrawal being delayed. 
• Threats to reliability due to degradation of virtual machine instances, 
incorrect configuration of virtual machine instances, incorrect configuration of 
EC2 infrastructure, withdrawal of services, late notification of withdrawal of 
services. 
• Threats to integrity due to misconfiguration of EC2 infrastructure, 
withdrawal of services, late notification of withdrawal of services. 
• Threats to maintainability due to insufficient/inappropriate documentation, 
out-of-date documentation, degradation of virtual machine instances causing a 
surge of support calls, misconfiguration of virtual machine instances causing a 
surge of support calls, a misconfiguration of EC2 infrastructure preventing 
support engineers from connecting, ‘Gold’ support staff resolving issues in an 
untimely manner, and ‘Gold’ support staff incapable of providing a fix. 
Of these threat conditions, four were present in both the ‘as-is’ and ‘to-be’ 
systems. These persistent threats comprise those due to: [11] insufficient or 
inadequate documentation to troubleshoot and configure the metering system; 
[14] offshore gateway becoming impaired such that valid data is not transferred; 
[15] company C has insufficient funds to pay for service; [16] company B has 
insufficient funds to pay for service. The other twelve threat conditions were 
unique to the EC2 configuration. For instance, [2] the EC2 virtual machine is late 
in its creation; [5] incorrect configuration of EC2 infrastructure; [6] EC2 services 
being used by customers is withdrawn. 
To understand the possible interactions between the different identified risk 
clauses a causal map was used to represent how each risk contributes to another 
(if at all) – see Figure 5.3 below. 
The map was created by first populating the model’s nodes with the ‘condition’, 
‘threat’ and ‘severity’ of each risk clause identified in tables 5.4-5.10. The links 
between the nodes represent that notion of ‘possible cause’ such that one node is a 
possible cause of another. To illustrate, using ‘risk clause 1’, we can see that node 
1, links to node 17, which links to node 18. This represents ‘risk clause 1’, ‘EC2 
virtual machine is late in its creation’, is a possible cause of ‘Customer 
temporarily does not receive service’, which is a possible cause of ‘Company B 
Liability: Possible financial liability if failing to meet SLA’. By representing each 
of the identified risk clauses in this manner it enables the analyst to understand the 
interactions between risk clauses and also spot additional interactions may have 
not been apparent before. 
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Figure 5.3 Causal map of risk clause interactions 
This form of representation is a particularly useful method of representing the 
behaviour of a system. This is because it enables a system analyst to explore the 
possible causes of undesirable behaviour e.g. it enables troubleshooting. 
Conversely it enables the exploration of the consequences of a component failing 
- 92 - 
by ‘following the arrows forward’ e.g. risk analysis. This form of representation is 
also useful as it may be used to identify cascade failures, or feedback loops, that 
may result in unexpected emergent behaviour. 
Since this system is a coalition-of-systems we also examined the fragility of the 
coalition partners overlapping self-interests. This was necessary as the on-going 
operation of the system, and so its dependability, depended on the organisational 
agents’ interests being satisfied by participation in the CoS. For this system since 
all the organisational agents’ are commercial organisations we assumed that their 
interest in the CoS was to make a profit that reflected the level of risk that they 
perceive to be taking i.e. the financial reward they expect outweighs the financial 
risk they are accepting by partaking in the CoS. 
In order to assess whether the agents’ interests were being satisfied we inspected 
the system’s distribution of obligations and liabilities as described in Table 5.2. 
We noted that AWS provided little liability or warranty for their service offerings 
leaving the burden of liability with Company B. For instance, if AWS incorrectly 
configures their infrastructure resulting in degradation, or failure of individual 
machines, they take no liability for this even though Company B would be subject 
to financial liabilities due its SLA agreement with Company C. We noted even in 
situations where AWS accepts financial liability they will only refund 10% of 
monthly usage charges. This means that Company B is exposing itself to financial 
loss due to AWS failures unless their financial liability is less than 10% of their 
monthly usage charges.  
This assessment of the distribution of liabilities indicates that the coalition’s 
overlapping self-interests may be highly fragile in the long term as AWS could 
renege on its responsibilities and suffer little financial loss whilst Company B 
would be left vulnerable. Company B could of course remedy this situation by 
requesting a stronger SLA from AWS such that a large proportion of the financial 
liability may be passed on to AWS; or by using multiple independent cloud 
partners to introduce an element of redundancy that reduces both the likelihood 
and severity of a cloud instance failure. In reality AWS is unlikely to offer a 
stronger SLA to Company B since it offers a commoditised service. However it is 
possible that a smaller cloud provider aiming to serve SMEs may offer such an 
SLA. 
The lessons learned from this case study with respect to responsibility modelling 
were that: 
1. Responsibility based threat identification may be used to identify 
conditions that threaten the required behavioural properties of SoS. 
2. Responsibility based threat identification may be used to identify 
conditions that trigger cascades that threaten the required behavioural 
properties of SoS. 
3. Responsibility based threat identification may be used to trace effect of 
changes to a systems behavioural properties to specific agents’ 
responsibilities. 
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The lessons learned from this case study with respect to the deployment of cloud-
based systems were that: 
1. Organisations assessing the feasibility of cloud solutions need to 
understand a cloud provider’s obligations, liabilities and norms so that 
they understand what the provider responsible for and to what extent they 
are liable for reneging on these obligations. 
2. Organisations should satisfy themselves that they are comfortable with the 
distribution of liabilities within a system. The distribution liabilities should 
be carefully examined so that organisations are aware of the others’ self-
interests and so can decide to take steps to preserve their own if necessary. 
This case study highlighted a need to further extend agent responsibility-based 
threat analysis to improve its ability to identify and analyse agent related threat 
conditions. This case study primarily analysed resource related threat conditions, 
agent related threat conditions such as insufficient interest, insufficient skills, or 
insufficient time were not analysed in-depth.  Organisational agents’ interests 
were analysed by means of inspecting the distribution of liabilities, however 
individual agents’ interests were not taken into account nor was the adequacy of 
their skills and their availability. 
In the next chapter this weakness will be addressed using conflict analysis. 
Conflict analysis helps an analyst identify and understand potential conflicts of 
interest between human agents that may pose a threat to the behavioural properties 
of a system. These interests include a person’s responsibilities, satisfaction and 
notions of fairness. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This case study of a cloud computing based CoS demonstrates that responsibility 
modelling when coupled with HAZOP keywords provides a means of identifying 
dependability threats associated with coalition partners reneging their 
responsibilities. This case study also demonstrates that causal maps may be used 
to identify potential cascade failures, or feedback loops, that could result in 
unexpected emergent behaviour or behavioural properties. It was also shown that 
inspecting the distribution of liabilities among coalition partners can indicate the 
fragility of overlapping self-interests. 
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6. Responsibility Modelling for Identifying Threats to 
Cooperation 
6.1 Introduction 
Responsibility models represent systems as a set of interacting agents that fulfil 
responsibilities with the aid of resources. For responsibilities to be fulfilled, 
agents may depend on the cooperative behaviour of other agents e.g. one agent 
provisioning a resource to another. Since a system’s behaviour, or behavioural 
properties, may be dependent upon agents’ fulfilling certain responsibilities, it is 
important to be able to identify threats that enable or impede cooperative 
interactions. One well-established method of understanding cooperation is 
through the lens of conflict theory (M. Deutsch, 1949; Morton Deutsch, 1973, 
1990; Morton Deutsch & Coleman, 2006). In this chapter we use conflict theory 
to identify threats to cooperation that may arise because of conflicts.  
This chapter’s key contribution is to propose a responsibility based threat 
identification approach sensitive to different types of conflict. This builds on the 
work of the previous chapter, which focused on resource related threats, by 
providing a means of identifying agent related threats resulting from: agents 
holding incompatible responsibilities; being dissatisfied with their 
responsibilities; or perceiving that they are being treated unfairly. 
A conflict-based framework is developed to identify these agent-related threats 
and two case studies are presented to illustrate its use. The first case study is a 
post-mortem of a well-known control room automation project (London 
Ambulance Service Computer Aided Dispatch) that was a public failure and 
subsequently turned into a success. This case supports the claim that the 
framework aids in the identification of threats due to incompatible interests and 
enables the identification of their consequences on system behaviour. The second 
case study the feasibility of a cloud adoption project at an oil/gas sector SME 
(from chapter 5) demonstrates the use of the technique to analyse a small yet non-
trivial system-of-systems deployment. Overall both of these case studies support 
the claim that conducting a conflict analysis using the framework may provide 
insights that bound a system-of-systems potential behaviour. 
A case study approach was selected because it illustrates that conflict analysis can 
be used in two non-trivial situations and thus highlights its practicality and 
usefulness to both academics and practitioners. Both case studies were selected to 
illustrate the use of the approach in different environments. The LASCAD case 
study is used to test the claim that the kinds of threats identified by conflict 
analysis if left unmitigated can have a significant effect on system behaviour. Our 
hypothesis was that the majority of conflict risks identified in the failed 
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LASCAD92 project would be unmitigated, whilst the majority of conflict risks 
would be appropriately mitigated/partially mitigated in the successful 
LASCAD96 project. Our results provided confirmation of this hypothesis 
indicating that the kinds of risk identified by conflict analysis are significant to 
the behaviour of systems composed of agents with differing interests. The oil/gas 
sector case study shows conflict analysis being used in a system-of-systems 
situation. The case study indicates that for little effort the approach is able to 
indicate unanticipated sources of potential conflict. This leads to the overall 
conclusion that conflict analysis does identify risks that are significant to the 
behaviour of systems composed of multiple agents with differing interests and 
may be used in differing contexts.  
This chapter is structured such that section 2 introduces the reader to existing 
approaches and their limitations with respect to eliciting threats resulting from 
multiple agents holding differing interests. Section 3 presents the development of 
this thesis’ approach to conflict analysis. Section 4 introduces our responsibility-
based approach to identifying threats using conflict analysis. Section 5 presents 
the case studies illustrating that the approach identifies risks that are significant to 
the behaviour of systems composed of multiple agents with differing interests. 
6.2 Background 
Existing approaches to socio-technical threat identification do not identify threats 
related to a system being incompatible with agents’ interests. The most notable 
socio-technical risk analysis approaches relevant to analysing socio-technical 
situations are Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004; 
Hollnagel & Goteman, 2004), Systems-Theoretic Accident Modelling and 
Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004; Leveson et al., 2006) and Responsibility 
Modelling for Risk Analysis (Lock et al., 2009; Sommerville et al., 2009). 
The FRAM approach is a process level accident analysis and risk analysis 
method. It uses the concept of interacting ‘functions’ to represent a process and 
identify risks to the outcome of a process. FRAM is performed by dividing a 
process into a number of interacting functions comprising inputs, outputs, 
preconditions, control constraints, timing constraints and resources. The potential 
variability of functions is identified and their implications are noted as 
consequences on the outcome. FRAM has been used to identify risks and analyse 
accidents involving socio-technical systems including air accidents and medical 
accidents (Hollnagel et al., 2008). 
The STAMP approach is an institutional level accident analysis and risk analysis 
method. It uses the concept of interacting parts in dynamic equilibrium to 
represent institutional structures and identify risks in terms of ‘control problems’, 
the premise being that risks arise when a system’s behaviour is not appropriately 
monitored and controlled. Identified risks are analysed in terms of their 
interactions with the systems control structures and their resultant effect on 
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institutional outcomes. STAMP has been used to analyse high profile socio-
technical accidents including the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia and the 
Walkerton water contamination tragedy (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 
2003). 
The responsibility modelling approach is a tactical level risk analysis method. It 
uses the concept of responsible agents (human / organisational agents) and their 
interactions to represent a situation and identify risks in terms of failures of agents 
to fulfil responsibilities. Risk identification is performed by: 1) modelling the 
responsibilities of the agents involved in a situation and the resources they require 
to discharge their responsibilities; 2) identifying the consequences/liabilities 
resulting from of an agent not having a resource or not discharging a 
responsibility. This can be facilitated by the use of hazard keywords such as early, 
late, never, incapable, insufficient and impaired. Responsibility modelling has 
been used to analyse socio-technical systems including E-counting systems in the 
Scottish elections and UK civil emergency plans [14, 15]. 
Responsibility modelling is a technique that is complementary to both STAMP 
and FRAM. STAMP may be used to identify risks at an institutional governance 
level whilst FRAM may be used to identify risks at a process level. Responsibility 
modelling enables the analysis of situations at a ‘tactical level’ by understanding 
the risks related to agents depending upon others to discharge their 
responsibilities. 
Responsibility modelling offers a number of attractive characteristics that makes it 
more suitable for conflict analysis of SoS than either FRAM or STAMP. Firstly, 
developing, deploying and maintaining a SoS necessarily requires reliance on 
other parties to discharge responsibilities. Secondly, responsibilities are relatively 
unproblematic to elicit as people find them ‘natural’ to articulate in comparison to 
‘technical’ constructs such as functions or goals. Thirdly, responsibility modelling 
is relatively rapid to perform unlike FRAM. FRAM is concerned with process 
level risks and therefore elicits information such as functions, preconditions, 
control constraints and so on, which may be impractical for large systems. 
Fourthly, STAMP is unsuitable as it focuses on institutional level control 
structures to identify ‘control problems’. This assumes that there already exist 
appropriate techniques to identify conflict-related threats so that they can be 
controlled. 
6.3 A Framework for Identifying Conflict-related Threats 
Responsibility models represent systems as a set of interacting agents that fulfil 
responsibilities with the aid of resources. For responsibilities to be fulfilled, 
agents may depend on the cooperative behaviour of other agents e.g. one agent 
provisioning a resource to another. Since a system’s behaviour, or behavioural 
properties, may be dependent upon agents’ fulfilling certain responsibilities, it is 
important to be able to identify factors that enable or impede cooperative 
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interactions as part of threat identification. One well-established method of 
understanding cooperation is through the lens of conflict theory (M. Deutsch, 
1949; Morton Deutsch, 1973, 1990; Morton Deutsch & Coleman, 2006). In this 
section we use conflict theory to identify threats to cooperation that may arise 
because of conflicts. Thus according to this method of analysis: 
A system’s desired behaviour, or behavioural property, is said to be threatened 
if it is judged that it is ‘unlikely for all necessary agent interaction to be 
successful due to the presence of threats that promote conflict or impede its 
resolution’. 
To identify factors that are important to the occurrence of conflict, a literature 
survey was performed by searching for the term conflict and/or resistance in the 
following journal databases: MISQ, ISJ, Journal of Personality & Social 
Psychology, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Management, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal, Information 
Management, CSCW, CACM, Behaviour & Information Technology, 
Management Science, Information Technology and Management. The rationale 
for approaching conflict analysis from this multidisciplinary perspective was for 
rigorously designed studies from experimental psychology, social psychology, 
and insights from administrative science and management, to be brought to bear 
upon the problem and therefore provide a sound theoretical basis for analysis. 
This section is structured so that a summary of the survey findings is presented 
up-front to orient the reader. Following this orientation detailed discussion 
follows. This detailed discussion covers the structure of cooperative and 
conflictual situations, types of agent interest and behaviours that affect these 
interests. It turns out that understanding these factors is important to the analysis 
of conflict. 
6.3.1 Summary of Literature Review Findings 
Techniques for socio-technical threat identification should take into account the 
following insights from conflict research to enable the identification of conflict 
related threats: 
1. The extent that a system is exposed to conflict is dependent on the system’s 
agents’ interactions’ potential for conflict and potential for a cooperative 
resolution. 
2. An interaction’s potential for conflict is a function of: 
o The number and importance of the perceived sources of conflict 
o The following are identified sources of agent conflict 
o Task conflict, process conflict, time, capabilities/skills, resources, values, 
satisfaction 
o procedural / distributive injustice 
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3. An interaction’s potential for a cooperative resolution is dependent upon these 
following factors: outcome interdependence, importance, acceptability of conflict, 
power, temporality, organisational barriers and history of conflict.  
o A cooperative resolution is dependent upon positive outcome dependence between 
stakeholders.  
o Intensity of cooperative or competitive conflict is dependent upon task importance. 
o Stakeholders in equal positions of power are more likely to be exploitative than those in 
power asymmetries. 
o A positive outcome from conflict is dependent being neither at the start of end of a 
project 
o Conflict resolution is dependent upon good quality communication as poor quality 
communication can be perceived as political manoeuvring. Perceived non-cooperative 
behaviour can occur because of theme incompatibilities, language differences, incomplete 
or specialised knowledge. 
4. Effect of conflict on systems: 
o Any type of agent conflict is likely to result in disruption of work as conflict has negative 
effects on work activity and individual satisfaction with exception to decision quality in 
certain cases. 
 
Table 6.1 - Summary of factors that affect potential for conflict 
Agent	  interest	  
Object	  of	  
conflict	  
Intra-­‐agent	   Inter-­‐agent	  
Task	   N/A	  
Interference	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  
to	  do	  to	  fulfil	  responsibility	  Responsibility	  
fulfilment	  
Process	   N/A	  
Interference	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  
to	  perform	  required	  behaviour	  
Time,	  
Resources,	  
Capability	  
Incompatibility	  between	  required	  
behaviour	  and	  practical	  
constraints	  
N/A	  
Values	  
Incompatibility	  between	  required	  
behaviour	  and	  agent's	  values	  or	  
standards	  
N/A	  
Multiple	  roles	  
Assigned	  multiple	  responsibilities	  
with	  incompatible	  activities	  or	  
assessment	  metrics	  
N/A	  
Satisfaction	  
Incompatible	  
role	  
Assigned	  responsibilities	  that	  are	  
incompatible	  with	  organisational	  
values	  or	  standards	  
N/A	  
Fairness	  
Procedural	  &	  
Distributive	  
N/A	  
Unjust	  allocation	  of	  resources,	  
status,	  benefits	  or	  loses	  
6.3.2 The Structure of a Cooperative Situation 
One way of understanding the structure of a cooperative situation is to use (M. 
Deutsch, 1949) theory of conflict. According to (Morton Deutsch, 1973), conflict 
comprises situations where one person’s actions interfere, obstruct, or in some 
way get in the way of another’s action. (M. Deutsch, 1949) theorised and then 
later demonstrated that the extent that people perceive their goals as interrelated is 
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a good predictor of the consequences of interaction. Cooperation occurs when 
agents perceive their interests as positively dependent and that their actions do 
not interfere with each other. Cooperative conflict occurs in situations where 
agents perceive their interests as positively interdependent but their actions 
interfere. Competition occurs in situations, where the converse is true, people 
perceive their interests to be negatively dependent but their actions compatible. 
Competitive conflict is said to occur in situations where agents perceive that their 
interests are negatively dependent and their actions interfere. 
Table 6.2 - The structure of a cooperative situation 
 Positive Goal 
Interdependency  
Negative Goal 
Interdependency 
Action 
Interference / 
Obstruction 
Cooperative 
Conflict 
Competitive Conflict 
 
Action 
Compatibility Cooperation  Competition 
 
In summary, the extent that agents composing a system will conflict is dependent 
upon the interdependency of their interests and the extent that their actions 
interfere with one another’s behaviour. Therefore, to understand the threats to the 
behaviour of a system resulting from agents’ differing interests we need to 
develop a framework to guide the identification of the: 
1. types of interest that are sufficiently important to agents that they will 
defend them using conflict; 
2. types of behaviour that are typically perceived to interfere with an agents 
interests. 
6.3.3 Determinants of Potential Conflict 
Studies of conflict suggest that there are three broad types of interest that if 
interfered with may result in conflict. These interests are responsibility fulfilment, 
satisfaction and fairness. 
6.3.3.1 Responsibility Fulfilment 
Responsibility fulfilment is often associated with task and process conflict. 
Studies of task and process conflict suggest that people conflict when their ability 
to fulfil a responsibility is interfered with. The kinds of actions that interfere with 
this interest include: 
1. disagreements over what should be done to fulfil a responsibility; 
2. disagreements over how it should be done; 
3. disagreements over who should do it; 
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4. disagreements over what resources are required. 
Task conflict is one of the most commonly identified types of conflict (Janssen, 
Vliert, & Veenstra, 1999; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Moeller & 
Zhang, 2008; Tjosvold, Poon, & Yu, 2005). There is much agreement about its 
primary focus but researchers draw boundaries around the concept in different 
ways. For example (Janssen et al., 1999, p. 119) states that “Task conflict in team 
decision making refers to disagreements about the work to be done including 
issues such as the allocation of resources, application of procedures, and the 
development and implementation of policies.” Whilst (Jehn & Mannix, 2001, p. 
238) states that “Task conflict is an awareness of differences in the viewpoints 
and opinions pertaining to a group task. … it pertains to conflict about ideas and 
differences of opinion about the task”. Notice that Janssen includes conflict about 
what work is to be done but also allocation of resources and to how to do it. In 
contrast, Jehn limits the concept to ideas and opinions about the task. This thesis 
promotes the usage of a common language to ensure comparability of results and 
thus suggests that task conflict should be regarded as conflict over what to do 
(e.g. to fulfil a responsibility) but should not include how-to do it which is the 
object of conflict during process conflict. 
The term process conflict (Greer & Jehn, 2007; Jehn, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 
2001) is often used to add granularity to the study of conflict. It is concerned with 
conflict surrounding responsibility accomplishment e.g. a group may be assigned 
the responsibility of reducing operating costs by 10% and therefore process 
conflict could arise about how to do that. For example (Jehn, 1997, p. 540) 
describes it as “conflict about how task accomplishment should proceed in the 
work unit, who’s responsible for what, and how things should be delegated”. 
Process conflict includes disagreements about assignments of duties or resources 
(Jehn, 1997). This definition of process conflict, we believe, conflates two 
separate yet important issues. The first is developing a strategy for how to do the 
task. The second is implementing the strategy by assigning who is to perform 
certain roles in the task. Therefore, this thesis proposes that process conflict 
should be restricted to conflict over strategies for how a task should be performed 
and that conflicts over implementation (e.g. who and assignment of resources) 
should be dealt with as separate issues. 
6.3.3.2 Satisfaction 
Studies of role conflict (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970) suggest that people 
conflict when their job satisfaction is inferred with. In this context a role is a set of 
responsibilities that a person or organisational agent must fulfil. Our review of 
role conflict identified that the following actions are triggers of role conflict: 
1. a person being assigned a role that is incompatible with  their internal 
standards or values; 
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2. a person being assigned a role that is incompatible with their available 
time, resources or capabilities; 
3. a person being assigned a role consisting of multiple responsibilities which 
require incompatible behaviour; 
4. a person being assigned a role that is incompatible with organisational 
policies, procedures and standards. 
6.3.3.3 Fairness 
Studies of procedural justice and distributive justice suggest that people also 
conflict when they perceive that they are being treated unfairly. Procedural justice 
refers to conflict over procedures that determine the relationships between parties. 
According to (Brown, 2000) it is “a feeling that the methods for deciding about 
and allocating material goods are unfair independently of the in-group’s  actual 
outcomes”. This thesis proposes that procedural injustice is not limited to material 
goods but also social status, time and finite organisational resources such as 
money or manpower. A second type of injustice is distributive injustice where 
parties perceive the distribution of benefits/losses to be unfair such that they enter 
into conflict with the those perceived to control their distribution (Brown, 2000). 
6.3.3.4 Empirical Studies of Conflict in Systems 
Studies of systems development confirm that these types of conflict occur in 
system developments. (Butler, 2003) illustrates that conflicts between groups 
emerge and create a high degree of institutional tension when an IT system is 
used to implement organisational capabilities that are not perceived as being in 
the interest of certain groups. For example, Butler (2003) found that certain 
groups perceived the introduction of an e-commerce capability as an interference 
with tried and tested face-to-face methods of sales and thus a threat to their status 
within their organisation. (Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2003) provides a similar 
account from the deployment of a hospital patient record system that resulted in 
different clinical coding systems being used across different systems due to 
doctors and administrators having conflicting needs for coding. (Lawrence, 2006) 
supports this with an account of conflict over the role of a software development 
team within a large distributed e-Science project. The team were invited to join a 
project to develop software to support meteorologists. However, the team 
received their funding for this work from a research grant that interfered with 
their responsibility to develop software. The research grant was given to the 
group to pursue research but the group were allowed to join the project to perform 
software development work. This created a perceived incompatibility between the 
roles expected of them by the funders, the project’s managers and collaborators. 
Stakeholder agendas, identities and values have also been studied in detail during 
the development and testing phase of ISD (Cohen, Birkin, Garfield, & Webb, 
2004; Sonnenwald, 1995; X. Zhang, Dhaliwal, Gillenson, & Moeller, 2008). The 
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sources of conflict between developers and testers comprise primarily of 
differences of: identity leading to a perceived asymmetry of status; differences in 
perceptions/expectations of appropriate extent of testing; limited resources. 
Stakeholder agendas, identities and values are also a source of conflict in the 
context of software evaluation and system deployment (Joshi & Rai, 2000; Wong, 
2005). Users and developers despite wanting similar consequences from software 
(e.g. look good at job, less stress, flexible, accurate) were motivated by different 
values and believed that different software characteristics would deliver those 
desired consequences (Wong, 2005). Within system deployment it is known that 
software that attempts to make employees do activities which they perceive not to 
be part of their role, or incompatible with their values, causes role conflict and is 
negatively correlated with employee satisfaction (Joshi & Rai, 2000). 
6.3.3.5 Summary of Determinants of Conflict 
In summary, the types of interest that are sufficiently important to agents’ that 
they will defend them using conflict are: 
• fulfilling responsibilities 
• job satisfaction 
• fairness 
The types of actions that are typically perceived to interfere with an agent’s 
interests are: 
• disagreement over what should be done to fulfil a responsibility; 
• disagreement over how it should be done; 
• disagreement over who should do it; 
• disagreement  over what resources are required; 
• being assigned a role that is incompatible with  their internal standards or 
values; 
• being assigned a role that is incompatible with their available time, 
resources or capabilities; 
• being assigned a role consisting of multiple responsibilities which require 
incompatible behaviour; 
• being assigned a role that is incompatible with organisational policies, 
procedures and standards; 
• perception of unfair procedures for distributing benefits or loses; 
• perception of unfair distribution of benefits or loses. 
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Having identified determinants of potential for conflict in this section, the next 
section identifies the determinants of potential for a cooperative resolution of a 
conflict. Understanding cooperative resolution is important to conflict analysis 
because conflicts that are unlikely to be resolved pose a greater threat to a system 
than those that are likely to be resolved. 
6.3.4 Determinants of Potential for Cooperative Resolution 
This subsection provides an account of the factors that determine a conflict’s 
potential for resolution. Our survey identified the following as determinants of the 
potential for resolution: structural factors; temporal factors; communicative 
factors; individual factors. 
6.3.4.1 Structural Factors 
Structural factors are factors that describe the relationship between the agents in a 
situation. In conflict situations outcome interdependence, task interdependence, 
task importance and power relations are important factors in determining the 
outcome of a conflict. 
Our survey suggests that a cooperative resolution to a conflict is dependent upon 
positive outcome interdependence between stakeholders. In general, having a 
high level of positive interdependence between conflicting parties increases 
decision quality and affective acceptance of outcome especially in situations with 
high personal conflict (Janssen et al., 1999). 
o Positive interdependence has been measured to mildly decrease 
decision quality and affective acceptance in situations with high task 
conflict and low personal conflict.  
o Positive interdependence promotes integrative behaviour in situations 
with low task conflict (or high task conflict & personal conflict). This 
means positive interdependence promotes behaviour that maximises 
total outcome for parties involved. 
o Positive interdependence promotes reductions in distributive behaviour 
in situations with low personal conflict (or high task & personal 
conflict). This means positive interdependence discourages behaviour 
that maximises unequal outcome for the respective parties. 
The implication for risk analysis is that positively dependent stakeholders are 
more likely to reach an acceptable resolution than those negatively dependent. 
The speed of a cooperative resolution is affected by importance of the outcome 
that is being interfered with or inhibited. The importance of the outcome 
amplifies the positive and negative effects of a conflict and may speed up 
resolution (Jehn, 1997). If an organisation’s norms accept conflict then this also 
typically amplifies both the positive and negative impacts of conflict (Jehn, 1995, 
1997). 
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The likelihood of a cooperative resolution is also affected by agents’ relative 
power. Agents in equal positions of power are more likely to be exploitative than 
those in power asymmetries. The importance of power has been demonstrated 
experimentally (Solomon, 1960). The greater the social power of an agent in 
contrast to another, the more likely they are to engage in trusting behaviour. 
Under conditions of equal power an agent is likely to be exploitative if the other 
party unconditionally cooperates, whilst cooperative if other party cooperates on 
condition. In unequal power conditions, the opposite is true. If the other party 
cooperates unconditionally then so will the agent. The implication for risk 
analysis is that agents in equal positions of power are more likely to be exploitive 
and thus increase the likelihood that conflicts will remain unresolved. 
The effects of structural factors have been observed and studied in the field of 
Computer Science and Information Systems. Studies of user participation within 
the development process support claims that structural factors mediate conflict 
and promote cooperative stakeholder behaviour in organisational settings (Daniel 
Robey, Farrow, & Franz, 1989).  
(D. Robey, Welke, & Turk, 2001) argue that the traditional life cycle, iterative 
incremental and component based development all have qualitatively different 
approaches to user participation/communication and therefore the manner in 
which conflict emerges is different. The traditional life cycle paradigm uses a 
carefully designed social process that relies on a largely sequential process that 
suppresses conflict by creating a power-relationship between developer and user. 
The developer controls the sequential interaction with users thereby suppressing 
‘off-topic’ issues that become rarely addressed. 
The iterative incremental paradigm uses a structured process to bring together the 
developer and user. However, the interactions are less structured thereby giving 
the user more power to direct attention to conflict issues than in traditional 
development. It is also argued that users and developers are more interdependent 
as users assist design and therefore this provides shared goals that promote 
cooperative behaviour. 
The component based development paradigm uses a structured process to bring 
together the developer and users with the aim of removing users dependence on 
in-house IT staff and thus giving users the power to build complete systems from 
components with little interference (D. Robey et al., 2001). This claim however is 
disputed by (Garlan, Allen, & Ockerbloom, 2009). Garlan et al. suggest that 
under the component based paradigm, conflicts are addressed through buyer seller 
negotiation, but due to end-users’ lack of formal training to deal with companies, 
it results in them using intermediaries or them becoming dependent on suppliers 
or component brokers, thereby preventing users from building systems with 
minimal interference. 
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6.3.4.2 Temporal Factors 
A cooperative resolution is influenced by the time period within a project that the 
conflict appears. Higher group performance is associated with a specific pattern 
of conflict (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). A high performing group at the beginning of a 
project will have low but increasing levels of task conflict, a low level of 
relationship conflict and a low level of process conflict. At the midpoint of the 
project there will be moderate levels of task conflict and this will subside towards 
the end of the project. These high performing teams also had established value 
systems, high levels of trust and respect, and open discussion norms. These 
findings are supported by the work of (Tjosvold et al., 2005) who identify that 
prior cooperative conflict (consensus based conflict resolution) promotes 
confidence in team relationships (as perceived by team members) and promotes 
team effectiveness (as perceived by team’s manager). Conversely low group 
performance is associated with a particular pattern of conflict. It begins with low 
task, relationship, and process conflict and remains low until the end of the 
project where conflict peaks (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). 
6.3.4.3 Communicative Factors 
A cooperative resolution is dependent upon good quality communication as poor 
quality communication can be perceived as political manoeuvring (X. Zhang et 
al., 2008). Intra-group communication promotes cooperation in social dilemmas 
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). Experimental results support that 
communication is believed to increase cooperation via individuals making 
commitments and building trust not by the development of group identity (Kerr & 
Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). When actors are left out of the loop, or receive last 
minute communication, or delayed communications this can be perceived as a 
provocation. Common examples of this include delays communicating changes to 
requirements, developers changing code without notifying testers, testers failing 
to provide feedback to developers, developers failing to communication with 
users (X. Zhang et al., 2008). 
Conflict can also occur because of theme incompatibilities, language differences, 
and incomplete or specialised knowledge (Sonnenwald, 1995). Theme 
incompatibility occurs when one party is unable to answer questions in another’s 
terms. For example, a user asks how much a particular feature will cost and the 
developer responds by explaining the standard pricing model of function points 
rather than the price in terms of cash. Language differences can cause parties to 
believe commitments or assurances have been made when they haven’t resulting 
in conflict. Incomplete or specialised knowledge can be perceived as obfuscation 
when in fact a certain variable in unknown or uncertain/vague in nature. Conflicts 
can also occur because of blunt communication that is perceived as an attack 
upon an individual or group’s status/reputation (Kock & McQueen, 1998). 
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6.3.4.4 Individual Factors 
A cooperative resolution is also affected by a stakeholder’s perceptual frame type 
as it influences the extent to which a person is likely to share the benefits (and 
losses) of interaction (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). A perceptual frame is the 
‘frame of reference’ that a person uses to analyse a situation. An actor is said to 
be in a gain frame where prospective outcome is gain e.g. gaining points. An 
actor is said to be in a loss frame where a prospective outcome is less favourable 
than reference e.g. losing points. De Dreu demonstrated that humans exhibit three 
kinds of behavioural strategy labelled: pro-social; individualist; competitive. Pro-
socials in a gain frame are likely to share loses evenly but not gains. In a loss 
frame, pro-socials tend to cooperate more. Individualists in a gain frame are more 
likely to share gains evenly but are less likely to share losses. In a loss frame they 
cooperate less. Actors of a competitive nature cooperate as little in a loss frame as 
a gain frame. 
6.3.4.5 Summary of Determinants of Cooperative Resolution 
In summary, the potential for a cooperative resolution is dependent upon certain 
conflict dimensions that impact the conflict outcome and intensity. These 
dimensions include outcome interdependence, importance, acceptability of 
conflict, power, temporality, organisational barriers and history of conflict.  
Table 6.3 - Summary of determinants of cooperative resolution 
Factor Type Determinant of Outcome / Intensity Affect 
Outcome 
interdependence Negative interdependence between Stakeholders 
Reduced likelihood 
of resolution 
Importance High importance of issue to Stakeholder Conflict is highly disruptive to work 
Acceptability 
Norms Perception that acceptability of conflict is high 
Conflict is highly 
disruptive to work 
Power Equal power between stakeholders Reduced likelihood of resolution 
Temporal Conflict at the start or end of a project Reduced likelihood of resolution 
Organisational 
Barriers 
Communication quality between parties is below 
average e.g. Specialist knowledge, different norms. 
Reduced likelihood 
of resolution 
History of 
conflict History of dislike / unresolved conflict 
Reduced likelihood 
of resolution 
 
• A cooperative resolution is dependent upon positive outcome dependence 
between agents.  
• Intensity of conflict is dependent upon outcome importance. 
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• Agents in equal positions of power are more likely to be exploitative than those 
in power asymmetries. 
• A positive outcome from conflict is dependent on it being neither at the start or 
end of a project 
• Conflict resolution is dependent upon good quality communication as poor 
quality communication can be perceived as political manoeuvring. Non-
cooperative behaviour can occur because of theme incompatibilities, language 
differences, incomplete or specialised knowledge. 
6.4 Responsibility Modelling for Conflict Analysis 
Responsibility-based conflict analysis aims to identify conditions that result in a 
system not exhibiting required behaviours or behavioural properties due to agent 
conflict. It shares many similarities to responsibility modelling for threat 
identification described in the previous chapter. A system is represented as an 
aggregate of agents, resources and responsibilities. Required behaviours are 
represented by responsibilities which represent units of behaviour that an agent 
has a duty to perform; a responsibility model is thus a description of the 
behaviours that agents (within the scope of analysis) have a duty to perform and 
the resources they require to perform these behaviours. 
Responsibility-based conflict analysis differs from the threat identification 
performed in previous chapters during data collection and analysis. During data 
collection information must be gathered to identify potential conflict and 
conditions that may inhibit their resolution. During data analysis this information 
is used to evidence claims about the extent that each agent’s interests are likely to 
be interfered with and whether these conflicts are likely to be resolved in a 
cooperative manner. 
6.4.1 Building a Responsibility Model 
As per the previous chapter, the responsibility models may be developed and 
analysed in any manner that is flexible enough to meet an analysts needs. 
6.4.2 Analysing a Responsibility Model for Conflict 
Analysis of a responsibility model for threats may be performed as per the 
previous chapter. In addition to the steps described in the previous chapter this 
time responsibility fulfilment should also be inspected for agent related threat 
conditions resulting from conflict. This comprising collecting information to 
assess whether agents have sufficient time, sufficient/adequate skills, and that 
their interests are compatible with their assigned responsibilities. 
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Conflict analysis identifies threats to each agent’s responsibility fulfilment 
interests, satisfaction interests, and fairness interests. This is achieved by judging 
whether: i) the agent’s responsibilities are likely to be compatible with their 
internal standards and values; ii) whether the agent’s responsibilities are 
compatible with their time, resources and capabilities;  iii) whether the 
combination of responsibilities that have been assigned to an agent are compatible 
with each other; iv)whether the responsibilities assigned to an agent are 
compatible with organisational standards and policies; and v) whether the agent 
will perceive changes as unfair or reduces their satisfaction. This form of analysis 
is supported via means of conflict analysis checklist that is completed for each 
agent (See Appendix A). 
6.5 The Case Study Investigations 
Two case studies were performed to investigate the usefulness of conflict analysis. 
The first case study comprised a retrospective analysis of a well-known and well-
studied control room automation project (LASCAD) that suffered from failure 
prior to being successfully turned around. The second case study comprised a 
feasibility study of a proposed migration from an in-house data-centre to a cloud-
based infrastructure as a service (IaaS). The aim of the first case study is to verify 
the reliability of conflict analysis by mapping the findings of previous studies to 
the threats identified using conflict analysis, and to verify that the types of threats 
identified using conflict analysis impacted the behaviour of the system. The aim 
of the second case study is to demonstrate that the technique can be used to 
analyse a real world system-of-systems. 
6.5.1 The Turnaround of the LASCAD Project 
The LASCAD (London Ambulance Service Computer Aided Despatch) project is 
an exemplar of an IT enabled work-transformation project. It comprised the 
automation of the dispatch of ambulances from call taking to ambulance dispatch. 
It is a particularly interesting case study since the project was a failure in 1992 but 
was then subsequently turned around and made into a success in 1996. This case 
study was selected as the organisational environment of the project was 
particularly complicated (as shall be described below) and the project itself is 
relatively well known and well studied in information systems and computer 
science. This case study will be used to test the reliability and validity of the 
conflict analysis approach. If the approach provides valid and reliable output, one 
expects that conflict analysis will identify a large number of unmitigated threats 
that map onto those threats found by other analyses of the LASCAD92 project. In 
contrast, for the successful LASCAD96 project, one would expect that a large 
number of those threats would have been mitigated. 
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6.5.1.1 History of the LASCAD Project 
The need for the automation project was identified in the mid-1980s when the 
government perceived the London Ambulance Service to be failing to modernise 
and generally invest in their work force. In May 1987, a project was initiated to 
automate ambulance dispatch from call taking to resource allocation. In October 
1990, this attempt to automate was scrapped. IAL, a British Telecoms subsidiary, 
was blamed for faulty software. LAS sought damages for a faulty dispatch 
module that failed under load testing (P. Beynon-Davies, 1995). In October 1990, 
a second LASCAD project was initiated. By June 1991 a contract with IT 
developers, Systems Options Ltd, was signed and by September 1991 a contract 
with a mobile data equipment provider, Solo Electronic Systems Ltd, was also 
signed.  The planned implementation date was 8th Jan 1992 but by March 1992, 
the second phase of live trials was suspended due to the users of the system not 
having confidence in the system, resulting in the Nation Union of Public 
Employees to become involved (Page, Williams, & Boyd, 1993). On the 26th 
October 1992, the LASCAD system went live and the automated system 
struggled to satisfy its objectives resulting in ambulances being scheduled 
inefficiently. The system performed similarly on the 27th October 1992 and the 
system was finally switched off after it crashed due to a malfunctioning fail-over 
mechanism on the 4th November 1992. Following this, a public enquiry was 
performed as it had become one of the highest profile IT failures in the UK. 
The LASCAD project was revitalised by newly appointed management. Rather 
than pursuing the same approach as the LASCAD90 & LASCAD92 failures, they 
opted for a radically different approach. The new project (called LASCAD96 in 
this thesis) comprised a non-time pressured in-house development. A COTS 
solution was evaluated, but rejected, and a participative approach utilising 
prototyping was adopted to generate user participation and ownership (Fitzgerald 
& Russo, 2005). In contrast to LASCAD92, LASCAD96 invested plentiful 
resources in testing the system and training users. Releases of the software were 
delayed in situations where the user-base was not convinced of its capabilities. 
The new system went live on the 17th January 1996 and after a week of successful 
operation the staff moved into a new purpose built control room. The initial 
system was extremely simple and improvements were released in small 
increments. By September 1996 more radical enhancements were being accepted 
by the user-base resulting in a jump in productivity from 38%-60% of calls being 
despatched in 3 minutes (Fitzgerald & Russo, 2005). 
6.5.1.2 Hypotheses 
The threats identified using conflict analysis were used to test two hypotheses 
with the overall aim of illustrating the validity and reliability of approach. 
[H1] The causes of the failure identified in other analyses map onto threats 
identified by the conflict analysis 
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If hypothesis one is supported then this provides an indication that conflict 
analysis produces reliable and valid output. This is because if the threats 
identified by other approaches map onto those of conflict analysis it confirms that 
the approach is consistent with the findings of other valid and reliable approaches 
to identifying threats. The hypothesis was tested by identifying the causes of the 
LASCAD92 failure as identified by the Official Inquiry (and supporting academic 
literature) and mapping these on to relevant threats identified by conflict analysis. 
[H2] Threats identified in the failed LASCAD92 project were appropriately 
mitigated/partially mitigated in the successful LASCAD96 project 
If hypothesis two is supported by the results then this corroborates that the kinds 
of threat identified by conflict analysis have a significant impact on the behaviour 
of systems composed of multiple agents with differing interests. Hypothesis two 
was tested by identifying if the changes to practices identified by (Fitzgerald & 
Russo, 2005) in their case-study of the successful turn-around (LASCAD96) 
mitigated or partially mitigated each threat identified by conflict analysis. 
6.5.1.3 Method 
To analyse the LASCAD92 and LASCAD96 systems the process described in 
section 6.4 was adopted. Data collection consisted identifying and reviewing 
publically available documents on the LASCAD92 and LASCAD96 projects. Our 
sources of data were the official report of the inquiry into the London Ambulance 
Service (Page et al., 1993), and from academic papers (P. Beynon-Davies, 1995; 
Paul Beynon-Davies, 1999; Finkelstein & Dowell, 1996; Fitzgerald & Russo, 
2005; Hougham, 1996). Each of the data sources were used to establish and 
corroborate the LASCAD’s: 
o Key stakeholders, 
o Stakeholder responsibilities with respect to ambulance dispatch system 
o Resources required to fulfil responsibilities 
o Dependencies between responsibilities 
o Stakeholders’ capabilities, interests and histories of conflict  
The information acquired was consolidated and represented visually using 
responsibility models – see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 over page. Information 
relevant for conflict analysis was used to populate conflict analysis checklist 
templates – see Appendix A for an example template. 
6.5.1.4 Responsibility Models 
After data collection, responsibility models of each system were developed to aid 
in threat identification. The LASCAD92 system is represented in Figure 6.1 
below. One can observe that the system has four key stakeholders. The LAS 
executives, whom are responsible for meeting ORCON requirements, the 
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LASCAD management, whom are responsible for monitoring and managing 
ambulance dispatch, the Control Room staff, whom are responsible for receiving 
calls, entering the calls into the LASCAD system and the dispatch of ambulances. 
And the Ambulance Crew, whom is responsible for acknowledging dispatch 
requests, attending incidents and transporting patients to hospital. We can also 
observe that the system depends upon multiple resources. The LAS executives are 
dependent upon the LAS management fulfilling their responsibility to monitor and 
manage ambulance dispatch. The LAS management depend upon the LASCAD 
software system generating ‘incident statistics’ to fulfil this obligation. The 
Control Room Staff depend upon a telephone system and the LASCAD software 
system. The Ambulance Crew depends upon the ambulance vehicle system for 
dispatch requests. One can also see that many of these resources are not 
independent but are mostly provisioned by either the LASCAD software system 
or the ambulance vehicle system. This signals to the analyst that resources will 
have shared threats e.g. A LASCAD software, or Ambulance Vehicle system 
failure, may result in multiple responsibility fulfilment failures. 
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Figure 6.1 - LASCAD92 system – Go Live 
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The LASCAD96 system is represented in Figure 6.2 below. Similarly to the 
LASCAD92 model we can see that there are four key stakeholders, the LAS 
executives, the LAS management, the control room staff and the ambulance crew. 
Crucially we can see that the allocation of responsibilities is subtlety different in 
the LASCAD96 system in comparison to the LASCAD92 system. In LASCAD96 
it is the human operators who are responsible for dispatching the ambulances and 
for communicating the dispatch request to the ambulance crew via radio or 
telephone. In the LASCAD92 system, although the control room staff are 
responsible for dispatching ambulances, it was the software that performed this 
action via a data-link to the ambulance vehicle system, which obfuscates whether 
or not the dispatch request was accepted since there was no human interaction. 
Also crucially in the LASCAD96 system, control room staff are responsible for 
updating the status of incidents via radioing ambulance crew and asking for 
situation updates if they are unsure of whether progress is being made. This means 
that all the status and location data in the LASCAD96 software system is gathered 
by a human and tacitly sense checked prior to being entered into the software 
system. In contrast, the LASCAD92 software was designed to automatically 
gather vehicle location and status from each ambulance vehicle system. This 
minimisation of human interaction between control room and ambulance crews 
threatens to cause confusion should events occur that the system has not been 
designed to take into account, e.g. if ambulance crews attend an incident in 
vehicles other than those specially assigned by the software system, or if 
ambulance crews swap incidents because of differing levels of expertise or road 
conditions.
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Figure 6.2 - LASCAD96 system – Go Live
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The above graphical representations of LASCAD92 and LASCAD96 were used to 
guide conflict analysis. For each agent in the diagram a conflict analysis checklist 
template was completed. The responsibility models assisted in this process by 
prompting the analyst to consider each responsibility, its required resources, and 
to consider inter-agent conflicts (conflict that occur when one agent depends on 
another). 
Since this chapter focuses on conflict analysis the threats identified are purely 
conflict related threats. Threats related to responsibilities being unfulfilled for 
reasons other than conflict will not be analysed here. Of course such an analysis 
could have been performed. For instance, one may trivially identify that if the 
ambulance crews’ radios, or their ambulance vehicle system, becomes inoperable 
due to radio interference then they will be unable to accept dispatch requests, 
which will have implications for control room staff fulfilling their responsibility 
to dispatch ambulances, which will ultimately have consequences for the LAS 
executives meeting ORCON requirements. However since this capability was 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, we will focus on the harder challenge of 
identifying threats resulting from intra-agent and inter-agent conflict. 
6.5.1.5 Identified Threats 
In total 24 potential conflicts were identified. These included new resources being 
perceived to interfere / impede agents’ fulfilment of responsibilities, new 
resources requiring capabilities that the agents’ do not possess, new resources 
interfering with agents’ values and satisfaction, new resources increasing the 
individual agents’ workloads and thus interfering with their satisfaction and 
ability to fulfil responsibilities. Potential inter-agent conflicts were also identified, 
for instance, the distribution of system benefits vs. drawbacks being distributively 
unjust, the procedure by which the change was implemented being procedurally 
unjust. A full list of threats may be explored in Appendix B. In this section for the 
purposes of illustration we will discuss a subset of these threats. 
Eight conflict related threats were identified and associated with the LAS 
management. Perhaps the most salient threat clauses were: 
o LAS management perceive that their jobs are under threat if they 
appear uncooperative (Condition). The LAS management will be 
reluctant to report negative information about the system to LAS 
executives for fear of reprisals (Threat). LAS management will 
therefore suppress negative information about the project for fear of 
losing their job (Consequences). 
o LAS management perceive that LAS control room staff and ambulance 
staff intend to obstruct the new system because of poor worker-
management relations (Condition). The LAS management may ignore 
negative feedback about the system as politically motivated behaviour 
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(threat). LAS management may ignore valid criticism of the system 
resulting in it being unfit for purpose when deployed (consequence). 
o LAS management view the imposition of the LASCAD software 
system as procedurally unjust because  LAS is an exceptional case due 
to the size of its region (Condition). LAS managers uncooperative or 
with hold information during the development (Threat). LAS software 
system may be unfit for purpose when deployed (Consequence). 
Eight conflict related threats were identified and associated with the control room 
assistants. These included: 
o Control room staff viewed the imposition of the LASCAD software 
system as distributed unfairly because their jobs will radically change 
but in return they do not get better working conditions or increases in 
pay (Condition). Control room staff will obstruct the development or 
attempt to sabotage the system (Threat). LAS software system may be 
unfit for purpose when deployed (Consequence). 
o Control room staff perceives the LASCAD software as removing 
satisfying work (Condition). Control room staff will obstruct the 
development or attempt to sabotage the system (Threat). LAS software 
system may be unfit for purpose when deployed (Consequence). 
o Control room staff perceives the LASCAD software as degrading their 
ability to meet their values of rapid patient care (Condition). Control 
room staff may obstruct the development or provide negative feedback 
about the (Threat). LAS software system may be unfit for purpose 
when deployed or may require significant rework prior to being fit for 
purpose (Consequence). 
Eight conflict related threats were identified and associated with ambulance crew. 
These included: 
o Ambulance crew are inadequately trained (Condition). Ambulance 
crew will not have the capability of fulfilling their responsibilities to 
acknowledge dispatch requests and report incident attendance leading 
to dissatisfaction (Threat). Control room staff may not be able to fulfil 
their responsibility to dispatch ambulances as their requests go 
unacknowledged (Consequence). 
o LASCAD system requires ambulance crew to attend incidents as 
decided by the software ambulance selection algorithms (Condition). 
Following the system may interfere with ambulance crews’ values of 
rapid patient care and may disobey the system if instructions go against 
their judgement (Threat). Ambulances may not accept dispatch 
requests, or may attend a dispatch request in a different vehicle to the 
one scheduled by the system (Consequence). 
o LASCAD system requires ambulance crew to attend incidents as 
decided by the software ambulance selection algorithms (Condition). 
Following the system may reduce ambulance crews’ satisfaction since 
it removes the autonomy of crews to use their local knowledge and 
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experience when accepting/attending incidents (Threat). Ambulances 
may not accept dispatch requests, or may attend a dispatch request in a 
different vehicle to the one scheduled by the system (Consequence). 
These example threats are intended to provide a representative sample of threats 
to the LASCAD system because of the system conflicting with agent’s 
responsibility fulfilment, satisfaction or notions of fairness. 
6.5.1.6 Hypothesis Testing 
In this section we test two hypotheses with the aim of establishing whether 
conflict analysis may be a useful approach for identifying threats that affect the 
behaviour of systems. 
Hypothesis 1: threats identified by conflict analysis map onto the causes of failure 
identified in other analyses 
The first hypothesis will be tested by verifying whether the officially identified 
causes of the failure of LASCAD92, and those identified by academic papers map 
onto the threats identified using conflict analysis. If the causes do map onto 
threats identified by conflict analysis then it can be claimed that conflict analysis 
identifies threats that can have adverse effects on system behaviours. 
When I performed the mapping exercise all but one cause could be mapped to 
threats identified using conflict analysis. A full table of mappings may be found 
in Appendix C. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported by these results, and this 
corroborates that conflict analysis captures threats captured by existing 
approaches and therefore provides an indication of the reliability and validity of 
the method. 
An example of a mapping between an officially identified cause and a conflict 
analysis identified threat is as follows. The report of the inquiry into the LAS 
identified that external pressure to achieve results resulted in insufficient time 
being allowed for developing and testing of the extremely complex technical 
solution. This maps to the inappropriate mitigation of threat [M2] using coercion 
rather than the provisioning of time and resources. Threat [M2] is that LAS 
management may resist the IT system if they perceive that they will be given 
inadequate time and resources for it to function. This threat was mitigated by 
coercion (applying pressure to managers) they preventing them for 
resisting/conflicting with the system until they perceived it to be fit for purpose. 
Another example of a mapping is between the identified cause that there was a 
lack of disciplined technical approach. This can be mapped onto the mitigation of 
threat [M3] by coercion (applying pressure) rather than ensuring management 
have appropriate capabilities and knowledge. Threat [M3] is the LAS 
management will resist/conflict with the system if they cannot, or are unwilling, 
to develop skills to manage the system or its development. Again rather than 
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providing an environment where LAS management could speak out about 
problems, coercion was used to discourage any behaviour that could be perceived 
as obstructive to the system being deployed as quickly as possible. 
Hypothesis 2: the majority of conflict threats identified in the failed LASCAD92 
project are unmitigated, whilst the majority of conflict threats are appropriately 
mitigated/partially mitigated in the successful LASCAD96 project. 
The second hypothesis will be tested by verifying whether the majority of threats 
identified by conflict analysis were unmitigated in LASCAD92 but appropriately 
mitigated in LASCAD96. If this is the case then it may be claimed that the kinds 
of threat identified by conflict analysis can have adverse effects on system 
behaviour unless appropriately mitigated. 
The conflict analysis found 24 conflict threats associated with the LASCAD 92 
and 96 projects. Of these 24 threats, 2 were appropriately mitigated or partially 
mitigated during LASCAD 92. However during LASCAD 96, 23 of the 24 threats 
were appropriately mitigated or partially mitigated. Since LASCAD 96 was 
considered a success this suggests that the conflict threat factors if left 
unmitigated influences the behaviour of systems composed of multiple agents 
with differing interests. Therefore hypothesis 2 is supported, as most of the threats 
identified in the LASCAD92 project were mitigated/partially mitigated in the 
successful LASCAD96 project 
The two appropriately mitigated stakeholder threats during the LASCAD 92 
project were: [M1] the threat that LAS Management may resist the IT system as 
they perceive the changes in working practices to degrade their chances of 
meeting ORCON (a standard for monitoring ambulance service performance) 
targets; [M4] the threat that LAS management may resist the IT system as they 
perceive dependency on new, perhaps unreliable, technology to degrade their 
chances of meeting ORCON targets. Both of these threats were mitigated by the 
fact that management was convinced that radical technology was the solution to 
their problem. 
The unmitigated stakeholder threat during the LASCAD 96 project was [M6] the 
threat that LAS management may view Control Room assistants or ambulance 
crew as being obstructive when providing negative feedback about the system due 
to poor past relations. There is no evidence to suggest that this threat materialised 
as all evidence reviewed suggests that management were open to all bottom-up 
feedback to the extent that they delayed a phase of the deployment until staff 
members were confident in its use. 
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6.5.1.7 Lessons Learned 
The LASCAD 92/96 project emphasises the importance of agent conflict and its 
adverse effect on the behaviour of systems composed of multiple agents with 
differing interests. 
[1] Resistance comprises stakeholders providing feedback on how they perceive a 
system to impact their local environment and therefore addressing their perceived 
threats is valuable as it facilitates good fit between their local environment and 
the system and the changes it brings about. 
[2] The majority of stakeholder threats can be appropriately mitigated, or partially 
mitigated, by senior management demonstrating that they are willing to invest the 
resources it takes to get a project done well and that they are open and respond to 
continuous consultation/feedback from all stakeholders. 
[3] Sources of continuous consultation/feedback include: Up-front consultation; 
ongoing drop-in sessions; User acceptance testing where users can delay go-live 
if unhappy. 
[4] Software and system designers should be mindful of stakeholders’ values, 
satisfaction, and status. One particularly important area is to avoid fully 
automating user decision-making and instead supporting the user to make better 
decisions. This is beneficial as it reduces the threat of removing satisfying or 
status-granting aspects work whilst simultaneously enabling the user to 
incorporate their local knowledge or expertise. 
[5] Stakeholder threats that are mitigated via coercion tend dampen feedback 
loops between stakeholders resulting in poor communication and ultimately a 
project that is not a good fit with its environment. 
6.5.2 Cloud Adoption in an Oil/Gas Sector SME 
The aim of this case study is to demonstrate the use of conflict analysis to identify 
threats to a system-of-systems. The case study organisation is a UK based SME 
that provides bespoke IT solutions for the oil & gas industry. It consists of around 
30 employees with offices in the UK and the Middle East. It has an organisational 
structure based on functional divisions (e.g. administration, engineering and 
support). 
The migration use-case comprised determining the feasibility of migrating one of 
the organisation’s primary service offerings (a quality monitoring and data 
acquisition system) to Amazon EC2 – an infrastructure-as-a-service offering from 
Amazon Web Services. The following is an anonymised description of the 
situation: Company C is a small oil and gas company who owns some offshore 
assets in the North Sea oilfields. Company C needed a data acquisition system to 
- 120 - 
allow them to manage their offshore operations by monitoring data from their 
assets on a minute-by-minute basis. Company C’s assets rely on the production 
facilities of Company A (a major oil company), therefore the data comes onshore 
via Company A’s communication links. Company C does not have the 
capabilities to develop their own IT systems, hence they outsourced the 
development and management of the system to Company B, which is an IT 
solutions company with a small data centre. Figure 6.3 provides an overview of 
the system, which consists of two servers: 
1. A database server that logs and archives the data coming in from the offshore platform into 
a database. A tape drive is used to take daily backups of the database, the tapes are stored 
off-site. 
2. An application server that hosts a number of data reporting and monitoring applications. 
The end users at Company C access these applications using a remote desktop client over 
the Internet. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 - Oil & Gas Case study: System Overview 
The system infrastructure was deployed in Company B’s data centre and went 
live in 2005. Since then, Company B’s support department has been maintaining 
the system and solving any problems that have risen. This case study investigated 
how the same system could be deployed using the EC2 cloud offerings of 
Amazon Web Services. Figure 6.4 provides an overview of this scenario, where 
Company B deploys and maintains the same system in the cloud. 
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Figure 6.4 - System deployed in the cloud 
A responsibility modelling approach was used to identify threats related to the 
proposed change. Data was collected via the use of five semi-structured 
interviews with staff members from different functions within the organisation 
(e.g. Technical manager, project manager, business development manager, 
systems engineers, support technicians) and supported with documents where 
available. Data was analysed using the conflict analysis approach by one 
researcher and corroborated by a second to help ensure reliability of finding. 
Responsibility analysis was performed in a manner similar to the LASCAD case 
study. Interview data was used to establish and corroborate the proposed cloud 
systems: 
o Key stakeholders, 
o Stakeholder responsibilities with respect to the data acquisition and 
monitoring system 
o Resources required to fulfil responsibilities 
o Dependencies between responsibilities 
o Stakeholders’ capabilities, interests and histories of conflict  
The information acquired was consolidated and represented visually using 
responsibility models – see Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 overleaf. Information 
relevant for conflict analysis was used to populate conflict analysis checklist 
templates. 
The ‘as-is’ responsibility model (Figure 6.5) describes the existing in-house data 
acquisition and monitoring system. One can see that the system is composed of 
seven agents. Company A, whom are responsible for providing the offshore 
gateway that transports data onshore to company B’s data centre. Company C, 
whom are responsible for paying for the metering system and paying for the 
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metering support contract with Company B. We can see that Company B is 
represented as five human agents, whom comprise the: 
o Support manager who is responsible for the provision of the metering 
service and the metering service technical support; 
o Customer relationship staff, which are responsible for responding to 
customer queries with respect to technical matters and also service 
provision agreements and billing; 
o Metering system engineers, who are responsible for support and 
maintenance of the hardware, operating system, database, application, 
fallback and recovery, back-ups and network support and maintenance; 
o Sales and marketing staff, who are responsible for creating awareness 
of products in the marketplace, identifying potential customers and 
matching their needs to products/services, convincing customers that 
products/services meet their needs; 
o Finance / Business development staff, who are responsible for 
managing expenditure, paying for the offshore gateway, managing 
cash-flow, managing income, and managing market share. 
We can also observe that the system depends upon multiple resources. The in-
house metering system, documentation for troubleshooting and configuration of 
the metering system, redundant hardware for fallback, back up media, the 
customer relationship and billing system, the offshore gateway, knowledge of in-
house service offerings and means of payment. We can also observe dependencies 
between responsibilities that span organisational boundaries. For instance for the 
support manager to fulfil his responsibility of provisioning and maintaining the 
metering system he is dependent upon Company A fulfilling their responsibility 
of provisioning and maintaining the offshore gateway. 
The ‘to-be’ responsibility model (Figure 6.6) describe the proposed the EC2 
cloud-based data acquisition and monitoring system. This system is composed of 
eight agents. Company A is responsible for provisioning and maintaining the 
offshore gateway, AWS is responsible for provisioning EC2 virtual machines and 
AWS gold support, Company C is responsible for paying for the metering system 
and the metering system support contract. Company B as represented by its five 
human agents are responsible for responsibilities similar to those in the ‘as-is’ 
system. 
The most notable differences between the ‘as-is’ system and the ‘to-be’ system 
are extent that company B’s responsibility fulfilment is dependent upon resources 
that are outside their organisational boundary and a reduction in the number and 
nature of the metering system engineers responsibilities. One may now observe 
that the Support manager’s responsibility to provision the metering system is 
dependent AWS EC2 virtual machines, AWS support staff and metering system 
engineers having access to EC2 documentation (which AWS provisions but does 
not take responsibility for). We will now use conflict analysis to get a better 
understanding of these changes by attempting to understand their implications for 
each agent’s interests. 
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Figure 6.5 - As-is responsibility model of the system 
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Figure 6.6 - To-be responsibility model of the system 
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6.5.2.2 Conflict Analysis 
Conflict analysis was performed by understanding the implications of the system 
changing from the ‘as-is’ configuration to the ‘to-be’ configuration. This 
comprised: 
1. Identifying changes in what responsibilities an actor is expected to 
perform; 
2. Identifying changes in how responsibilities will be performed; 
3. Identifying changes in agents required time, resources or capabilities to 
ensure appropriate fulfilment of responsibilities; 
4. Identifying potential risk of not having required time, resources or 
capabilities; 
5. Identifying risk of interference between required activity, individual 
values, status and satisfaction; 
6. Identifying risk of multiple incompatible responsibilities; 
7. Identifying risk of incompatibilities between agents e.g. histories of 
conflict; 
8. Identifying risk of perceived distributive injustice or procedural 
injustice. 
Risk clauses were identified by considering conditions that could result in a threat 
to responsibility fulfilment, and the consequences of this for the fulfilment of 
other responsibilities. For example from the perspective of the support manager it 
was identified that if AWS support staff are not forthcoming in resolving support 
requests (condition), then the support manager’s responsibility of providing 
metering service technical support may not be fulfilled (threat), resulting in 
possible SLA violations and financial loss. Another salient example is that if the 
support manager perceives the system to downsize his department (reduce his 
number of required resources) because of the outsourcing of network support and 
back-ups (condition), the support manager may conflict with the project (threat), 
resulting in a system that does not fulfil metering system SLAs. Another salient 
example is that if support manager perceives that he lacks required resources 
because of lack of staff capabilities and experience in cloud systems (condition), 
the support manager may conflict with the project (threat), resulting in a system 
that does not fulfil metering system SLAs. See Appendix D for a complete list of 
risks. 
From the perspective of the support engineers a number of conflict related risks 
were also identified. For instance, if the system engineers perceive that the 
removal of hardware, network and backup responsibilities is a threat to their 
working hours or job satisfaction (condition), then support engineers may conflict 
with the system (threat), resulting in a system that does not fulfil metering system 
SLAs. Another risk is that, if system engineers perceive that the dependency on 
EC2 hardware introduces additional satisfying work e.g. contacting Amazon 
support rather than fixing in house issues (condition), then support engineers may 
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conflict with the system (threat), resulting in a system that does not fulfil metering 
system SLAs. See Appendix D for a complete list of risks. 
Risks were also identified from the perspective of non-technical staff. For 
instance, if sales and marketing staff do not have the capability to understand how 
a cloud solution is useful to customers (conditions), then they may conflict with 
the system (threat), resulting in poor sales of the cloud-based offerings 
(consequence). From the finance and business development perspective, if finance 
staff perceive that the system exposes the organisation to significant fluctuations 
in bandwidth, processing and storage costs (condition), then variability may 
threaten the finance staff’s responsibility to manage cash flow, thus resulting in 
additional operational risk. From the perspective of customer relationship staff, if 
customer relationship staff do not have appropriate knowledge and capability to 
understand cloud style services (condition), then there is a threat to the timely 
response of customer queries (threat), as a result SLAs may be breached resulting 
in financial liability or degradation of customer service resulting in dissatisfaction 
(consequence). 
6.5.1.3 Lessons Learned 
The following lessons were learnt from the case study: 
• Conflict derived risks can outweigh the substantial financial opportunities of an 
IT project. 
• The systematic structuring of thinking and data to reason about conflict 
sensitises analysts to unexpected, but significant, factors that contribute to 
determining the feasibility of a project. 
• Localising the negative consequences of conflict to specific stakeholder groups 
is a powerful approach to getting a handle on the impact of agents’ differing 
interests on system behaviour. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that conflict analysis promises to be a reliable and 
valid approach to identifying threats to systems composed of cooperating agents. 
This was demonstrated through two case studies. The LASCAD case study 
supports that conflict analysis is a reliable and valid approach to identifying risks. 
Validity was indicated by the fact that the risks identified by independent analyses 
of the LASCAD92 project mapped onto risks identified using conflict analysis. 
Validity was also indicated by the fact that the successful LASCAD96 had far 
fewer unmitigated risks in comparison to the LASCAD92 project. A limitation of 
these findings is that the author was aware that the LASCAD92 should have fewer 
mitigated risks than the LASCAD96 system; therefore unintended bias may be 
present in the results. 
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The oil/gas sector SME case study indicated the three fold value of conflict 
analysis: firstly its ability to sensitise practitioners to agent conflict by 
systematically structuring a practitioner’s thinking and data in-order to be able to 
reason about it; secondly that the approach encourages thinking about 
management support, user support and adequacy of resources which are three 
aspects of project performance that are empirically demonstrated to have a 
significant effect on IT project performance (Xia & Lee, 2004); thirdly that the 
approach has the ability to trace the negative consequences of conflict to specific 
stakeholder groups and present the information at a granularity that practitioners 
may be able to utilise to inform practice. 
The conclusions of this chapter are limited by the usual limitations of case study 
approaches. Case studies are descriptive and conclusions about causes and effects 
cannot be safely drawn since they do not comprise controlled laboratory 
conditions. Also, case studies may not be representative of a general population 
and due to the nature of the research topic the data is collected from human 
subjects so it is potentially subject to bias. Every effort was made to control for 
these shortcomings by using multiple sources to corroborate information where 
possible and using multiple case studies from contrasting sectors and technology 
types. 
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7. Structural-Intentional Responsibility Modelling for 
Troubleshooting a Problematic Enterprise-scale System 
7.1 Introduction 
Enterprise-scale systems are systems intended to serve the needs of multiple 
human agents whom work within the same organisation but may hold differing 
priorities due to differing responsibilities, departmental loyalties and so on. The 
aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the modelling of responsibilities aids the 
troubleshooting of enterprise-scale system behaviour. This is shown through the 
application of structural-intentional responsibility modelling to a case study of a 
multi-national systems engineering firm with a problematic enterprise document 
management (EDM) system. 
Structural-intentional responsibility modelling augments responsibilities with 
intentional and structural notions from activity systems theory to provide a 
modelling framework with greater granularity of analysis. This provides an 
analyst with a troubleshooting framework to identify a variety of potential 
conflict, also referred to as tensions, between interacting agents. Tensions can be 
thought of in terms of an agent’s behaviour being pulled in incompatible 
directions. For instance, an agent may be simultaneously encouraged to always 
fulfil a responsibility by following a defined process but also encouraged to 
reduce the time it takes to fulfil a responsibility. The agent is therefore conflicted 
whether to behave in a manner that follows the defined process, or in a manner 
that does not adhere to the process but reduces fulfilment time. 
Our use of structural-intentional responsibility modelling to troubleshoot a 
problematic enterprise document management system resulted in the 
identification of 14 software and system usability issues and a set of six structural 
and intentional incompatibilities. This enabled the identification of four vicious 
circles that we hypothesise contributed to the system being perceived to behave in 
a problematic manner by engineering management. These insights were used to 
suggest how the behaviour of the agents and the EDM artefact could be changed 
so that the problematic behaviours of the EDM system could be ameliorated. 
Overall the case study supports the claim that structural-intentional responsibility 
modelling enables the analysis of the behavioural properties of enterprise-scale 
systems. 
This chapter is structured such that section 2 provides specific background and 
motivation for the development of structural-intentional responsibility modelling. 
Section 3 introduces the case study design, data collection methods, the 
framework used to analyse the data, and the case study organisation. Section 4 
describes the case study findings, first highlighting software and system level 
issues prior to suggesting that the behaviour of the system is most coherently 
accounted for through the analysis of structural and intentional issues. In section 5 
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we discuss the case study findings with respect to our aim of analysing the 
behaviour of enterprise systems and how structural-intentional responsibility 
modelling contrasts and complements other approaches I* and SSM. In section 6 
we conclude that structural-intentional responsibility modelling is a viable 
candidate as a scalable engineering technique for analysing and troubleshooting 
enterprise-systems post-implementation. 
7.2 Social Analysis to Inform System Implementation 
Information system development is the process of conceiving, analysing, 
designing and implementing an information system (Avison & Fitzgerald, 2006). 
The process of implementation comprises the deployment, adoption and 
routinisation of a system within its environment. Implementation can be 
challenging because of unforeseen problems. For instance, users may not be 
interested in using a system because they perceive it not to help them fulfil their 
responsibilities, or that it creates them additional work (Doherty & King, 2005). 
In order to minimise these types of issue, methods of social analysis such as 
Coherence (Viller & Sommerville, 1999, 2000), ETHICS (Mumford, 1995), 
Multiview (Avison et al., 1998) and I* (E. S. K. Yu, 1997) have been developed 
to inform the analysis and design of systems. 
There is recognition within the socio-technical systems community that 
practitioners’ needs are not being met by the above analysis and design methods 
(Bygstad, Nielsen, & Munkvold, 2010). This is motivated by their lack of use by 
industry and recognition of the ‘design fallacy’. The design fallacy is the 
assumption that the primary solution to meeting users’ needs is to develop ever 
more sophisticated social analyses to inform the design of systems (Stewart & 
Williams, 2005). Qualitative studies of system development show that 
implementation outcome is not only influenced by a system’s design but is also 
strongly influenced by groups of people (‘technology mediators’) shaping the 
familiarisation of a system and the ability of organisational and technical 
infrastructure to facilitate the adaptation of the system and associated work 
practices to users circumstances during implementation (Anderson, Hardstone, 
Procter, & Williams, 2005; Doherty & King, 2005; Orlikowski, Yates, Okamura, 
& Fujimoto, 1995; R. Williams, Stewart, & Slack, 2005). 
The idea that ‘better design is not enough’ is largely unexplored from an 
engineering perspective. As a result the engineering community is devoid of 
engineering approaches to identify socio-technical issues that may be inhibiting 
adaptation and familiarisation of a system. Similarly we have yet to develop 
knowledge of the most effective and efficient combinations of organisational and 
technical infrastructure (e.g. IS steering groups, user groups, wikis and so on) to 
facilitate adaptation and familiarisation. 
Quantitative and qualitative studies of system adoption demonstrate a strong 
relationship between system adoption and structural-intentional elements. For 
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instance the two best-established quantitative models of system adoption or 
success suggest the importance of intentional factors e.g. beliefs and intentions 
with respect to a system. The Delone-Mclean model (Delone & McLean, 2003) 
highlights the importance of the relationship between users’ intentions and their  
beliefs about system quality, service quality and information quality. Similarly the 
UTAUT model (Venkatesh et al., 2003) highlights the importance of the 
relationship between system adoption and users’ beliefs about ‘performance 
expectancy’, ‘effort expectancy’, ‘social influence’ as well as ‘facilitating 
conditions’ such as appropriate technical and organisational infrastructure to 
support the use of a system. Qualitative studies also indicate the importance of 
structural-intentional elements. For example (Anderson et al., 2005; Doherty & 
King, 2005; Orlikowski et al., 1995; R. Williams et al., 2005) illustrate the role of 
institutional rules shaping the adoption and use of technology as well as the 
important role of people acting as ‘technology mediators’. 
Since the above studies indicate a strong relationship between system adoption 
and structural-intentional factors, this thesis chapter proposes to model and 
analyse some of these factors. There has been little work specifically directed at 
developing engineering approaches that inform deployment and adoption, 
however there is an existing body of work that addresses the troubleshooting of 
problematic socio-technical systems. This work has largely come from related 
fields outside of socio-technical systems engineering such as ergonomics, CSCW 
(Computer Supported Collaborative Work) and Soft OR (Operations Research). 
Some of the most notable approaches include situated action (SA) (Suchman, 
1987), distributed cognition (DC) (Hutchins, 1995), activity systems theory (AST) 
(Engestrom, 2000) and soft systems methodology (SSM) (Checkland, 1999). Of 
these approaches SA and DC do not analyse intentional level issues (Halloran, 
2000). We decided to adopt a variant of AST because AST enables a more 
granular analysis of structural-intentional issues than SSM, which is limited in 
scope to norms, values and roles, notions that can be already captured using the 
notion of responsibilities in terms of obligations, liabilities and norms. 
7.3 Research Design 
A case study approach was selected because our aim was to test the hypothesis 
that ‘structural-intentional responsibility analysis enables the identification of 
stakeholder conflicts in enterprise-scale deployments by identifying 
incompatibilities between structural and intentional elements’. A case study 
approach was deemed appropriate since our aim was to test our hypothesis in a 
real-world corporation with a problematic system. 
The fieldwork was performed at three different sites of a multinational system-
engineering corporation that we will call ‘Company A’. Their main work activity 
comprises the design, manufacture and maintenance of specialist electro-optical 
components and systems. The organisation is divided into a number of functional 
groups that come together under a project structure to produce customer 
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deliverables e.g. components, systems and documents. The design of components 
and systems is a collaborative activity involving programme managers, 
engineering managers and engineers and the sharing of documents is a vital aspect 
of this activity. 
‘Company A’ deployed an electronic document management (EDM) system in 
the early 2000s as it was perceived by the IT director that an EDM system would 
be more advantageous than using shared folders on a file server to exchange 
documents. There was a perception that the introduction of the system would 
bring about greater visibility and awareness of work rather than having different 
teams and functions working in information silos. Within projects it was 
envisioned that EDM would be an up-to-date repository of all project 
documentation. Teams would store their documents in personal working areas and 
upload them to standardised locations in standardised EDM project file structures. 
When we visited the organisation in 2010 the EDM was perceived by engineering 
management to be problematic due to “socio-technical factors”. The use of the 
system was mandatory so all projects had an EDM project area but the extent that 
documents were being uploaded from working areas to the EDM project areas 
varied between teams. In addition to this the use of the EDM file structure varied 
between teams, as did the location of files within the file structure. As our 
investigation unfolded it became clear that engineering management perceived the 
system to be problematic because teams did not use it in a “common way”. 
We collected our data using 16 one-hour semi-structured interviews of the 
document management system’s stakeholders. Interview participants were 
selected on the basis of availability by a facilitator within the organisation. The 
interviews comprised a set of open-ended questions and a set of closed questions 
comprising 7-point semantic differential scales and 7-point Likert scales. A copy 
of our interview questions can be found in Appendix E. 
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed when permitted. The open-
ended interview questions were designed to elicit the relationship between the 
participant’s view of the their work (role, responsibilities, their day-to-day 
activities, most serious work challenges) and the deployed system (their history 
with the system, which responsibilities/activities the system helps them 
accomplish, how it does so, what problems it introduces to their work, how the 
system impedes their responsibilities and activities). The closed interview 
questions elicited the relationship between the participant and the system by 
exploring aspects of IT systems that are associated with intention to use 
(performance expectancy, effort expectancy, information quality, system quality, 
support quality, system usage policy) and aspects of organisational change that 
can lead to conflict (interfering with roles, goals, values, resources, 
capabilities/skills, job satisfaction, status, procedural justice, distributive justice, 
importance, ownership). 
Dialogue mapping was then used to organise interview data into more abstract 
units of information. Dialogue maps were compared to the participant’s responses 
to closed questions to corroborate findings. Dialogue maps were compared across 
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participants to identify themes. The ‘activity space’ framework in combination 
was structural-intentional responsibility models were then used to structure the 
findings and provide a lens for identifying tensions between different elements 
within the situation.  
The ‘activity space’ framework (Halloran, 2000, 2001) is a framework for 
structuring data and identifying problematic intentional and structural aspects of a 
system. The framework comprises three intentional constructs comprising:  
mediators (tools, beliefs, skills); subjects (responsibilities) and objectives. And 
three structural constructs comprising: rules (formal / informal norms); 
community (actors involved in a situation); and the division of labour (how work 
is divided). 
According to ‘activity space’ theory the outcome of a situation (e.g. a 
deployment) is brought about by interactions between actors’ behaviour(s). Each 
actor’s behaviour is mediated by intentional and structural elements. So, 
problematic situations can arise when tensions exist within and between actors’ 
intentional and structural elements. By understanding these tensions a situation 
can be modified to change the outcome. We chose this framework as it gives 
primacy to the interrelationships between intentional and structural aspects of a 
situation. Structural-intentional responsibility models were found to be useful for 
the purpose of visually representing and structuring the information gathered, as 
well as providing a means of tracing the relationships between multiple agents 
with incompatible responsibilities, objectives and behaviours. 
7.4 Our Findings 
We report our findings in three parts: the first part identifies software usability 
issues, such as user interface issues, that frustrate the use of EDM regardless of 
the software’s specific configuration; the second part identifies system 
acceptability issues to do with the deployed configuration fitting the existing work 
environment; the third part reports on the structural-intentional issues that 
frustrate the use of EDM. In the third part, EDM is viewed as a resource that 
mediates (enables / constrains / transforms) work activity. In contrast to the first 
and second parts, the issues raised will highlight underlying tensions that result in 
issues or challenges that impede the use of EDM in a “common way” as desired 
by engineering management. 
7.4.1 Software Usability Issues 
We found that the following aspects confounded the usability of the tool in both 
experienced and novice/infrequent users. The consequences of these issues were 
typically frustration and/or perceptions of wasted time. 
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Table 7.1. Aspects Detrimental to Software Usability According to Experienced Users 
# Aspects detrimental to usability according to experienced users 
1 Requires a login separate from workstation login. 
2 Web-based interface is slow to respond to user interaction. 
-Screen updates and file uploads are perceived to be slow or freeze. 
3 Files can only be uploaded individually using the web-based interface. 
4 Files are rendered poorly when viewed in using the web-based interface. 
5 Search feature does not return expected results. 
6 Web-based interface has screen-rendering issues when used with browsers other than Internet 
Explorer 6. 
 
Table 7.2. Additional Aspects Detrimental to Software Usability According to New / Infrequent Users 
# Additional aspects detrimental to usability according to new / infrequent users 
1 Menus are cluttered and there is no obvious feature prioritisation to guide novice/infrequent users. 
2 Search query presentation is difficult to understand 
-E.g. Use of MIME types. 
3 The ‘look & feel’ of the web-based interface is dissimilar to the ‘drag & drop’ interfaces that end-
users are generally accustomed to. 
End-users found that the above issues to be slightly problematic but in general 
they perceive them to have a minor effect on their overall productivity, job 
satisfaction, speed of accomplishing work activity, and effort to use EDM. 
• Most participants surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that EDM takes little 
effort to use on their part. They reported that EDM did not significantly 
improve nor worsen their individual productivity, responses were mainly 
distributed around no effect, or slight positive or negative effects. 
• Most participants agreed that EDM did not significantly slow down or speed up 
their speed of accomplishing activities. Responses were distributed equally 
between no difference, slower and faster. 
Most participants reported that EDM neither favourably nor adversely affects 
their job satisfaction. However participants did report that the user interface does 
not meet their needs and is slightly problematic. And that the search facility does 
not meet their needs and is slightly problematic. 
These mixed responses indicate that although the system has a number of 
frustrating or timing wasting usability issues, the majority of users we interviewed 
found that it did not significantly interfere with either their overall productivity or 
job satisfaction. These findings are perhaps surprising as management perceive 
the system to be problematic. This difference is explained by the fact that the 
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extent that each team uses EDM is in accordance with their own approach and 
therefore they use the system in a manner that is acceptable to them (as a team) 
but not necessarily in a manner that is desired by management. We can conclude 
therefore that issues and problems are not due to software usability. 
7.4.2 System Acceptability Issues 
We found that the following aspects confounded the acceptability of the tool in 
both experienced and novice/infrequent users. 
Table 7.3. Aspects detrimental to system acceptability  
# Aspects detrimental to system acceptability 
1 EDM is perceived to be more time consuming to use for storing documents in comparison to 
shared drives, or personal areas, due to the software usability issues identified. 
2 EDM has been configured to offer standardised folder structures however users struggle to 
understand where to put their documents within these structures. They perceive that there are a 
variety of possible locations, which makes remembering and sharing the location of a document 
problematic. This interpretative flexibility enables the use of EDM in contrasting and 
inconsistent ways. 
3 EDM project areas have no built-in document registers making it difficult to establish what 
documents are within a project area and which are missing. Lack of a document register is seen 
be problematic because of inconsistent use of the standardised folder structures which makes 
finding files on the basis on their expected folder location impractical. 
4 EDM has practical limitations on the number of files in a single folder as this can cause freezing 
or degrade the performance of the search facilities. This has been mitigated on the most part by 
using a folder structure. 
5 EDM runs on servers within a ‘restricted’ network and so cannot be accessed by all parts of the 
organisation. In a number of situations this results in end-users having to use other IT resources 
for document sharing undermining the purpose of the EDM. 
Despite the issues identified above, the participants that we interviewed reported 
that, in general, the use of EDM does facilitate their working practices, they are 
supportive of continuing investment and development of EDM, and that EDM is 
considered to be slightly important, or important, to their interests and 
responsibilities. This indicates that despite the systems shortcomings it was 
recognised by those that we interviewed as a valuable tool that supports work. 
Again these findings may be surprisingly considering that engineering 
management perceive the system to be problematic. However this again highlights 
that end-users use the system in a manner that is acceptable to them but not 
necessarily in a “common way” as desired by engineering management. We 
therefore can conclude that system usability is not the source of problems. 
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7.4.3 Structural-Intentional Issues 
In this subsection EDM is viewed as a resource available to ‘Company A’ 
employees that mediates (enables / constrains / transforms) work activity. We 
highlight underlying organisational tensions that result in the challenges that 
impede the adoption of EDM. The analysis is presented by summarising our 
overall findings and then describing how these findings were generated using 
structural-intentional responsibility modelling. 
7.4.3.1 Findings 
Using structural-intentional responsibility modelling we identified 6 issues that 
interact to produce the problematic behaviour identified by engineering 
management.  
1. Whilst analysing the objectives of the engineering managers, programme 
managers and engineers we identified a potential process conflict between 
the objectives of engineering management and those of programme 
managers and engineers. Essentially engineering managers objectives 
prioritise strategic needs to improve process in the long term but this can 
be incompatible with engineers’ and programme managers’ short-term 
objectives of meeting contractual obligations and meeting customer 
expectations. 
2. Whilst analysing the mediators available to the engineering managers, 
programme managers and engineers, we identified that the different 
groups placed different emphasis on the value, or salience, of the EDM’s 
features and those of shared folders. Essentially engineering managers 
valued EDM’s audit and file access control features more than programme 
managers and engineers. This meant that perceived alternatives to EDM 
such as shared folders appear far less attractive to engineering managers 
than to engineers and programme managers, thus explaining why use of 
shared folders may be prevalent. 
3. Whilst analysing the structure of the socio-technical system we identified 
that as a result of the division of labour within ‘Company A’ the EDM has 
not become domesticated. A split between engineers being informally 
responsible for supporting technical tools and corporate IT being 
responsible for corporate tools resulted in no party taking ownership of 
domestication. This has resulted in a tool whose features/capabilities are 
not widely understood and incorporated into daily practice. 
4. Whilst analysing the usability of the EDM software we identified a 
number of issues frustrating the use of the software but not significantly 
impeding people’s productivity or satisfaction. 
5. Whilst analysing the structure of the socio-technical system we identified 
that informal rules of ‘Company A’ suggest the existence of a ‘strong 
practice culture’, rather than a process culture. This means that work is 
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performed on the basis of norms and experience rather than following 
explicit rules are specified by processes. 
6. Also whilst analysing the informal rules of ‘Company A’ we recognised 
the existence of an exemption culture. Employees would find justification 
to exempt themselves from following processes on the basis of being a 
special case. 
The issue map below (Figure 7.1) was created to represent the relationships 
between the issues and aid in communicating how they interact. The issue map 
indicates that four vicious circles within the situation were identified to be 
contributing to sustaining the problematic situation. Vicious circles are 
particularly important to identify, as any intervention to ameliorate the situation 
must disrupt the vicious circles in order to change the outcome of the situation. 
 
Figure 7.1 - Interactions of the socio-technical issues identified 
The first vicious circle occurs between the differences in saliencies of EDM 
features and the domestication of EDM. The programme managers and engineers 
within ‘Company A’ are not valuing the visibility and control features of EDM as 
much as engineering management. This has resulted in the continued use of 
shared drives, rather than the use of EDM, resulting in a lack of domestication and 
thus an absence of familiarity and acceptance of EDM. Conversely as 
domestication has not occurred, programme managers and engineers will not have 
had the opportunity to be convinced of the value of the visibility and control 
features. 
The second vicious cycle occurs between domestication and usability issues. 
Because domestication has not occurred users experience usability issues due lack 
of familiarity or because of lack of adaptation to the tool over time. Conversely 
users experience usability issues because of lack of domestication e.g. familiarity / 
tool adaption. 
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The third vicious circle occurs between the exemption culture and domestication. 
The culture of allowing projects to decide on the extent and nature of EDM use 
(exemption culture) has resulted in a lack of familiarity with the full capabilities 
of EDM and consequently EDM is not perceived as acceptable as a working drive 
so shared drives are used as an alternative. Conversely because EDM has not been 
domesticated this has reinforced the culture of exemptions by giving people a 
reason not to use the tool. 
The fourth vicious circle occurs between the practice culture and the exemption 
culture. As work is performed on the basis of norms (e.g. individual and shared 
experience of what has happened in the past) rather than following explicit ‘rules’ 
(e.g. referring to process documentation) this has made it acceptable for projects 
to exempt themselves from standard ways of working such as EDM. Conversely, 
since projects are permitted to exempt themselves from standard ways of working 
this reinforces the ‘practice culture’ as enacting an exemption is in itself  the 
exercise of the primacy of experience over standards and processes. 
In summary, we hypothesise that the interaction of these vicious circles 
contributes to sustaining a situation where the extent and nature of EDM use 
varies on a project-by-project basis and is dependent upon the preferences of the 
project teams. In the following sections it will be explained how each of the issues 
was identified using structural-intentional responsibility modelling. 
7.4.3.2 Modelling Intentional Issues 
In this subsection we analyse the intentional components of the socio-technical 
system. We begin by identifying incompatibilities between the human agents’ 
responsibilities, followed by incompatibilities between their objectives and 
mediators. This analysis focuses on three important agents within the situation: 
o Engineering managers, whom are technical subject matter experts and are 
responsible for improving the overall efficiency, quality, safety and so on 
of the outputs created by engineers; 
o Programme managers, whom are responsible for ensuring the engineers’ 
outputs meet customer expectations and meet contractual obligations; 
o Engineers, whom produce system and component designs (and related 
documentation) under the management of engineering managers and 
programme managers. 
We found that the responsibilities of engineering management, programme 
management and engineers are aligned such that their overall responsibilities are 
positively dependent (See Figure 7.212). This was deduced from the responsibility 
diagram by observing the relationships between engineering management’s 
responsibilities and those of the other parties. It may be seen that their 
responsibility to improve delivering time, quality, efficiency and safety ‘helps’ 
                                                
12 The role of responsibility models in this analysis is to provide a form of visual notation to help the analyst 
understand the network of relationships between agents’ responsibilities. 
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programme managers and engineers fulfil their responsibilities. The ‘helps’ 
relation indicates that improved delivery time and improved quality makes 
programme management’s responsibility of meeting customer expectations and 
contractual obligations easier to fulfil. It may be observed that this responsibility 
also ‘helps’ engineers to meet time, budget and quality pressures, which in turn 
‘help’ programme managers meet customer expectations.  The engineers 
responsibility to follow process also ‘helps’ engineering managers implement 
change / process improvement by enabling them to monitor and assess the 
standardised processes. Overall this means it is in the interest of all parties to 
coordinate their activities as one party’s success ‘helps’ contribute to the success 
of the other parties. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 - Responsibilities Activity Space 
Whilst responsibilities are positively dependent, it is possible for process conflict 
to occur. By process conflict we mean that the manner in which parties pursue 
their responsibilities may be perceived by another to interfere with their own 
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responsibilities. This is investigated in our subsequent analysis of objectives and 
structural issues. 
Analysis of objectives revealed that there is a potential process conflict between 
the objectives of engineering management and the objectives of programme 
management (See Figure 7.3). This may be deduced from the diagram by 
observing the relationships between objectives13 that are represented as hexagons. 
One can see that the objective of pursuing improvements via process 
standardisation and lean thinking potentially interferes with programme 
manager’s objectives of meeting contractual obligations, meeting customer 
expectations and engineers meeting programme managers expectations. This 
interference occurs because in the short term the process of implementing changes 
can caused short-term degradation of performance even if done well. This short-
term degradation of performance must be carefully coordinated with programme 
management to avoid effecting milestones or other legitimate concerns they may 
hold. 
                                                
13 Objectives represent how an agent breaks down a responsibility into a set of objectives to be fulfilled. 
These objectives will then directly influence the agent’s behaviour. 
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Figure 7.3 - Objectives Activity Space 
We now proceed to assessing the mediators of activity in this situation. Mediators 
are entities that mediate the transformation of responsibilities into objectives and 
then subsequently into behaviour. In this context the EDM system and its 
perceived alternative ‘shared drives’ are analysed as they afford agents different 
ways of fulfilling their responsibilities. 
The EDM and ‘shared drives’ were identified as mediators of the tensions that 
exist between the strategic (long term) and tactical (short term) priorities of 
‘Company A’. The EDM provides features such as file access control and audit 
trails that engineering managers perceive to help them fulfil their responsibilities 
such as improve safety, product quality and efficiency. The salience of these 
features to programme managers and engineers is much weaker. Some 
programme managers and engineers preferring the speed and ‘drag and drop’ ease 
of ‘shared drives’ over the file access control and audit trail features of the EDM. 
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This difference in the salience of features, and thus the (lack of) enthusiasm to use 
the EDM reflects the divide between the long-term priorities of engineering 
management and the shorter-term priorities of programme managers and 
engineers. Therefore EDM and ‘shared drive’ use mediates the division in the 
strategic (long-term) and tactical (short-term) priorities of ‘Company A’. 
7.4.3.3 Modelling Structural Issues 
In this subsection we analyse the structural components of the socio-technical 
system. We begin by identifying incompatibilities due to the division of labour, 
followed by incompatibilities due to community differences and finally 
incompatibilities due to attitudes towards rule following. 
The division of labour with respect to programmes is structured using a matrix 
approach, such that engineers must meet the requirements of programme 
managers and those of engineering managers. This means that changes in work 
activity (e.g. process improvement) should not be inconsistent with either party’s 
interests otherwise resistance to change may be amplified. We believe that 
inconsistencies have occurred because historically it would appear that ‘Company 
A’ has found it challenging to embed standardised ways of working as illustrated 
by the loss and reacquisition of CMMI level 2. Additionally discussions also 
suggest that it may be the case that certain programme managers, or product 
group managers, have reservations about the extent process standardisation and 
data management practices may contribute to easing their time and budget 
concerns. This attitude appears to have rippled through to engineers working to 
time and budget pressures where a culture of de-prioritising the importance of 
time consuming processes or the use of EDM (a data management tools perceived 
to be time consuming) seems to be occurring. A strong sign of this culture of de-
prioritisation is that the use of EDM was not made mandatory until approximately 
8 years after its introduction. 
The division of labour can result in disconnects of ownership or responsibility. It 
appears that this has occurred with respect to the ownership/responsibility 
associated with the domestication of EDM. Domestication is the process of 
making a technology/tool acceptable and familiar to its unique communities. 
Domestication is not a discrete event (e.g. pre/post-deployment training) but a 
long-term process that requires the genesis and nurturing of a community of 
practice and institutional structures to support this community. It does not appear 
that much domestication has occurred with respect to EDM as end-users are not 
aware of the existence of a formal user group to liaise with corporate IT to work 
through technical issues such file upload speeds or screen refresh speeds. Nor are 
they aware of less formal venues such as forums to discuss best practices. Neither 
are they proactively informed of ‘power-user’ tool features that could be relevant 
to their work. For instance, EDM has features that enable the use of meta-data for 
improving search accuracy and enabling custom report generation. The quality 
team use this to generate ISO reports and it is possible that other teams could 
benefit. 
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The division of labour can result in different communities that place different 
saliencies on aspects of their work environment. Such a disconnect has occurred 
with respect to EDM as engineers, engineering management and programme 
management have differing and potentially conflicting perceptions of EDM, and 
the use of shared directories as a viable alternative to EDM. Whilst engineering 
management value the features that promote visible and controlled working such 
as version control, audit trails, email notifications of changes to documents, use of 
aliases to avoid multiple copies, and the ability to control access to documents 
without the involvement of IT staff. Other communities place different weightings 
to these aspects or are unaware of their existence. This is evidenced through the 
extensive use of shared drives where a trade-off for speed and ease of access is 
made in favour of the visibility and control that EDM offers. 
The engineering and programme management communities have a practice rather 
than process culture. This means that norm following takes precedence over rule 
following e.g. standards. In other words they perceive that their experiential 
knowledge is a replacement for adherence to standardised repeatable processes. 
This is evidenced by: 
• discussions revealing that some ‘compulsory’ processes within the 
quality management system have never been read by anyone other than the 
authors and reviewers of the processes. 
• discussions that suggest that projects are given sufficient flexibility 
to adopt, adapt or exempt themselves from company standards with relative 
ease and without having to report this to process improvements for review. 
This reinforces a culture of practice over process and also results in potential 
process weaknesses not being reported or corrected. 
• the use of EDM project area was not made compulsory until 2009. 
7.4.3.4 Modelling the Outcome: The Product of the Cognitive & Structural 
Issues 
The resultant outcome of the interactions between cognitive and structural issues 
identified in the preceding sections is presented in Figure 7.4. The extent and 
nature of EDM use varies on a project-by-project basis and is dependent upon 
individual programme managers and engineering teams. Figure 7.4 shows that 
engineering management are continuing to encourage EDM use and are 
continuing to pursue an improvement strategy based on the concept of 
standardisation. 
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Figure 7.4 - Outcome Activity Space 
The outcome may be summarised as the product of the interactions of the 
following socio-technical components: 
Division of labour 
o A matrix structure is a conduit of tensions, or potential conflicts, and 
therefore employees within the matrix become a focal point of resistance 
when incompatible demands are placed. 
o The division of labour can result disconnects of responsibility or 
ownership. This has occurred with respect to the domestication of EDM. 
Communities 
o Communities within ‘Company A’ have emerged around the division of 
labour and thus roles/responsibilities e.g. program management, 
engineering management, engineers. There is a potentially conflicting 
divergence between the viewpoints of each of these communities with 
respect to the value of EDM and the salience of its capabilities and 
purpose. 
Rules 
o There is a strong practice culture rather than a process culture within 
programme management and engineering. This means that work is 
performed on the basis of norms (e.g. individual and shared experience of 
what has happened in the past) rather than following explicit ‘rules’ (e.g. 
referring to process documentation). 
Responsibilities 
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o The responsibilities of engineering management, programme management 
and engineers are aligned such that their overall responsibilities are 
positively dependent. This means it is in all parties’ interests to 
coordinate their activities as one party’s success contributes to the success 
of the other parties.  
o Whilst responsibilities are positively dependent. There is however scope 
for process conflict and our study suggests that may be occurring. By 
process conflict we mean that the manner in which parties are pursuing 
their objectives may be perceived by others as interfering with their own 
objectives. 
Objectives 
o There is a potential for conflict between the objectives of engineering 
management and programme management. Whilst it is the responsibility 
of engineering management to take a strategic (long-term) view and run 
improvement projects. This is potentially conflicting with the tactical 
(shorter-term) responsibilities of programme management. Introducing 
change, even when successful, can cause short-term productivity 
degradation as changes are being ‘bedded in’. This can be at odds with 
programme managers’ contractual obligations such as milestones. 
o Note: This potential for conflict between engineering management and 
programme management ripples through to engineers working on projects 
by virtue of the matrix organisational structure. 
o Note: It is possible that the length of the ‘bedding in’ process is protracted 
by parties that allow temporary exemption from the change being ‘bedded 
in’. This may perhaps cause a vicious circle where changes are never fully 
adopted due to culture of exemption. 
Mediators 
o EDM as a mediator of work is acknowledged by all communities to suffer 
from usability issues at both the software and system level, which 
ultimately results in frustration. 
o The salience of these usability issues as a reason to use shared drives 
differs between engineering management, programme management and 
engineers. 
7.5 Discussion 
Our study was designed to evaluate the following hypothesis: ‘structural-
intentional responsibility analysis enables the identification of stakeholder 
conflicts in enterprise-scale deployments by identifying incompatibilities between 
structural and intentional elements’. Our study supports this hypothesis as firstly 
we identified a number of tensions between structural and intentional elements 
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and their interactions. Secondly we were able to make specific recommendations 
to ameliorate the deployment. 
7.5.1 Recommendations 
The recommendations we made comprised a six-step plan to address the vicious 
circles identified. Each individual recommendation can be described as codified 
commonsense. The value of the plan came from the fact that the combination of 
recommendations we made was tailored to the specific dynamics of the 
deployment environment. 
We proposed that our recommendations could be implemented in the following 
manner: 
1. -Identify a minimal set of practices for EDM use that programme 
management and engineering management have firm grounds to believe 
are valuable to Company A (taking into account short term vs. long term 
tradeoffs). 
-Assign ownership of domestication to a high level manager(s) within 
Company A  
2. -Create a network of EDM evangelists with members from each discipline 
/ functional unit 
-Create a EDM steering committee with members representing the 
interests of programme management, engineering management, IT and 
other legitimate stakeholders. 
3. -Support the EDM evangelists to create role specific resources that can be 
used to facilitate the use of EDM according to the set of practices intended 
by management 
-Actively inform end-user of EDM steering committee and its role in 
improving the tool 
4. -Actively inform end-users of the strategic value of EDM and the 
mandatory practices 
-Actively inform end-users of the role specific feature of EDM and how 
the mandatory practices will change there existing work practices 
5. -Roll out mandatory practices 
6. -Audit practices in use to ensure they are in accordance with mandatory 
practices 
These recommendations were derived from identifying approaches for dealing 
with each of the issues identified by structural-intentional responsibility analysis. 
For instance to break the culture of programmes exempting themselves from 
EDM usage, the use of EDM should be made mandatory for specific practices that 
programme management and engineering management have identified, on a firm 
basis, as valuable to Company A.  These practices should be clearly prescribed, 
perhaps as a set of programme data management practices, and audited for 
compliance to signal that exemption from these is not a cultural norm. We believe 
that the implementation of this change should be coordinated with the programme 
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management community in order to minimise the potential for conflict due to 
possible tactical/strategic differences in priorities. 
To address the domestication issue we suggested that management should take on 
ownership of the responsibility for EDM’s domestication and in doing so create 
appropriate institutional structures and resources to support its occurrence. 
1. Staff should be actively informed of the value-adding features of EDM for 
their specific work activity. 
Staff should be shown what previous practices/tools EDM replaces and what new 
practices/responsibilities it creates and how it contributes value to Company A. 
This should not be mistaken for merely informing user of the system’s 
functionality. Staff should also be informed on an ongoing basis rather than as one 
off training to reinforce the importance of the systems use. Sending email 
reminders, creating posters, distributing ‘cheat sheets’ are all appropriate means 
of enacting an ongoing basis. 
2. Institutional structures should be created to enable the coordinated 
adaptation of EDM.  
A formal structure should be in place for staff to raise usability issues and have 
the case considered for a possible adaptation to EDM. The creation of an EDM 
steering group that represents the interests of EDM users and other stakeholders 
across the site could enable this. A typical steering group would have 
representatives from a broad range of functional units including users, managers 
and IT representatives, and would have the authority to make change requests 
with respect to EDM on behalf of the site. 
3. Institutional structures should be created to nurture/support an EDM 
community of practice so that best practices and advice can be shared. 
Specially selected members of each discipline, or functional unit, should be 
empowered by giving them ownership of the task of evangelising their local 
community to follow EDM best practice. The EDM evangelist’s role would be to 
a) share/nurture/support best practice and b) learn from the experiences of their 
colleagues from across disciplines/functional units. This network of EDM 
evangelists could be supported by the creation a homepage/wiki containing 
resources to support their task by providing role specific ‘cheat sheets’, how-to 
guides, and best practice guidelines. 
To address the issue of salience of features effort should be put into fostering a 
shared view of tool features. To achieve this we suggested that staff should be 
actively informed, or reminded, of the strategic organisational need for 
capabilities that EDM offers. This can be implemented by top down managerial 
communication and reinforced by a network of local EDM evangelists. 
To address usability issues we suggested that an institutional structure should be 
created to enable the adaptation of EDM and the folder structure. The usability 
issues that we highlight could be considered by an EDM steering committee 
created to address issues of domestication. 
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To address the practice culture we suggested that exemptions from standard 
practices should be very carefully controlled to ensure that: i) they are necessary; 
ii) process improvement can take place to ensure that over time exemptions 
become the exception rather than the norm. This can be implemented by auditing 
the use of EDM, enforcing standard practice where appropriate, and highlighting 
opportunities for process improvement to appropriate parties e.g. process 
improvements or EDM steering group. 
7.5.2 Reflections on the Use of Structural-Intentional Responsibility 
Modelling 
Structural-intentional responsibility models provided an appropriate means of 
understanding the relationships between responsibilities, objectives and outcomes. 
Responsibility models provided an important means of concisely representing the 
insights gathered using issue maps of interview transcriptions. Their most 
important contribution is to bring to the foreground the relationships between 
issues so that their interconnections may be understood. A limitation of this 
approach was however observed. When the number of entities (responsibilities, 
objectives, outcomes) or relations became large the diagrams became cluttered 
and were no longer as helpful in articulating the situation. This limitation is 
addressed in the next chapter via means of representing the models as a directed 
graph and using a large-scale network analysis and visualisation package 
(Gephi.org) to represent the graph in a user-friendly manner. 
In comparison to a task centred analysis approaches (such as I*) we believe that, 
despite the above-described limitations, structural-intentional responsibility 
analysis offers a number of useful tradeoffs.  Firstly data collection can be of a 
shorter duration as a detailed understanding of tasks is not required and thus 
avoids time-consuming ethnography or process mapping. Secondly, the scale of 
the deployment under analysis can be much larger as data collection is rapid and 
data analysis can be supported through the use of off-the-shelf digraph 
visualisation and analysis tools that support large datasets. It remains an open 
research question if task centric approaches such as I* models can scale up to 
analyse large-scale systems (E. Yu et al., 2011). 
The disadvantages of a structural-intentional approach, in contrast to a task centric 
approach, is that it will not deliver insights with respect to the subtleties of task 
level interactions within a work environment e.g. distributed coordination, 
awareness, spatial and temporal organisation and so on. Nor does structural-
intentional analysis enable modelling at the task level so it does not represent how 
actors and resources are configured at a task level. 
Despite these shortcomings, we believe that this trade-off is desirable as it makes 
structural-intentional analysis complementary to established task/activity centric 
analyses that inform information systems development. For example when time 
permits ethnography, we expect structural-intentional analysis to provide 
complementary findings. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
This work illustrates that structural-intentional responsibility modelling is a viable 
candidate as a scalable engineering technique for analysing and troubleshooting 
enterprise-systems post-implementation. Our case study indicates that structural-
intentional analysis has a number of attractive characteristics with respect to 
timeliness and scalability. Data collection appears more rapid than either process 
mapping or ethnography and data analysis appears extremely scalable as it can be 
supported through the use of off-the-shelf digraph visualisation and analysis tools. 
Our fieldwork demonstrates that structural-intentional data is: i) sufficient to 
diagnose problematic interactions between a system, intentional elements and 
structural elements; ii) sufficient to suggest practical interventions to ameliorate a 
deployment. We therefore advocate the structural-intentional approach as a 
candidate engineering approach for analysing and troubleshooting large-scale 
deployments. 
Our conclusion is limited by the usual limitations of qualitative case study 
research. Case study research may not be generalisable and whilst every effort 
was taken to minimise investigator or participant bias, bias may be reflected in 
our findings. 
There are many opportunities to further validate and develop the structural-
intentional view of deployments. We encourage more case studies or action 
research to demonstrate its scalability and ability to ameliorate deployments in a 
variety of settings. We encourage comparative work between structural-
intentional approaches and task/activity-centric approaches (such as I*) to explore 
their strengths and weaknesses. We also encourage the development of tools to 
support structural-intentional analysis. 
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8. Scaling Structural-Intentional Responsibility Modelling Using 
Network Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
In recent years developments in the analysis of complex networks have enabled 
scientists to analyse certain classes of large-scale socio-technical systems 
(Vespignani, 2012). Complex network analysis has enabled physicists, chemists, 
epidemiologists and social scientists to study systems comprising thousands or 
millions of nodes in applications as wide ranging as social network analysis and 
metabolic pathway analysis. This chapter proposes that these techniques may also 
be of practical use in the analysis of problematic socio-technical systems in 
organisational settings. 
Troubleshooting large-scale systems remains an open research question within the 
socio-technical systems engineering community. Whilst analysing socio-technical 
issues in small-to-medium scale systems may be achievable using approaches 
such as theoretically informed rapid ethnography, analysing large scale systems is 
an open research question because of the overwhelming number of socio-
technical elements and interactions involved (RAE, 2004). 
In order to develop a more scalable approach, it was argued in chapter 7 that the 
exploration of structural and intentional factors using interviews may enable a 
more scalable way of analysing a system as it has a different set of trade offs 
(Greenwood & Sommerville, 2011a) to typical ethnographic approaches. The 
structural-intentional approach is similar in spirit to SSM but incorporates a 
variant of the ‘activity space’ framework (Halloran, 2000, 2001) - a framework 
that analyses a broader range of socio-technical elements than SSM. 
This chapter provides evidence that problematic large-scale systems are amenable 
to computer-aided analysis using network theory. This is significant to the 
problem of scalability as it enables the partial automation of the process of 
identifying important elements and complex behaviour thus reducing the burden 
of work and perhaps enabling the analysis of large systems where a human cannot 
be expected to analyse every element in the problem due to their vast number. 
This chapter demonstrates, using the EDM case study presented in chapter 7, 
proof-of-concept tools for large-scale network analysis and visualisation that may 
provide a promising avenue for identifying problematic elements and interactions 
amongst an overwhelming number of socio-technical elements. We demonstrate 
the potential of this approach by showing that: 
- 150 - 
i) a system may be represented as a directed graph such that the elements in 
the system are represented as nodes, and interactions between nodes as 
links; 
ii) that eigenvector centrality, a well established measure of node importance, 
may be used to rank the importance of elements in a system and that 
highly ranked elements match those identified as important by a human 
analyst; 
iii) the ‘complexity’ of a system, or a part of a system, may be characterised 
using a feedback degree score which provides an indication of the extent 
elements are highly interconnected and are involved in feedback loops. 
The implications of these findings are that computers may be used to aid 
the analysis of problematic large-scale socio-technical systems by 
highlighting elements, or groups of interacting elements, that are important 
to the overall outcome of a problematic system. This contribution is 
significant as it provides an avenue for developing scalable engineering 
techniques to troubleshoot large-scale systems. 
This chapter is structured such that section 2 provides an overview of aspects of 
complex network analysis that may be relevant to socio-technical analysis. In 
section 3 we describe our aim, hypotheses and research design. In section 4 we 
illustrate our approach to representing, visualising and analysing a problematic 
socio-technical system as a directed graph. In section 5 we present our case study 
findings and analyse the relationship between: i) eigenvector centrality scores and 
node importance as ranked by an analyst; ii) feedback degree scores and node 
complexity as ranked by an analyst. Finally in section 6 we conclude and describe 
future research opportunities. 
8.2 Using Network Analysis to Analyse Socio-Technical Systems? 
Network theory is a rapidly evolving branch of computer science and 
mathematics that studies mathematical structures that model relations between 
discrete objects. Complex networks are “networks whose structure is irregular, 
complex and dynamically evolving overtime” (Boccaletti et al., 2006). In recent 
years network analysis and visualisation tools have become accessible to non-
mathematicians due to the increasingly widespread availability of off-the-shelf 
tools. These tools have enabled the analysis of systems of thousands or millions 
of nodes such as electric power grids, the Internet and social networks. This 
ability to analyse vast numbers of nodes and interactions makes network analysis 
attractive for the purpose of developing scalable techniques for analysing 
problematic large-scale systems. 
There are two significant barriers to using network analysis for the analysis of 
problematic socio-technical systems. Firstly the socio-technical system must be 
representable as a set of nodes and a set of links. Secondly, appropriate network 
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analysis techniques or metrics must be identified, or invented, to enable the 
identification of nodes or links that are important to sustaining the overall 
problematic behaviour of a system. 
In this chapter we propose that a socio-technical system is representable as a 
directed graph using the elements and relationships used in structural-intentional 
responsibility modelling, as described in chapter 7. That is to say nodes represent 
agents’ responsibilities, objectives, outcomes, resources, the division of labour 
and attitudes to rule following. The links between nodes represent ‘helps’ and 
‘interferes’ relations as per chapter 7. The directed graph therefore is a 
representation of the structural-intentional elements composing the system and 
the tensions between them. 
To address the barrier of appropriate techniques / metrics, in this chapter we 
explore the usefulness of well-established metrics. Firstly, we test the usefulness 
of network centrality metrics to discover the ‘influence’ or ‘importance’ of a 
structural-intentional element (node) in a socio-technical system (directed graph). 
Network centrality metrics have been used for this purpose in other domains such 
a social network analysis (Boccaletti et al., 2006). Secondly we explore whether 
the ‘complexity’ (interconnectedness and extent of feedback) of an element may 
be estimable by combining existing techniques to count the number of feedback 
loops a node is involved in and its number of links to other nodes. The counting 
of loops, referred to as k-cycles, is a well-established practice (Vázquez et al., 
2005) as is counting the links of node (Opsahl et al., 2010). 
A particularly well-suited centrality metric for our purposes is eigenvector 
centrality. The metric captures the intuition that a node that influences many other 
nodes is influential, whilst also taking into account the notion that a node that 
influences many highly influential nodes is more influential than a node that 
influences many weakly influential nodes. A node’s eigenvector centrality 
(Bonacich, 1972) is defined as its summed connections to others weighted by 
their centralities. The centrality of node i is given by λυi=ΣAijυj - the defining 
equation in matrix notation is λυ=Αυ where Α  is the adjacency matrix, λ is a 
constant and υ is the eigenvector. The metric is particularly well-suited for our 
purpose as it has the following properties: it assumes that all nodes influence their 
neighbours (rather than influence being restricted to a single shortest path) 
(Borgatti, 2005); influence is subject to feedback loops such that nodes are 
revisited multiple times (rather than assuming no node is visited more than once) 
(Borgatti, 2005). 
We propose that the ‘complexity’ (extent of interconnectedness and of being 
involved in feedback loops) of a node may be captured using a metric that we call 
feedback degree. It captures the intuition that the complexity of a node is 
primarily determined by the complicatedness of its interactions (number of 
feedback loops it partakes) and secondarily by its total number of interactions. 
Mathematically it comprises the linear combination of a nodes degree and the 
- 152 - 
number of k-cycles (feedback loops) it partakes. The degree of a node in a 
directed graph is the sum of the number of outgoing links (termed outdegree) and 
incoming links (termed indegree). The defining equation for the outdegree is kiout 
= Σjaij, the indegree is kiin = Σjaji, and the total degree is ki = kiout + kiin, where ki is 
the degree for the node i and aij represents an element in the adjacency matrix of 
the network. We define feedback degree as fi = ki/2n + ci where fi is the feedback 
degree for a node i, ki is the degree of the node i, n is the total number of nodes in 
the network, and ci is the number of cycles the node partakes. 
8.3 Research Design 
This research analysed data obtained from the case study in chapter 7. Our aim 
was to provide proof of concept that techniques for network analysis help to 
analyse real world problematic socio-technical systems. We formulated the 
following hypotheses from our aim: 
1. Eigenvector centrality may be used to rank the importance of elements in a system 
i.e. high eigenvector centrality scoring nodes correspond to those identified as ‘most 
important’ by a human analyst. Our null hypothesis was that there would be no 
difference between the distributions of eigenvector centrality scores for the 
population of important elements and unimportant elements. 
2. Feedback degree may be used to rank the ‘complexity’ of elements in a system, or a 
part of a system i.e. feedback degree scores correlate with node complexity as ranked 
by a human analyst. Our null hypothesis was that any correlation between node 
complexity as ranked by a human analyst and feedback degree would not be 
statistically significant. 
8.3.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
To test the hypotheses outlined above we firstly analysed the elements and 
interactions (without the aid of network analysis software) to identify important 
elements and interactions that mediate the problematic outcome. This process is 
described in chapter 7. Secondly we repeated the analysis with the aid of network 
analysis and visualisation software (Gephi.org) by parsing the elements and 
interactions into a machine-readable file format (DOT language). 
To assess hypothesis 1 we divided the nodes into two populations, those thought 
‘most important’ by the analyst and the rest that we labelled ‘least important’. 
Secondly we generated eigenvector centrality scores for each node using Gephi. 
Thirdly, we used an Independent-Samples Man-Whitney U-test to compare the 
distribution of eigenvector centrality score between each population using the 
PASW (SPSS) statistical package. Our null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 was that 
there would be no difference between the distributions of the ‘most important’ 
and ‘least important’ populations thus confirming that eigenvector centrality is 
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not an indicator of importance. To confirm hypothesis 1 we expected each 
population to have a different distribution and that the ‘most important’ 
population would have a larger median and mean eigenvector centrality score 
than the ‘least important’ population. This would enable us to conclude that 
elements with a large eigenvector centrality are more likely to be members of the 
‘most important’ population than the ‘least important’ population; thus 
confirming that ranking elements by eigenvector centrality is a reasonable method 
of ranking the importance of an element. 
To assess hypothesis 2 we generated three sub graphs of the problematic system. 
We used sub graphs comprising up-to 10 nodes, rather than the whole graph 
comprising 30+ nodes, to make the ranking scenario a manageable size for a 
human analyst. Subsequently: 
1. We (without the aid of network analysis software) ranked each element on 
the basis of its complexity as judged by a human analyst; 
2. We generated feedback degree scores for each node; 
3. We used Spearman’s correlation to analyse the relationship between 
feedback degree and a node’s complexity as judged by an analyst. 
Spearman’s correlation is a non-parametric measure of statistical 
dependence between two variables and is also implemented in PASW. 
Our null hypothesis was that any correlation between feedback degree and 
complexity would be due to random chance. To confirm hypothesis 2 we firstly 
expected a statistically significant correlation between feedback degree and 
complexity. Secondly we desired the r>0.83 such that feedback degree accounts 
for a meaningful proportion of the variance (>70%) of the complexity as judged 
by an analyst. This would enable us to conclude that feedback degree is a 
reasonable indicator of the complexity of an element in a problematic system. 
8.4 Representing a Responsibility Model as a Direct Graph  
We represented the elements and interactions composing our problematic system 
using a plain text graph description language called DOT (Gansner & North, 
2000). The language enables the description of a network in a machine-readable 
format so that a network analysis and visualisation package, such as Gephi 
(Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009), can process the data. The DOT language 
has a simple syntax that enables the expression of nodes, links and presentational 
information such as shapes, colours and labels. 
The language offers a small yet expressive set of primitives that enable the 
description of a graph with a finite number of nodes and links. The key primitives 
that we made use of included: 
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digraph g { … } – which defines a directed graph called ‘g’ and 
the description of the graph in contained within the parentheses; 
[colour = …] – which sets the colour attribute of a node, or a link, 
to a specified value 
[label = …] – which sets the label attribute of a node, or a link, to 
a specified value 
 -> - which is an edge operator that connects one node to another e.g. 
“a” -> “b”; 
 
A directed graph (See Figure 8.1) representing the interactions between the 
responsibilities in the problematic system described in section 5.1 (See Figure 
8.2) is represented in DOT language below: 
digraph g { 
"20. EM_Responsibility : Improving delivery time, quality, safety, 
efficiency, repeatability"[color=yellow]; 
"22. PM_Responsibility : Delivering product on time, on budget in 
accordance to contractual obligations"[color=pink]; 
"20. EM_Responsibility : Improving delivery time, quality, safety, 
efficiency, repeatability" -> "22. PM_Responsibility : Delivering product 
on time, on budget in accordance to contractual obligations"[color=green, 
label = "" ] ; 
"21. EM_Responsibility : Implementing change / process 
improvements"[color=yellow]; 
"26. Eng_Responsibility : Meeting time, budget, and quality 
pressures"[color=purple]; 
"21. EM_Responsibility : Implementing change / process improvements" -> 
"26. Eng_Responsibility : Meeting time, budget, and quality 
pressures"[color=green, label = "" ] ; 
"22. PM_Responsibility : Delivering product on time, on budget in 
accordance to contractual obligations"[color=pink]; 
"23. PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations"[color=pink]; 
"22. PM_Responsibility : Delivering product on time, on budget in 
accordance to contractual obligations" -> "23. PM_Responsibility : 
Meeting customer expectations"[color=green, label = "" ] ; 
"25. Eng_Responsibility : Design Systems / components"[color=purple]; 
"23. PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations"[color=pink]; 
"25. Eng_Responsibility : Design Systems / components" -> "23. 
PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations"[color=green, label = 
"" ] ; 
"26. Eng_Responsibility : Meeting time, budget, and quality 
pressures"[color=purple]; 
"23. PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations"[color=pink]; 
"26. Eng_Responsibility : Meeting time, budget, and quality pressures" -> 
"23. PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations"[color=green, 
label = "" ] ; 
"27. Eng_Responsibility : Following process"[color=purple]; 
"21. EM_Responsibility : Implementing change / process 
improvements"[color=yellow]; 
"27. Eng_Responsibility : Following process" -> "21. EM_Responsibility : 
Implementing change / process improvements"[color=green, label = "" ] ; 
} 
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Figure 8.1 – Sub graph of a problematic system being visualised using Gephi 
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Figure 8.2 - Responsibility Model from Chapter 7 
On comparing Figure 8.1 and 8.2 one may observe that they are representations of 
the same information. For instance, the engineering manager’s responsibility for 
improving delivery time, quality, safety, efficiency and repeatability helps both 
the programme manager’s responsibility to delivery product on time, on budget in 
accordance to contractual obligations and helps engineer’s meet time and budget 
pressures. 
A useful aspect of the language for the purpose of representing problematic 
systems is its ability to express the colour of nodes and relationships. We have 
found this feature useful for highlighting node and relationship types when 
visualising systems with many nodes. In Figure 8.1 the yellow nodes belong to 
engineering managers, the purple to engineers and the pink to programme 
managers. The colour of the links between the nodes represents the type of 
relationship. A green link represents one node supporting another. An 
orange/brown link represents a tension (potential incompatibility). Visualisation 
is a particularly powerful technique as seeing the relationships laid out spatially 
with colours identifying each node type enables the complexity of a problematic 
system to be articulated extremely rapidly. 
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Since writing and rewriting DOT files by hand can be tedious and time 
consuming we developed a prototype GUI using Microsoft Access 2010. 
 
Figure 8.3 - Screenshot of Microsoft Access Based GUI 
This enables the analyst to rapidly enter each socio-technical element and 
subsequently indicate which elements interact together using a spreadsheet like 
interface rather than via code. This enables graphs to be generated, viewed, 
reviewed or modified rapidly using features typically available in any database or 
spreadsheet e.g. filters, queries and so on. We found this to be very fruitful when 
combined with Gephi as it enabled us to rapidly visualise a graph or perform 
statistical analyses. 
8.5 Research Findings 
In this section we compare the results of our unaided analysis in chapter 7 with 
our network aided analysis. By comparing our findings using statistical 
techniques we analyse: 
1. the relationship between important nodes identified by an analyst 
and a node’s eigenvector centrality ranking; 
2. the relationship between the complexity of nodes as ranked by an 
analyst and a node’s feedback degree ranking. 
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8.5.1 Findings from Network Aided Analysis 
To test whether eigenvector centrality is a good indicator of element importance 
we firstly categorised the nodes into two groups – those that we believed to be 
‘most important’ (See Table 8.1) and the rest we labelled ‘least important’. The  
‘most important nodes’ were those that we believe contributed most to creating 
and sustaining the problematic system according to our unaided analysis. The 
diagram below (Figure 8.4) provides a reminder of these findings from chapter 7, 
and thus what elements were considered to be ‘most important’ by the analyst.  
 
Figure 8.4 – Socio-Technical Interactions Identified in Chapter 7 
The reader may observe that the elements in Table 8.1 are those that the analyst 
perceived to contribute most to the vicious circles. For instance, node ‘3 
Domestication Responsibility’ supports the domestication failure element and 
thus is present in Table 8.1. Node ‘6 Practice Culture’ supports the practice 
culture element and therefore is present in Table 8.1. The same may be said of 
nodes ‘7 EM_Outcome’ and ‘8 EM_Outcome’, which sustain the EM-PM 
responsibility conflict. Node ‘9 PM_Outcome’ supports both the practice culture 
and exemption culture elements represented. Node ‘10 Eng-Outcome’ is a 
supporter of EDM usability issues and EDM domestication failure represented in 
Figure 8.4. Nodes 21-26 are supporters of the EM-PM responsibility conflict. 
Node 28 is a supporter of EDM domestication failure and practice culture. And 
finally Node 29 is a supporter of the EDM domestication failure and of the 
exemption culture. 
Table 8.1 - 'Most Important' nodes identified during unaided analysis 
Node ID and Description of Most Important Nodes 
3. Domestication Responsibility : Domestication responsibility has fallen between the cracks 
6. Practice Culture : Tendency to follow norms rather than procedures 
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7. EM_Outcome : Encouraging the use of EDM in a standardised manner 
8. EM_Outcome : Pursuing an improvements strategy based on process standardisation 
9. PM_Outcome : Each PM encourages the use of EDM according to their own practices 
10. Eng_Outcome : EDM is perceived to be a source of frustration 
21. EM_Responsibility : Implementing change / process improvements 
22. PM_Responsibility : Delivering product on time, on budget in accordance to contractual obligations 
23. PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations 
25. Eng_Responsibility : Design Systems / components 
26. Eng_Responsibility : Meeting time, budget, and quality pressures 
28. Eng_Outcome : Extent and use of EDM varies on project by project basis 
29. PM_Outcome : Each PM implements and follows data management plans according to their own practices 
 
Secondly, having identified the ‘most important’ nodes we generated eigenvector 
centrality scores and visually inspected the results to explore the relationships. 
We observed that the eight most highly ranked nodes (in Table 8.2) are members 
of the ‘most important’ group (Table 8.1). In other words there appeared to be a 
good correspondence between the ‘most important’ nodes as identified during 
unaided analysis (See Table 8.1) and those highly ranked according to 
eigenvector centrality (See Table 8.2). 
Table 8.2 - Ranking of Node Importance using Eigenvector Centrality 
# Node ID and Description 
EV 
Centrality 
1 6. Practice Culture : Tendency to follow norms rather than procedures 1.00E+000 
2 28. Eng_Outcome : Extent and use of EDM varies on project by project basis 9.54E-001 
3 7. EM_Outcome : Encouraging the use of EDM in a standardised manner 8.51E-001 
4 9. PM_Outcome : Each PM encourages the use of EDM according to their own practices 8.35E-001 
5 3. Domestication Responsibility : Domestication responsibility has fallen between the cracks 6.19E-001 
6 10. Eng_Outcome : EDM is perceived to be a source of frustration 4.38E-001 
7 8. EM_Outcome : Pursuing an improvements strategy based on process standardisation 3.53E-001 
7 29. PM_Outcome : Each PM implements and follows data management plans according to own practices 3.35E-001 
9 30. EM_Objective : Pursue an improvements strategy based on process standardisation and Lean thinking 2.76E-001 
10 16. PM_Objective : Meet customer expectations 1.07E-001 
11 19. Eng_Objective : Meet programme managers schedule, cost and quality expectations 8.85E-002 
12 15. PM_Objective : Meet contractual obligations 8.01E-002 
13 31. Eng_Objective : Meet  engineering managers  process expectations 2.86E-002 
14 23. PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations 3.04E-003 
15 18. Eng_Objective : Design high quality component or system 1.74E-003 
16 22. PM_Responsibility : Delivering product on time, on budget in accordance to contractual obligations 1.29E-003 
17 17. PM_Objective : Timely Internal reporting 2.75E-004 
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17 26. Eng_Responsibility : Meeting time, budget, and quality pressures 2.75E-004 
17 12. EM_Objective : Improve quality 2.75E-004 
17 13. EM_Objective : Improve safety 2.75E-004 
17 14. EM_Objective : Improve efficiency 2.75E-004 
17 21. EM_Responsibility : Implementing change / process improvements 2.75E-004 
17 11. EM_Objective : Improve delivery time 2.75E-004 
24 24. PM_Responsibility : Internal reporting 0.00E+000 
24 25. Eng_Responsibility : Design Systems / components 0.00E+000 
24 1. EDM : Document Management System 0.00E+000 
24 20. EM_Responsibility : Improving delivery time, quality, safety, efficiency, repeatability 0.00E+000 
24 4. Shared Folders : Document Management System 0.00E+000 
24 27. Eng_Responsibility : Following process 0.00E+000 
24 2. Matrix Structure : Engineers managed by Programme management & Engineering Manager 0.00E+000 
Statistical Test of Hypothesis 1 
In order to test hypothesis 1 we performed an Independent-Samples Mann-
Whitney U test using PASW. The results of the Mann-Whitney U test indicated to 
reject the null hypothesis with a p = 0.01. The distribution of eigenvector 
centrality scores was not the same across the population of ‘most important’ and 
‘least important’ elements. 
Table 8.3 - Descriptive Statistics of 'Most Important' and 'Least Important' 
Statistics 
 Most Important Least Important 
N Valid 13 17 
Mean .4146062 .0343126 
Median .3530000 .0002750 
Std. Deviation .39882271 .07188513 
Minimum .00000 .00000 
Maximum 1.00000 .27600 
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Figure 8.5 - Histograms of Most Important & Least Important 
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Via inspection of each population’s descriptive statistics and histograms (See 
Table 8.3, Figure 8.5) one can corroborate the findings of the Mann-Whitney U 
test by observing that the standard deviation, mean, median, minimum and 
maximum values of the least important and most important populations are very 
different. The most important population had a mean of .41, a median of .35, a 
standard deviation of .40 and a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. In contrast 
the least important population had a small standard deviation and a mean and 
median close to zero with a minimum of 0 and maximum of 0.28.  
The corroborated Mann-Whitney U test enables us to conclude that elements with 
a large eigenvector centrality are more likely to be a member of the ‘most 
important’ population than the least important population14. This confirms that 
ranking elements by eigenvector centrality is a reasonable indicator of the 
importance of an element in a problematic system. These findings thus indicate 
that computers may be used to aid the analysis of large problematic socio-
technical systems by identifying elements that are most important to sustaining 
the current problematic system. 
Statistical Test of Hypothesis 2 
In order to test whether feedback degree is a good indicator of ‘complexity’ 
(hypothesis 2) we ranked (without the aid of network analysis) the ‘complexity’ 
of nodes in three subsections of the overall problematic system. The reason we 
used subsections is because the ranking of every node in the whole problematic 
system (with over 30 nodes and over 60 interactions) may have been unreliable 
due to human error. Therefore we opted for three chunks of the problematic 
system comprising 10 or fewer nodes. The subsections we selected were 
responsibilities and their interactions (see Figure 8.6 and Table 8.4), outcomes 
and their interactions (see Figure 8.7) and objectives and their interactions (see 
Figure 8.8). We selected these sub graphs as a convenience sample since they 
each had 10 or fewer nodes. 
                                                
14 One must of course be sensible when interpreting eigenvector centrality rankings as a higher 
score indicates an element is more likely to be a member of the ‘most important’ population but 
it does not mean it is necessarily a member of the ‘most important’ population. 
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Figure 8.6 - Directed Graph of Responsibilities 
Table 8.4 - Ranking of Complexity of Responsibility Nodes 
Id FD Rank 
22. PM_Responsibility : Delivering product on time, on budget in 
accordance to contractual obligations 0.4 1 
23. PM_Responsibility : Meeting customer expectations 0.3 2 
26. Eng_Responsibility : Meeting time, budget, and quality 
pressures 0.3 3 
20. EM_Responsibility : Improving delivery time, quality, safety, 
efficiency, repeatability 0.2 4 
25. Eng_Responsibility : Design Systems / components 0.2 4 
Our rationale for ranking the complexity of responsibility elements (Figure 8.6) is 
as follows. One may observe that node 22 is involved in the most complex 
interactions in comparison to its peers. This may be observed by the fact that it is 
influenced by three nodes and influences another node. It helps the PM fulfil his 
responsibility to meet customer expectations (node 23) and is helped by the EM 
responsibility to improve delivery time, quality (and so on) (node 20) and the 
engineers responsibility to design components (node 25) and systems and to meet 
time, budget and quality pressures (node 26). 
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The second most highly ranked node is node 23 as it is influenced by three others 
nodes but does not influence any node. This may be observed by the fact that the 
fulfilment of the responsibility to meet customers expectations is helped by the 
engineers responsibility to meet time, budget and quality pressures (node 26), the 
PM’s responsibility to deliver product on time on budget in accordance to 
contractual obligations (node 22), and engineers responsibility to design systems 
and components. 
The third most highly ranked node is node 26 as it is influenced by one other 
node and influences two other nodes. The engineer’s responsibility to meet time, 
budget and quality pressures is helped by EM responsibility to improve delivery 
time, quality, safety, efficiency, repeatability (node 20). Node 26 helps the PM’s 
responsibility to delivery product on time and on budget in accordance with 
contractual obligations, and it also helps the PM’s responsibility to meet customer 
expectations. The four most complex nodes are node 20 and 25. They both exhibit 
the least complex behaviour as they are not influenced by any other node but both 
influence two other nodes. A similar rationale was used for ranking the 
complexity of nodes in outcome (Figure 8.7) and objectives (Figure 8.8) sub 
graphs. 
 
Figure 8.7 - Directed Graph of Outcomes 
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Figure 8.8 - Directed Graph of Objectives 
In order to test hypothesis 2, we performed Spearman’s correlation test on the 
data from these three sub graphs using PASW. For all sub graphs tested we were 
able to detect statistically significant correlations between feedback degree (FD) 
and complexity as judged by an analyst. For the responsibility sub graph it may 
be observed that FD has a correlation of -0.973, which is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level (Table 8.5). For the outcome sub graph it may be observed that 
FD has a correlation of -0.997, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
(See Table 8.6). For the objectives sub graph it may be observed that FD has a 
correlation of -.975, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (See Table 
8.7). This enables us to reject the null hypothesis. These findings confirm 
hypothesis 2 as the correlations are statistically significant account for a 
significant proportion of the variance e.g. r>0.83. These findings thus indicate 
that computers may be used to aid the analysis of large problematic socio-
technical systems by identifying elements that display the most complex 
behaviour. 
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Table 8.5 Spearman's Rho for Responsibility Sub Graph 
Correlations 
 Degree Loops Feedback Degree 
Correlation Coefficient -.973** . -.973** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 . .005 
Spearman's rho Rank 
N 5 5 5 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 8.6 -  Spearman's Rho for Objectives Sub Graph 
Correlations 
 Degree Loops Feedback Degree 
Correlation Coefficient -.768** -.701* -0.997** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .024 .010 
Spearman's rho Rank 
N 10 10 10 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 8.7 - Spearman's Rho for Outcome Sub Graph 
Correlations 
 Degree Loops Feedback Degree 
Correlation Coefficient -.866 -0.975** -0.975** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .058 .005 .005 
Spearman's rho Rank 
N 5 5 5 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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8.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we demonstrate that structural-intentional responsibility modelling 
may be a scalable technique for the socio-technical analysis of systems. This was 
shown by providing proof-of-concept that that tools for large-scale network 
analysis and visualisation may provide a promising avenue for a scalable form of 
structural-intentional responsibility analysis. Using a case study of an enterprise 
document management (EDM) system (from chapter 7) we demonstrated 
structural-intentional responsibility modelling’s potential to scale to larger 
systems by showing that: 
i) a problematic socio-technical system may be represented as a directed 
graph such that the elements in the system are represented as nodes, and 
interactions between nodes as edges; 
ii) that eigenvector centrality may be used to rank the importance of elements 
in a system and that highly ranked elements correspond to those identified 
as important by a human analyst; 
iii) the ‘complexity’ of the system, or a part of a system, may be characterised 
using a feedback degree score that provides an indication of the extent of 
feedback loops and the interconnectedness of elements.  
These findings more generally indicate that computers may be used to aid the 
analysis of problematic large socio-technical systems within organisations by 
highlighting elements, or groups of interacting elements, that are important to the 
overall outcome of a system. This contribution is significant as it demonstrates 
the partial automation of a laborious process and opens an avenue for developing 
engineering techniques suited to troubleshooting systems where analysts cannot 
be expected to inspect each individual node due to their overwhelming number. 
We hope this may be the starting point of a discussion within the socio-technical 
systems community as to how network analysis may aid the analysis and 
engineering of large socio-technical systems. There is a need for further work in 
this area. Of up most importance is the pursuit of further case studies to verify 
these early findings in other systems, contexts and domains. Whilst the analysis 
of problematic systems has been traditionally a qualitative process we believe as 
the scale of problematic systems increases the use of metrics to guide analysis 
becomes increasingly compelling. 
Our conclusion is limited by the usual limitations of case study research. Case 
study research may not be generalisable and whilst every effort was taken to 
minimise investigator or participant bias, bias may be reflected in our findings. 
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9. Conclusion and Future Work 
9.1 Conclusion 
This thesis’ overall conclusion is that the notion of ‘responsibility’ is a promising 
abstraction for representing and analysing systems that are composed of parts that 
are independently managed and maintained by agents spanning multiple 
organisational boundaries e.g. systems-of-systems, coalitions of systems, 
enterprise-scale systems. 
It was argued in chapter 4 that the notion of ‘responsibility’ provides a suitable 
abstraction for facilitating the enquiry, representation and understanding of 
systems by teasing out potentially intricate dependencies between technical and 
non-technical agents, whilst providing a suitable language for representing and 
discussing obligations, liabilities and norms which are important for 
understanding the threats and issues that may arise when systems span multiple 
organisational boundaries. 
This argument was evidenced by means of qualitative case studies that illustrated 
how the responsibility abstraction can be used, or extended, to facilitate the 
analysis of real world problematic situations.  
In chapter 5, responsibility modelling was used to enable the identification of 
socio-technical threats to the dependability of a coalition-of-systems. Coalitions-
of-systems (CoS) are a class of system similar to SoS but they differ in that they 
interact to further overlapping self-interests rather than an overarching mission. 
Assessing the socio-technical dependability of CoS is an open research question 
of societal importance as existing socio-technical dependability analysis 
techniques typically do not assess threats associated with coalition partners 
reneging on responsibilities or leaving a coalition. We used a cloud computing 
based case study to demonstrate that a responsibility modelling based threat 
identification approach enables the identification of these threats. This research 
provided first evidence that inspecting the distribution of liabilities among 
coalition partners may indicate the fragility of overlapping self-interests. 
In chapter 6, responsibility modelling was extended to identify agent-related 
threats. Current approaches to threat identification view stakeholders from a 
mechanistic means-end perspective where human agents are assumed to be 
passive and compliant. In this chapter, we used conflict theory to develop a 
framework to assess threats to cooperative agent behaviour. We made the case 
that this class of risk is an important class that is missing from threat identification 
approaches. We extended the cloud computing based case study from chapter 5 to 
demonstrate that conflict based threat identification enables the identification of 
threats to cooperative behaviour in SoS type situations. 
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In chapter 7, a responsibility-based troubleshooting approach was developed 
building upon the work in chapter 6. In this chapter it was postulated that 
ethnographic and social analyses have not been widely assimilated into industry 
practice because they did not fit practitioners’ practices. In response to this, we 
developed a lightweight qualitative responsibility-based technique to provide 
insights to ameliorate problematic enterprise-scale system deployments. Unlike 
typical ethnographies and social analyses of work activity that inform systems 
analysis and design; we argued that analysis of intentional and structural factors 
to inform system deployment and integration could have a shorter time duration 
and yet can provide actionable insights. We evaluated our approach using a case 
study of a problematic enterprise document management system within a 
multinational systems engineering organisation. Our findings are of academic and 
practical significance as our approach demonstrated that structural-intentional 
analysis scales to enable the timely analysis of enterprise system deployments. 
In chapter 8, it was argued that techniques for network analysis may enable the 
analysis of problematic enterprise-scale socio-technical systems comprising large 
numbers of nodes. By means of re-analysing the case study in chapter 7, we 
demonstrated a proof-of-concept responsibility-based technique for SoS scale 
network analysis and visualisation that may provide a promising avenue for 
identifying problematic elements and interactions amongst an overwhelming 
number of socio-technical elements. We demonstrated the potential of this 
approach by showing that: i) a problematic situation may be represented as a 
directed graph such that the elements in the situation are represented as nodes, and 
interactions between nodes as edges; ii) that eigenvector centrality may be used to 
rank the importance of elements in a situation and that highly ranked elements 
match those identified as important by a human analyst; iii) the ‘complexity’ of a 
situation, or a part of a situation, may be characterised using a feedback degree 
score which provides an indication of the extent elements are highly 
interconnected and involved in feedback loops. These findings indicated that 
computers could be used to aid the analysis of SoS situations by highlighting 
elements, or groups of interacting elements, that are important to the overall 
outcome of a problematic situation. 
9.2 Threats to the Validity 
This thesis adopted a mainly qualitative case study approach so the validity of 
these findings is largely dependent upon the plausibility of the phenomena of 
study being representative of SoS. Another limitation of this research, like all 
qualitative research, is that the findings rely upon the expertise of the researcher 
not to inject bias into the results. Reasonable measures were taken to control for 
bias, for example by checking interpretations with interview subjects and by 
presenting findings to domain experts for sense checking. However one may not 
rule out the possibility of bias influencing the findings. Further research by 
independent researchers is therefore required to validate this thesis’ findings. 
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9.3 Future Work 
The socio-technical analysis of SoS is still in a nascent form. Significant amounts 
of further work are required to transform this area into a mature field. 
An area of primary importance is the sensitisation of practicing engineers to the 
socio-technical problems associated with systems that span organisational 
boundaries. Providing practitioners with the tools to ‘see’ these problems in their 
own systems is paramount because at present it seems that experienced 
practitioners have an intuition that something isn’t quite right but they are unable 
to ‘see’ the problem until a researcher, like myself, casts their eye on the situation. 
The forms of responsibility modelling described in this thesis may be good 
avenues to approach sensitisation. They appear to be simple, practical and 
scalable. Further case studies testing these claims of practicality and scalability 
would be valuable to their development and extension. The exploration of the 
benefits and drawbacks of combining responsibility models with statistical models 
such as Bayesian belief networks, instead of causal diagrams, may also be of 
interest.   
Another potentially valuable area of research related to sensitisation is the 
development of a taxonomy of pathogenic socio-technical system design patterns. 
A taxonomy could help reveal patterns, or common traits among systems, thus 
providing the equivalent of a ‘periodic table’ for socio-technical systems. 
Compiling an initial taxonomy from existing case studies and pursuing new cases 
would contribute to this area. 
Another area of importance is the amelioration of problematic socio-technical 
systems. Once practitioners ‘see’ specific problems in their systems, ‘solutions’ 
are required. The development of a body of knowledge to help practitioners 
identify ‘solutions’ and understand their trade-offs would be valuable. Compiling 
a survey of existing work and pursuing action research would contribute to 
advancing this area. 
To further research in socio-technical systems as a whole, an ambitious researcher 
may consider using new research methodologies. Whilst qualitative case study 
research is highly valuable for producing exploratory work, it limitations with 
respect to repeatability and validity may hinder advancements in the long term. 
Ambitious researchers may like to consider using case studies in tandem with a 
simulation environment, so as to be able to generate and manipulate observed 
phenomena ‘in-silico’15. The process of generating a phenomenon ‘in-silico’ 
provides a rigorous means of testing theories by verifying whether they are indeed 
able to reproduce a phenomenon in a controlled environment. The use of 
simulation for this purpose is gaining traction in the social sciences and may be 
useful to the study of socio-technical systems (Epstein, 2007). 
                                                
15 The term ‘in-silico’ refers to the use of computers to reproduce (simulate) observed phenomena by means 
of representing the mechanisms for its generation. 
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Appendix A – Example Conflict Analysis Template 
LASCAD 
Manager 
Analysis 
Responsibility 
1. Identifies 
changes to what 
tasks an actor is to 
perform. 
 
Manage operational performance of London Ambulance Dispatch 
-Ensure that operational performance meets/exceeds ORCON requirements. 
Forecast future operational resource requirement of London Ambulance Service 
- Introduction of new task 
Responsibility 
1. Identifies 
potential changes 
in how the 
actor(s) will 
perform tasks 
 
Manage operational performance of London Ambulance Dispatch 
Old 
1. Previous manual system did not provide rigorous performance metrics 
New 
1. New IT system provides data to management for analysis. E.g. call answering 
times, response percentages within 14 minutes. 
Time, resources, 
and capabilities) 
1. Identifies any 
changes in 
individuals 
required time, 
resource or 
capabilities 
ensure 
appropriate 
fulfilment of tasks 
2. Identifies 
potential risks of 
not having 
required time, 
resources or 
capabilities 
Time 
There is a risk that LAS Management may resist the IT system as the perceive 
it to degrade their chances of meeting ORCON targets. 
Resources 
There is a risk that LAS Management may resist the IT system if they perceive 
they will be given inadequate resources to for it to function. 
Risk Mitigated by top-down pressure to meet ORCON targets. 
Capabilities 
There is a risk that LAS Management will resist the system if they do not or 
are not willing to develop skills to manage the system. 
Risk Mitigated by top-down pressure to meet ORCON targets. 
Values, status & 
satisfaction 
1. Identify agents 
values and 
satisfaction 
2. Identify risks 
of Incompatibility 
between required 
activity and 
individual values 
and satisfaction 
criteria 
Values 
‘providing ambulance services at or above national requirements’ 
There is a risk that LAS Management may resist the IT system if they perceive 
the system to be a threat to meeting requirements - due to dependency on new 
technology (perhaps unreliable) and untested processes to meet targets. Risk 
Mitigated since radical technology perceived as the only way to meet targets. 
Status 
Benefit: LAS Management may perceive the IT system as increasing their status as 
would be most technologically advanced in country. 
Satisfaction 
‘providing ambulance services at or above national requirements’ 
There is a risk that LAS Management may resist the IT system if they perceive 
the system to be a threat to meeting requirements - due to dependency on new 
technology (perhaps unreliable) to meet targets. 
Risk Mitigated since radical technology perceived as the only way to meet 
targets. 
 
Multiple 
incompatible 
None Noted. 
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responsibilities 
1. Identify risks 
that an individual 
is assigned 
multiple 
responsibilities 
with incompatible 
activities or 
assessment 
metrics 
Relational 
(Incompatibility 
between actors) 
Control Room Assistants & Ambulance Crew 
Ongoing pay disputes between NUPE and LAS resulting in tension and mistrust 
between LAS management. 
There is a risk that LAS Management may view Control Room assistant or 
ambulance crew as being obstructive when providing negative feedback about 
the system due to poor relations. 
LAS Executives 
Implementation follows a recent downsizing of LAS Management resulting in a 
continuing fear for jobs. 
There is a risk that LAS Management may be reluctant to report negative 
information to executives for fear of losing their  jobs due to recent downsizing 
by LAS Executives 
Relational 
(Procedural / 
Distributive 
Injustice) 
Procedural Injustice 
There is a risk that the LAS Managers may perceive that the imposition of the 
IT system by LAS executives (due to ORCON requirements) is unjust because 
LAS is an exceptional case due to the London area being a far larger region 
than any other. (ORCON requirements should not apply) 
Distributive Injustice 
There is a risk that LAS Managers may perceive that the imposition of the IT 
system by LAS executives (due to ORCON requirements) is distributively 
unjust as other ambulance services will have to make less changes to meet 
targets due to the smaller scale of other regions. 
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Appendix B – Risk Tables for LASCAD92/96 
 
 
Control Room Assistant 
Risks 
There is a risk that Control centre assistants will resist change because of a perception of job cuts because many of their existing tasks will be 
computerised. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated since additional operational staff hired 
C1 
There is a risk that Control centre assistants will resist the system because they perceive they will not be given adequate resources to perform 
their tasks using the system. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated since control room upgraded with new electrical systems and digital phones. 
C2 
LAS Manager 
Risks 
There is a risk that LAS Management may resist the IT system as they perceive it to degrade their chances of meeting ORCON targets. 
92&96Risk Mitigated as management perceive technology as the only approach that will enable the meeting of ORCON targets. 
M1 
There is a risk that LAS Management may resist the IT system if they perceive they will be given inadequate time/resources to for it to 
function. 
92Risk Inappropriately Mitigated as LAS Management fearful for their jobs and under intense pressure to meet deadlines. 
96Risk Mitigated by perception of top-down commitment to provide what ever is required for success. E.g. Investment in new control room, 
additional staff. 
M2 
There is a risk that LAS Management will resist the system if they cannot or are not willing to develop skills to manage the system or its 
development. 
92Risk Inappropriately Mitigated by top-down pressure to meet ORCON targets and risk of job loss. 
96Risk Mitigated by top-down pressure to meet ORCON targets, acquisition of additional resources and restructuring to bolster management 
and operational staff. 
M3 
There is a risk that LAS Management may resist the IT system if they perceive the system to be a threat to meeting requirements - due to 
dependency on new technology (perhaps unreliable) and untested processes to meet targets. 
92&96Risk Mitigated since radical technology perceived as the only way to meet targets. 
M4 
There is a risk that LAS Management may be reluctant to report negative information to executives for fear of losing their  jobs due to recent 
downsizing by LAS Executives 
96Risk Partially Mitigated since flexible time-frame adopted removing pressure for immediate results and recent hiring of management and 
operational staff suggesting jobs not at risk. 
M5 
There is a risk that LAS Management may view Control Room assistants or ambulance crew as being obstructive when providing negative 
feedback about the system due to poor past relations. 
M6 
There is a risk that the LAS Managers will resist as they perceive that the imposition of the IT system by LAS executives (due to ORCON 
requirements) as procedurally unjust because LAS is an exceptional case due to the London area being a far larger region than any other. 
(ORCON requirements should not apply) 
92Risk Inappropriately Mitigated as LAS Management fearful for their jobs and under intense pressure to meet deadlines. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated since flexible time-frame adopted allowing LAS additional time to meeting the ORCON requirements. 
M7 
There is a risk that LAS Managers will resist as they perceive that the imposition of the IT system by LAS executives (due to ORCON 
requirements) is distributively unjust as other ambulance services will have to make less changes to meet targets due to the smaller scale of 
other regions. 
92Risk Inappropriately Mitigated as LAS Management fearful for their jobs and under intense pressure to meet deadlines. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated since flexible time-frame adopted allowing LAS additional time to meeting the ORCON requirements. 
M8 
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There is a risk that Control centre assistant will resist the change because of a lack of capabilities to operate computerised systems. 
96Risk Mitigated since new software developed using a participative approach whereby software only goes live once users are confident in 
the capabilities of the release and their ability to use it. 
C3 
There is a risk that Control centre assistants may perceive the changes in processes as degrading their ability to meet their values of rapid 
patient as now dependent upon the function of an IT system 
96Risk Mitigated since new software developed using a participative approach whereby software only goes live once users are confident in 
the capabilities of the release its compatibility with their values. 
C4 
There is a risk that Control centre assistant perceive the IT system as trivialising/routinizing the work thus reducing its status. 
96Risk Mitigated since new software supports/enhances control room assistants decision-making rather than taking over their decision-
making. E.g. Rather than automatically selecting resources the system provides the operator with suggestions for suitable resources and their 
locations. 
C5 
There is a risk that Control centre assistant perceive the IT system as removing satisfying work as it automates important decisions such as 
resource allocation which employees may have pride in performing. 
96Risk Mitigated since new software supports/enhances control room assistants decision-making rather than taking over their decision-
making. 
C6 
There is a risk that Control Room assistants will perceive the project negatively if it is perceived as a LAS Management/LAS Executive 
initiative due to a long standing history of disputes with LAS Management & LAS Executives regarding pay and also the failed introduction 
of previous systems. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated since significant changes to LAS Management / Executives were made and also their actions (such as hiring 
additional staff and providing new equipment) suggest a management style based upon cooperation and gradual change as approved by staff. 
C7 
There is a risk that Control Room assistants may perceive the project as distributively unfair as they face major changes and perhaps job losses 
and in return they receive little benefit. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated since control room assistants receive an improved control room which is more comfortable, are more in control of 
the changes made and the atmosphere of job losses is minimal due to recent hiring. 
C8 
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Ambulance Crew 
Risks 
There is a risk that without adequate training the Ambulance crew will be unable to operate the equipment or lack trust in equipment 
96Risk Mitigated as ambulance crew involved in testing and approving equipment prior to go-live. 
A1 
There is a risk that the IT system will interfere with values of crew (rapid patient care) as they must follow instructions of machine even if 
obviously suboptimal. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated as ambulance crew involved in testing and approving equipment prior to go-live. 
A2 
There is a risk that the IT system will interfere with values of crew if it does not facilitate the taking into of crew experience and local 
knowledge. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated as ambulance crew involved in testing and approving equipment prior to go-live. 
A3 
There is a risk that Ambulance Crew may perceive the system to reducing the status of their work as it automates their decision-making 
process such that they must follow instructions from screen only. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated as ambulance crew involved in testing and approving equipment prior to go-live. 
A4 
There is a risk that the IT system will interfere with satisfaction of crew as does not give them autonomy to use their crew experience and 
local knowledge for which they have pride. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated as ambulance crew involved in testing and approving equipment prior to go-live. 
A5 
There is a risk that Ambulance crews will perceive changes to processes brought about by the  IT system as negative (interference) because of 
ongoing problems with staff consultation 
96Risk Mitigated as ambulance crew involved in testing and approving equipment prior to go-live. 
A6 
There is a risk that Ambulance crews will perceive the process as procedurally unjust due to their lack of involvement in consultation. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated as ambulance crew involved in testing and approving equipment prior to go-live. 
A7 
There is a risk that Ambulance crews will perceive the changes as distributively unjust due to losing a large chunk of autonomy for which they 
derive no/little benefit. 
96Risk Partially Mitigated as ambulance crews received upgraded ambulances that makes work more comfortable and were issued with 
personal radios so they can communicate between themselves.  
A8 
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Appendix C – Mapping of Identified Causes and Conflict Analysis 
Risks 
Table C.1 – Identified causes of failure and identified conflict derived risk 
Identified cause of Failure Identified conflict derived risk 
Executives did not appreciate that 
LASCAD was a business re-
engineering project (P. Beynon-
Davies, 1995) (Hougham, 1996) 
Executives outside of scope of conflict analysis performed as 
little information obtainable from literature. 
Due to external pressure to achieve 
results, insufficient time was allowed 
for development and testing of the 
extremely complex technical solution 
(Page, 1993) (P. Beynon-Davies, 
1995)(Hougham, 1996) (Beynon-
Davis, 1999) 
The underlying source of this failure was the inappropriate 
mitigation of risk [M2] using coercion rather than provision of 
time and resources. 
There was a lack of disciplined 
technical approach (Page, 1993) 
(Finklestein, Dowell, 
1996)(Hougham, 1996) (Beynon-
Davis, 1999) 
The underlying source of this failure was the inappropriate 
mitigation of risk [M3] using coercion rather than ensuring 
management had appropriate skills and knowledge. 
There was little attempt to manage the 
changes in the organisations culture 
as part of the project (Hougham, 
1996) 
The underlying source of this failure was the inappropriate 
mitigation of risk [M3] using coercion rather than ensuring 
management had appropriate skills and knowledge. 
Poor user involvement, lack of 
ownership and some evidence of 
resistance (Page, 1993) (P. Beynon-
Davies, 1995)(Finklestein, Dowell, 
1996) (Beynon-Davis, 1999) 
The underlying source of this failure was the lack of mitigation 
of risk [M6] resulting in management ignoring stakeholder 
feedback. 
Evidence of irrational persistence in 
relation to continuing to use an 
approach with a tightly constrained 
budget and time-scale (Page, 
1993)(Beynon-Davis, 1999) 
The underlying source of this failure was the inappropriate 
mitigation of risk [M3] using coercion resulting in management’s 
irrational persistence. 
Developers had little experience of 
developing critical systems [(Page, 
1993)(P. Beynon-Davies, 1995) 
The underlying source of this failure was the inappropriate 
mitigation of risk [M3] using coercion resulting in management 
being able to admit they lacked the necessary tendering and 
acquisition skills or spending time to remediate this. 
History of failure (P. Beynon-Davies, 
1995)(Finklestein, Dowell, 1996) 
The underlying source of this failure was the lack of mitigation 
of risk [C7] that resulted in the perception that the project was a 
management power play.  
No formal Project Management 
Methodology followed e.g. PRINCE 
(Page, 1993)(P. Beynon-Davies, 
1995)(Finklestein, Dowell, 1996) 
The underlying source of the failure was the inappropriate 
mitigation of risk [M3] via coercion rather than 
enabling/ensuring management had the appropriate skills and 
knowledge to manage the project. 
Fear of reporting failure & 
Misleading LAS Executives over 
experience of Contractors (Page, 
1993)(P. Beynon-Davies, 1995) 
The underlying source of the failure was the lack of mitigation of 
risk [M5] resulting in fear of reporting failure. 
Lack of adequate testing (Page, The underlying source of the failure was the inappropriate 
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1993)(P. Beynon-Davies, 1995) 
(Finklestein, Dowell, 1996) 
mitigation of risks [M2] [M3] using coercion. Management were 
given neither the time, the resources, nor the skills to ensure 
inadequacies in vendors’ practices could be identified and 
addressed. 
Training was limited (Page, 1993)(P. 
Beynon-Davies, 1995) (Finklestein, 
Dowell, 1996) 
The underlying source of the failure was caused by the 
inappropriate mitigation of risk [M2] via coercion rather 
provision of time/resources.  
Communication and response time 
problems (Page, 1993)(Beynon-
Davis, 1995) 
The underlying source of the failure was caused by the 
inappropriate mitigation of risk [M2] via coercion rather 
provision of time/resources and the lack of mitigation of risk 
[M5]. 
Frustration of Ambulance crews 
(Page, 1993)(Beynon-Davis, 1995) 
The underlying source of the failure was the lack of mitigation of 
risks [A1] [A2] [A3] [A5] 
Anti-computer bias (Beynon-Davis, 
1995) 
The underlying source of the failure was the lack of mitigation of 
risks [C5] [A4]  
Poor NHS & Labour relations 
background & Low moral (Page, 
1993)(Beynon-Davis, 1995) 
(Finklestein, Dowell, 1996) 
The underlying source of the failure was the lack of mitigation of 
risks [C7], 
[C8], [A6], [A8] 
Lack of strategic vision (Page, 
1993)(Beynon-Davis, 1995) 
Executives outside of scope of SIA performed as little 
information obtainable from literature. 
Aggressive pace of change (Page, 
1993)(Beynon-Davis, 1995) 
The underlying source of the failure was the lack of mitigation of 
risk [A7] and the inappropriate mitigation of risk [M2] resulting 
in an aggressive pace of change. 
Lack of investment in LAS (Page, 
1993)(Beynon-Davis, 1995) 
The underlying source of the failure was the lack of mitigation of 
risks [C7] and [A6] resulting in a lack of investment. 
Evidence of ignoring outside advice 
on tightness of timetable or high risk 
of system (Page, 1993) (Beynon-
Davies, 1995) 
The underling source of the failure was the lack of mitigation of 
risk [M5] and the inappropriate mitigation of [M2] and [M3]. 
Tendering process focused on price 
over quality (Page, 1993) 
The underlying source of the failure was the inappropriate 
mitigation of risks [M2] [M3] resulting inappropriate tendering 
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Appendix D - Risk Tables for Oil/Gas Case Study 
Risks from Support Manager Perspective 
Support Manager 
Risks 
There is a risk that Support manager will conflict with the change because in 
situations where external providers are not forthcoming in resolving support 
requests managerial time may be significantly diverted. 
SM1 
There is a risk that the Support Manager will conflict with the change because they 
perceive it will result in a downsizing of their department. This may occur because 
work may be perceived to require fewer resources (Systems engineers) since 
network/hardware support and back-ups is provided by external provider. 
SM2 
There is a risk that the Support manager may require additional resources (Systems 
Engineers) if staff experience & knowledge of ‘EC2’ administration results in 
slower work in comparison to local environment. 
SM3 
 There is a risk that Support manager will conflict with the change because they 
perceive the ‘EC2’ style provision to interfere with provision of SLA. This could 
occur because support is dependent upon: 
i) external provider that is out of their direct control.  
ii) it comprises a new technology that staff have little experience with. 
iii) There are additional uncertainties which impact service quality that is out of 
their direct control such as network connection between external service provider 
and customer. 
SM4 
Risks from Support Engineer Perspective 
Support Engineer 
Risks 
There is a risk that support engineers will conflict with the change because they 
may perceive it interferes with their role with respect to h/w, network and back-up 
support activities as a reduction in workload and thus a threat to their jobs. 
SE1 
There is a risk that support engineers will conflict with the change because they 
may perceive their interactions with external providers as time consuming and un-
enjoyable and a threat of being overworked 
SE2 
There is a risk that support engineers will conflict with the change because they 
perceive the change as the creation of additional unsatisfying work (the need to 
acquire new skills). 
SE3 
There is a risk that support engineers will not have enough experience & requisite 
knowledge of EC2 administration resulting in rework & increased time/effort to 
accomplish tasks. 
SE4 
There is a risk that support engineers will conflict with the change because changes 
result in employees being less hands-on with technology at a hardware, network 
and back-up level thus reducing their satisfaction. 
SE5 
There is a risk that support engineers will conflict with the change as reliance on 
external provider introduces dependence (and thus an uncontrollable uncertainty) 
to being perceived to be good at system support thus reducing certainty that they 
will be satisfied by their work. 
SE6 
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Risks from Sales / Marketing Perspective 
Sales / Marketing 
Risks 
There is a risk that sales/marketing will conflict with the change if they are not 
provided with suitable promotional resources. 
S1 
There is a risk that sales/marketing staff will conflict with the change because if 
they do not understand the benefits of the product to customers. 
S2 
There is a risk that sales/marketing will conflict with the change because if 
sales/marketing persons are set unrealistic goals with regards to selling the ‘EC2’ 
style offerings as this would compromise their satisfaction. 
S3 
Risks from Finance / Business Perspective 
Finance / Business Development 
Risks 
There is a risk that finance/business development staff will conflict with the change 
because calculating profits over a long-term period will become more uncertain 
unless costs are transferred directly to customer. 
F1 
There is a risk that finance staff will conflict with the change because profit 
calculations become more time consuming. This can occur if external provider 
charges are not directly passed to customer. This is because costs associated with 
consumption of bandwidth and processing power vary with extent of usage and may 
change with market forces. 
F2 
There is a risk that financial staff will conflict with the change because ‘EC2’ is 
perceived to decrease the financial soundness of the organisation by opening it to 
significant fluctuations in bandwidth and processing costs. 
F3 
Risks from Customer Relations Perspective 
Customer Relations Staff 
Risks 
Description No 
There is a risk of deterioration in customer care as in some situations it may take 
longer to resolve customer queries as cooperation with external service provider may 
be necessary. This may result in a backlog of work resulting in additional pressure 
being placed on staff. 
CR1 
There is a risk of deterioration in customer service quality if Customer relations staff 
are not given appropriate knowledge of ‘EC2’ style services. This may occur as 
effort would be wasted resulting in rework and wasted customer time resulting in a 
deterioration of customer service quality. 
 
CR2 
There is a risk that customer relationship staff will conflict with the change because 
the change may be perceived to compromise their satisfaction of providing fast and 
accurate responses to customers’ queries. The ‘EC2’ style deployment will create 
additional dependencies (with an external service provider) resulting in customer 
care being out of their direct control in situations related to h/w, network 
connectivity, and availability. 
CR3 
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Appendix E – Survey Questions 
 
 
Survey: Electronic Document Management Usage & 
Issues 
 
Introduction 
We are investigating the use of document management systems and the 
impact they have on peopleʼs work as part of a UK Strategic Initiative 
called LSCITS. 
 
Purpose 
The aim of this research is to understand peoplesʼ experiences of using 
document management systems and the impact they have on work. To 
address a need to develop cost-effective approaches that help 
practitioners understand and manage socio-complexity. 
 
Procedure 
We would be grateful if you could spend ten minutes of your time to share 
with us your views by completing this questionnaire. You may feel there is 
an element of repetition in some of the questions - this is necessary to 
ensure construct validity and is minimized as much as possible. 
 
Thanks, 
David Greenwood dsg22@cs.st-andrews.ac.uk 
PhD Student – Computer Science – University of St Andrews 
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Questionnaire Begins 
1. Please provide a short introduction to your role within <organisation>? 
 
 
2. Please describe your responsibilities? 
# Description  
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
 
3. What are your day-to-day activities? 
# Description Proportion of time 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
 
4. What are your most serious work challenges/problems? 
# Description  
1   
2   
3   
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4   
5   
6   
7   
 
5. Please describe your History with <SYSTEM>? 
 
 
6. Which of your activities and responsibilities does <SYSTEM> help you 
accomplish 
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8. How does <SYSTEM> help you accomplish your activities and responsibilities 
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9. What problems does using <SYSTEM> introduce to your work – how do you 
work around them?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. What aspects of <SYSTEM> impede your accomplishment of activities and 
responsibility? 
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Organisational Complexity 
1. Continuing investment, development and maintenance of <SYSTEM> 
_____________________ my interests, goals, responsibilities, or values 
Strongly 
interferes 
with 
  Neither 
interfere with 
nor facilitate 
  Strongly 
facilitates 
 
2. <SYSTEM> affects my working practices in ways that  
_____________________ my interests, goals, responsibilities, or values 
Strongly 
interfere 
with 
  Neither 
interfere with 
nor facilitate 
  Strongly 
facilitate 
 
3. <SYSTEM> affects my time in ways that _____________________ my 
interests, goals, responsibilities, or values 
Strongly 
interfere 
with 
  Neither 
interfere with 
nor facilitate 
  Strongly 
facilitate 
 
4. <SYSTEM> affects my ability to acquire sufficient or appropriate resources 
in ways that _______________________ my interests, goals, responsibilities, or 
values 
Strongly 
interfere 
with 
  Neither 
interfere with 
nor facilitate 
  Strongly 
facilitate 
 
5. <SYSTEM> affects my capabilities or skills in ways that 
_______________________ my interests, goals, responsibilities, or values 
Strongly 
interfere 
with 
  Neither 
interfere with 
nor facilitate 
  Strongly 
facilitate 
 
6. <SYSTEM> is _________ with my values e.g. privacy, confidentiality, risk 
aversion 
Strongly 
Incompatible 
  Neither 
Compatible / 
Incompatible 
  Strongly 
Compatible 
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7. <SYSTEM> _________ affects my job satisfaction 
Adversely   Neither 
favorably / 
adversely 
  Favorably 
 
8. <SYSTEM> _________ affects my status 
Adversely   Neither 
favorably / 
adversely 
  Favorably 
 
9. <SYSTEM> causes me to cooperate with people/groups where in the past 
there have been tensions or rivalries 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
agree/disagree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
 
10. The distribution of project benefits and drawbacks is ______ to me 
Unfair   Neither fair / 
unfair 
  Fair 
 
11. For me the benefits of <SYSTEM> are ________ its drawbacks  
Smaller 
than 
  Equal to   Greater 
than 
 
12. To what extent are you satisfied with <SYSTEM> 
Strongly 
Dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Slightly 
Dissatisfied 
Neither 
satisfied/ 
dissatisfied 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Satisfied Strongly 
Satisfied 
 
13. To what extent are you supportive of continuing investment, development and 
maintenance of <SYSTEM> 
Strongly 
unsupportive 
  Neither 
unsupportive 
or supportive 
  Strongly 
Supportive 
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14. To what extent is <SYSTEM> important to your interests, responsibilities, 
goal and values 
Very 
unimportant 
  Neither 
important or 
unimportant 
  Very 
Important 
 
15. To what extent do you feel ownership of <SYSTEM> 
None      Strong 
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Efficiency & Effectiveness 
1. <SYSTEM> affects my speed at accomplishing activities 
Significantly 
slower 
Slower Slightly 
slower 
Neither 
faster 
nor 
slower 
Slightly 
faster 
Faster Significantly 
faster 
 
2. <SYSTEM> affects my productivity 
Significantly 
worsen 
Worsen Slightly 
worsen 
Neither 
improve 
nor 
worsen 
Slightly 
Improve 
Improve Strongly 
Improve 
 
3. <SYSTEM> takes little effort to use on my part 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree/disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
4. <SYSTEM> creates me unnecessary work and thus wastes effort 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree/disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
5. To make <SYSTEM> fit the way I work I have to use work-arounds 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree/disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
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Information Quality 
1. The accuracy of information in <SYSTEM> is typically 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meets my 
needs 
 
2. The timeliness of information in <SYSTEM> is typically 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meets 
my 
needs 
 
3. The completeness of information in <SYSTEM> is typically 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meets 
my 
needs 
 
4. The relevance of information in <SYSTEM> is typically 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meets 
my 
needs 
 
5. The consistency of information in <SYSTEM> is typically 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meets 
my 
needs 
 
System Quality 
1. The reliability and uptime of <SYSTEM> is  
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
  Meets 
my 
needs 
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needs 
 
2. The user interface of <SYSTEM> is 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meets 
my 
needs 
 
3. The system features for finding relevant documents are 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meet my 
needs 
 
4. Ease of establishing accuracy and timeliness of documents 
Problematic   Neither 
problematic 
or meets my 
needs 
  Meets 
my 
needs 
 
Document Management Policy 
1. There is limited Understanding of policies and procedures 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. There is uncertainty of what and Where content should be stored 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
 
Support Service Quality 
1. Extent and timeliness of training provided 
Inadequate      Adequate 
 
2. Extent of your understanding of how <SYSTEM> can help you accomplish 
your responsibilities and activities 
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Insufficient      Sufficient 
 
3. To what extent are you informed about how <SYSTEM> can help accomplish 
your work 
Very 
uninformed 
Uninformed Slightly 
uninformed 
Neither 
informed 
nor 
uninformed 
Slightly 
informed 
Informed Very 
informed 
 
4. Extent of your feeling of involvement/participation with <SYSTEM> 
deployment 
Insufficient      Sufficient 
 
5. The processing of change requests is _______ 
Slow      Fast 
 
6. Time required for development of changes to <SYSTEM> is __________ 
Unreasonable      Reasonable 
5. Relationship with <SYSTEM> IT Staff is _____ 
Dissonant      Harmonious 
 
6. Attitude of <SYSTEM> IT Staff is ________ 
Belligerent      Cooperative 
 
7. Communication with <SYSTEM> IT Staff is ______________ 
Destructive      Productive 
 
8. The Quality of communication of <SYSTEM> IT staff 
Problematic      Excellent 
 
9. To what extent do you trust <SYSTEM> IT staff 
None      Strong 
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10. In the past the relationship between users and <SYSTEM> IT staff has been 
Conflictual      Cooperative 
 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please feel free to write comments in the space below and overleaf if 
necessary: 
 
 
